We investigate how external credit market development affects corporate earnings management, by studying the impact of the U.S. interstate banking and branching deregulations on the intensity of accruals-based and real earnings management. We find that the banking and branching deregulations significantly decrease both accruals-based and real earnings-management intensity among firms in deregulated states. The effect is stronger for those deregulated states that have lower bank branch density before deregulation and states that have greater out-of-state bank entry after deregulation. The impact on corporate earnings management is channelled through increased banking competition and credit supply providing firms with easier access to external financing. The findings are robust to various endogeneity concerns. We further document that interstate banking and branching deregulations reduce the instances of financial results being subsequently affected by accounting restatements and improve firms’ information environment.

We study the impact of the recent government bailout, called Trouble Asset Relief Program (TARP), on bank accounting quality. By adopting a difference-in-difference (DID) method, we find a significantly positive impact of TARP on earnings management of recipient banks, compared with their non-recipient peers. Further, we observe that TARP-recipient banks engage more in earnings-decreasing manipulation rather than earnings-increasing manipulation. This behavior is more obvious for those banks that voluntarily request for TARP funds. Also, participant banks change their accounting strategy to manipulate earnings upwards after TARP funds are paid back. Our findings confirm our hypothesis that TARP-recipient banks are motivated to manipulate downwards (or hide some earnings) to obtain further favorable treatment by the program administrators.

Using a unique proprietary dataset of daily mutual fund trading records and the COVID-19 pandemic-triggered lockdown in Wuhan (China) as a natural experiment, we find that individual mutual fund investors in Wuhan significantly reduced their daily trading frequency, total investment of their portfolios, and risk level of their invested funds during the lockdown period as compared to investors in other cities. The results suggest that the elimination of face-to-face interaction among individual investors during the lockdown reduced their information sharing, which led to more conservatism in their financial trading. We rule out alternative explanations of salience bias due to limited investor attention and temporary changes in personal circumstances such as depression and/or income reduction, during the lockdown period. Finally, consistent with the theory of naïve investor trading, we also find that investors received higher trading returns during the lockdown as they reduced trading aggressively in the absence of face-to-face interactions.