This study extends extant research on the determinants of financial analyst bias by examining the role that political incentives play. Using a series of scheduled provincial political events in China, we document that analysts are significantly more likely to issue favorable recommendations or revise their recommendations upward during political event periods, and the effect of political events on optimism is larger for analysts employed by brokerage firms affiliated with politicians. Cross‐sectional evidence suggests that the impact of political events on analyst optimism is concentrated in those provinces where capital market development is a more important performance indicator for politicians or where the incumbent politicians face a pending promotion. Stock return analyses reveal that favorable recommendations issued during political event periods are significantly less profitable in the long run and are less credible according to investor perceptions. Reinforcing our main evidence, we also find that financial analysts are more likely to issue optimistic earnings forecasts during political event periods. Collectively, our results imply that political incentives distort analyst opinions and political‐economic factors affect the corporate information environment in China.

We study how professional fund managers’ growth expectations affect their equity investments and the consequent effects on prices. Using novel data on China’s mutual fund managers’ growth expectations, we show that pessimistic managers decrease equity allocations and shift away from more cyclical stocks. We identify a statistically significant link between managers’ growth expectations and returns on the stocks that they hold and trade. We also find that an earnings-based measure of price informativeness is increasing in forecasting managers’ investment and forecast-consistent trading, implying that active fund managers in China help move stock prices closer to underlying fundamentals.

We examine how digital disruption affects bank competition using the staggered rollout of 3G mobile networks. 3G expansion increased mobile banking adoption among tech‐savvy households, reducing branch networks—especially in younger counties. Banks' strategies diverged: Less branch‐reliant banks closed branches and competed on price, while more branch‐reliant banks maintained branches but raised spreads. A structural model shows that perceived digital service improvements among younger consumers drove these shifts, reducing welfare for older savers. Counterfactuals demonstrate that subsidizing adoption for older savers can cost‐effectively reduce these disparities, facilitating a smoother digital transition.

We measure financial literacy and study its impact on household use of digital finance using the 2015 and 2017 China Household Finance Survey. We find that financial literacy significantly boosts the use of digital finance, including mobile payments, online borrowing, and online financial products. This effect is more pronounced for online borrowing and online financial products than for mobile payments. This result suggests that the impact of financial literacy increases with the complexity of digital finance. Furthermore, financial literacy plays a more important role in promoting the use of digital financial services among disadvantaged groups, such as families with low income and wealth, the elderly, and residents in rural areas, compared with their counterparts.

This study examines the impact of political corruption on the provision of CEO risk-taking incentives. We hypothesize that firms adjust their CEO’s risk-taking incentives to reflect the influence of local political corruption on the firms’ desired level of risk-taking. Using U.S. Department of Justice data on local political corruption, we find that the sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock volatility (vega) is lower in firms located in high-corruption districts. The negative impact of corruption on vega is more pronounced among (1) firms operating in industries that are more dependent on government procurement, (2) firms operating in more innovative industries, and (3) firms without political connections. Our study offers new insights into how the institutional environment shapes executive compensation design. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.