We show that information exposure through international business networks enables firms to take proactive measures that benefit employees and potentially the local community. Specifically, in the early days of COVID‐19, firms that have business networks with China and Italy are more likely to be aware of the severity of the disease, and proactively implement work‐from‐home (“WFH”) policies that can protect their employees. Using Safegraph foot traffic data, we find a higher stay‐at‐home ratio before local governments impose lockdowns in zip codes where firms have a larger information exposure. These areas are also associated with a lower spread of COVID‐19. Our main findings are more pronounced when local governments face constraints in quickly responding to COVID‐19 and when firms have a higher WFH capability or have more investors with socially responsible preferences. Collectively, we present evidence on the role of private corporations in mitigating the negative effects of a public health crisis before government intervention.

An audit committee (AC) report is the primary channel through which investors learn about the responsibilities and activities of an AC. AC members may use personal language (“we”) or impersonal language (“the audit committee”) in an AC report. Psychology research suggests that personal (vs. impersonal) language signals that the language user has greater warmth and sense of communion (i.e., being part of a larger group). Applying this theory, we predict that an AC's use of personal (vs. impersonal) language leads investors to perceive a warmer and more communal AC, and that an AC's perceived warmth/communion (cued by personal language) positively impacts investor judgments. We further posit that the positive effect of personal language is stronger when AC compensation is largely short term than long term. This is because investors need more assurance of AC oversight effectiveness when AC compensation is short term, which makes investors rely more on heuristic cues such as AC language to make judgments. Consistent with this prediction, we find that when AC compensation is largely short term, nonprofessional investors (proxied by Master of Business Administration students) react more positively to an AC's use of personal language than impersonal language. The effect of AC language is insignificant when AC compensation is largely long term, as the long‐term compensation structure already provides assurance about the AC's oversight effectiveness, and thus, investors rely less on heuristic cues. Furthermore, we find that the perceived warmth of AC members explains the effect of AC language. Finally, our interviews with nonprofessional investors corroborate some of our main findings and validate their practice implications.

Corporate social responsibility (CSR) misconduct often negatively impacts firms and damages their reputation. Using data on U.S. listed firms from 2002 to 2018, we demonstrate that firms are more likely to establish board interlocks with firms that have better CSR performance after a CSR-related violation than with other firms. Furthermore, this relationship is more pronounced in violating firms that have a greater incentive to maintain their reputation than in other firms. We also find that the capital market and the media react positively to board interlock announcements by violating firms. However, we find no improvement in future CSR performance or a reduced likelihood of future CSR misconduct after the formation of such board interlocks. Altogether, our findings suggest that establishing board interlocks with firms that have better CSR performance is an effective signaling strategy for reputation management for firms engaging in CSR misconduct.

In this paper, we investigate value creation by hedge funds using Berk and van Binsbergen's (2015) value-added. We find that, on average, a hedge fund manager extracts $0.76 million per month from the market. We provide strong evidence of persistence in value creation by hedge fund managers. Of three skill indicators—skill ratio, fee ratio, and total compensation—we find that total compensation best identifies the skilled manager out-of-sample. Investors in value-creating funds benefit from a better risk–return payoff. While hedge funds operate in a less competitive market than mutual funds, incentive fees do not indicate greater skill. The value that hedge funds can extract from the market depends on both the profitability and scalability of the investment strategy.