This paper investigates tax effects in the Canadian government bond market during the period 1964—1986. Unlike previous studies, we apply both statistical and nonstatistical teststo analyze clientele effects and market equilibria. The results divide the sample into two distinct periods of time, with the end of 1976 marking the division. We find that tax effects are almost nonexistent in the Canadian government bond market before the end of 1976, but are predominant in the post-1976 period. Non-segmented market equilibria cannot be rejected before 1977, but are strongly rejected after 1976. In fact, segmented equilibria with clientele effects in both quantities and prices characterize the entire five year period from 1982 to 1986. These findings are consistent with tax reforms, government deficit financing and interest rate fluctuations in Canada during our sample period.

Operating performance and stock return results imply that managers who commit fraud anticipate large stock price declines if they were to report truthfully, which would cause greater losses for managerial stockholdings than for options because of differences in convexity. Fraud firms have significantly greater incentives from unrestricted stockholdings than control firms do, and unrestricted stockholdings are their largest incentive source. Our results emphasize the importance of the shape and vesting status of incentive payoffs in providing incentives to commit fraud. Fraud firms also have characteristics that suggest a lower likelihood of fraud detection, which implies lower expected costs of fraud.