This paper links existence of the pyramidal ownership structure to tunneling and propping. Tunneling refers to a transfer of resources from a lower-level firm to a higher-level firm in the pyramidal chain, whereas propping concerns a transfer in the opposite direction intended to bail out the receiving firm from bankruptcy. We show that tunneling alone cannot justify the pyramidal structure unless outside investors are myopic, since rational outside investors anticipate tunneling and adjust their willingness-to-pay for the firm’s shares accordingly. With propping, however, they may be willing to be expropriated in exchange for implicit insurance against bankruptcy.

Standard economic models assume that the demand for expert predictions arises only under the conditions in which individuals are uncertain about the underlying process generating the data and there is a strong belief that past performances predict future performances. We set up the strongest possible test of these assumptions. In contrast to the theoretical suggestions made in the literature, people are willing to pay for predictions of truly random outcomes after witnessing only a short streak of accurate predictions live in the lab. We discuss potential explanations and implications of such irrational learning in the contexts of economics and finance.

We design an experiment to study the implications of information networks for incentives to acquire costly information, market liquidity, investors' earnings, and asset price characteristics in a financial market. Social communication crowds out information production as a result of an agent's temptation to free ride on the signals purchased by her neighbors. Although information exchange among traders increases trading volume, improves liquidity, and enhances the ability of asset prices to reflect the available information in the market, it fails to improve price informativeness. Net earnings and social welfare are higher with information sharing due to reduced acquisition of costly signals.