We empirically examine whether adopting a uniform set of accounting standards mitigates information frictions in financial markets and facilitates market integration. Using a difference‐in‐difference design, we find that after the mandatory adoption of IFRS local stock returns incorporate more global information and at a faster speed. The effect of IFRS adoption is stronger in countries where there are larger improvements in accounting comparability and for firms with a larger increase in foreign ownership. Overall, our results suggest that accounting standards harmonization facilitates financial market integration.

Theoretically, the implied cost of capital (ICC) is a good proxy for time-varying expected returns. We find that aggregate ICC strongly predicts future excess market returns at horizons ranging from one month to four years. This predictive power persists even in the presence of popular valuation ratios and business cycle variables, both in-sample and out-of-sample, and is robust to alternative implementations. We also find that ICCs of size and book-to-market portfolios predict corresponding portfolio returns.

We introduce the implied value premium ( IVP ), the difference between the implied costs of capital of value and growth stocks, to predict time variation in the ex post value premium. During 1977–2023, IVP is the strongest predictor of the ex post value premium. It also predicts the investment premium, consistent with the Investment CAPM. However, IVP ’s ability to predict the difference in cumulative abnormal returns around quarterly earnings announcements of value and growth stocks suggests that mispricing may also play a role. Overall, our results suggest that recent value underperformance reflects cyclical variation rather than a permanent shift.

We analyze a model in which traders have different trading opportunities and learn information from prices. The difference in trading opportunities implies that different traders may have different trading motives when trading in the same market—some trade for speculation and others for hedging—and thus they may respond to the same information in opposite directions. This implies that adding more informed traders may reduce price informativeness and therefore provides a source for learning complementarities leading to multiple equilibria and price jumps. Our model is relevant to various realistic settings and helps to understand a variety of modern financial markets.

We investigate whether voluntary corporate restrictions on insider trading effectively prevent insiders from exploiting their private information. Our results show that insiders of firms with seeming restrictions on insider trading continue to take advantage of positive private information while being more cautious when exploiting negative private information. The results suggest that insiders continue to exploit their informational advantages in a way that minimizes their legal risk. We also find that the degree of information asymmetry is significantly lower in firms with restriction policies and that corporate governance significantly affects firms' decisions to adopt these policies.