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Crashes, Volatility, and the Equity Premium: Lessons from S&P 500 Options

The Review of Economics and Statistics 2010 92(2), 435-451 open access
We use a novel pricing model to imply time series of diffusive volatility and jump intensity from S&P 500 index options. These two measures capture the ex ante risk assessed by investors. Using a simple general equilibrium model, we translate the implied measures of ex ante risk into an ex ante risk premium. The average premium that compensates the investor for the ex ante risks is 70% higher than the premium for realized volatility. The equity premium implied from option prices is shown to significantly predict subsequent stock market returns.

Heterogeneous Expectations and Bond Markets

Review of Financial Studies 2010 23(4), 1433-1466 open access
This paper presents a dynamic equilibrium model of bond markets in which two groups of agents hold heterogeneous expectations about future economic conditions. The heterogeneous expectations cause agents to take on speculative positions against each other and therefore generate endogenous relative wealth fluctuation. The relative wealth fluctuation amplifies asset price volatility and contributes to the time variation in bond premia. Our model shows that a modest amount of heterogeneous expectations can help explain several puzzling phenomena, including the “excessive volatility” of bond yields, the failure of the expectations hypothesis, and the ability of a tent-shaped linear combination of forward rates to predict bond returns.

Solving the Feldstein-Horioka Puzzle With Financial Frictions

Econometrica 2010 78(2), 603-632 open access
Unlike the prediction of a frictionless open economy model, long-term average savings and investment rates are highly correlated across countries—a puzzle first identified by Feldstein and Horioka (1980). We quantitatively investigate the impact of two types of financial frictions on this correlation. One is limited enforcement, where contracts are enforced by the threat of default penalties. The other is limited spanning, where the only asset available is noncontingent bonds. We find that the calibrated model with both frictions produces a savings–investment correlation and a volume of capital flows close to the data. To solve the puzzle, the limited enforcement friction needs low default penalties under which capital flows are much lower than those in the data, and the limited spanning friction needs to exogenously restrict capital flows to the observed level. When combined, the two frictions interact to endogenously restrict capital flows and thereby solve the Feldstein–Horioka puzzle.

Market conditions, default risk and credit spreads

Journal of Banking & Finance 2010 34(4), 743-753 open access
This study empirically examines the impact of the interaction between market and default risk on corporate credit spreads. Using credit default swap (CDS) spreads, we find that average credit spreads decrease in GDP growth rate, but increase in GDP growth volatility and jump risk in the equity market. At the market level, investor sentiment is the most important determinant of credit spreads. At the firm level, credit spreads generally rise with cash flow volatility and beta, with the effect of cash flow beta varying with market conditions. We identify implied volatility as the most significant determinant of default risk among firm-level characteristics. Overall, a major portion of individual credit spreads is accounted for by firm-level determinants of default risk, while macroeconomic variables are directly responsible for a lesser portion.

Helping Hand or Grabbing Hand? Central vs. Local Government Shareholders in Chinese Listed Firms

Review of Finance 2010 14(4), 669-694 open access
We analyze related party transactions between Chinese publicly listed firms and their state-owned shareholders to examine whether companies benefit or lose from the presence of government shareholders and politically connected directors. Minority shareholders seem to be expropriated in firms controlled by local governments, firms with a large proportion of local government directors on their board, firms without central government directors, and firms in provinces where local government bureaucrats are less likely to be prosecuted for corruption. In contrast, firms controlled by the central government (or having central government affiliated directors), benefit in related party transactions with their government parents.