Do political connections add value to audit firms? Evidence from IPO audits in China

I identify a “slope” factor in the cross section of commodity futures returns: high-basis commodity futures have higher loadings on this factor than low-basis commodity futures. Combined with a level factor (an index of commodity futures), this slope factor explains most of the average excess returns of commodity futures portfolios sorted by basis. More importantly, I find that this factor is significantly correlated with investment shocks, which represent the technological progress in producing new capital. I investigate a competitive dynamic equilibrium model of commodity production to endogenize this correlation. The model reproduces the cross-sectional futures returns and many asset pricing tests.

In capital-intensive industries, firms face complicated multi-staged financing, investment, and production decisions under the watchful eye of existing and potential industry rivals. In various representations of this environment, we show that a first-mover advantage in debt weakly dominates a first-mover advantage in capacity. Without a first-mover advantage in debt, the incumbent may suffer a dead-weight loss. When both the entrant and incumbent deploy debt prior to capacity, a first-mover in capacity benefits from softer competition. With a long-purse debt cost, leading in debt still remains advantageous.

Empirical studies of household portfolios show that young households, with little financial wealth, hold underdiversified portfolios that are concentrated in a small number of assets, a fact often attributed to behavioral biases. We present a potential rational alternative: we show that investors with little financial wealth, who receive labor income, rationally limit the number of assets they invest in when faced with financial constraints such as margin requirements and restrictions on borrowing. We provide theoretical and numerical support for our results and identify the ratio of financial wealth to labor income as a useful control variable for household portfolio studies.

Using a 2004 Chinese securities regulation that requires equity offering proposals to obtain the separate approval of voting minority shareholders, we examine whether giving minority shareholders increased control over corporate decisions helps to reduce value-decreasing corporate decisions for firms domiciled in weak investor protection countries. We find that the regulation deters management from submitting value-decreasing equity offering proposals in firms with higher mutual fund ownership. There is also weak evidence that minority shareholders are more likely to veto value-decreasing equity offering proposals in firms with higher mutual fund ownership in the post-regulation period. Overall, our evidence suggests that in weak investor protection countries, the effect of granting minority shareholders increased control over corporate decisions on the quality of corporate decisions depends on the composition of minority shareholders.

The scarcity of suitable proxies for asymmetric information has impeded empirical research from providing reliable evidence on whether information risk shapes equity pricing. In reexamining this unresolved question, we rely on firms’ geographic distance from financial centers to gauge information asymmetry. We provide strong, robust evidence supporting the prediction that equity financing is cheaper for firms nearer central locations, implying that investors rationally require more compensation when information asymmetry is worse. The equity pricing role of geographic proximity is economically large, with our coefficient estimates translating into firms located within 100 kilometers of the city center of the nearest of six major financial centers, or in their metropolitan statistical areas, enjoying equity financing costs that are seven basis points lower. Our inferences are insensitive to measuring both the cost of equity capital and distance in several ways, controlling for corporate governance quality, and addressing endogeneity. Collectively, our analysis suggests that investors discount the price that they pay for their securities to reflect the greater information asymmetry that ensues when firms are far from major financial centers.

We examine whether and how individual auditors affect audit outcomes using a large set of archival Chinese data. We analyze approximately 800 individual auditors and find that they exhibit significant variation in audit quality. The effects that individual auditors have on audit quality are both economically and statistically significant, and are pronounced in both large and small audit firms. We also find that the individual auditor effects on audit quality can be partially explained by auditor characteristics, such as educational background, Big N audit firm experience, rank in the audit firm, and political affiliation. Our findings highlight the importance of scrutinizing and understanding audit quality at the individual auditor level. Data Availability: Data used in this study are publicly available from the sources described herein.

We document that public firms participate more than private firms as buyers and sellers of assets in merger waves and their participation is affected more by credit spreads and aggregate market valuation. Public firm acquisitions realize higher gains in productivity, particularly for on‐the‐wave acquisitions and when the acquirer's stock is liquid and highly valued. Our results are not driven solely by public firms' better access to capital. Using productivity data from early in the firm's life, we find that better private firms subsequently select to become public. Initial size and productivity predict asset purchases and sales 10 and more years later.