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Would a Balanced PCAOB Inspection Approach Increase Auditors' Use of Innovative Audit Procedures?

Contemporary Accounting Research 2026 open access
Prior research criticizes PCAOB inspection reports for focusing solely on audit deficiencies, arguing that this encourages auditors to pursue traditional procedures to demonstrate compliance with standards rather than procedures that maximize audit quality. We contribute to this debate by examining whether the PCAOB's approach discourages auditors from considering innovative audit procedures (that are potentially more effective), since they are, by definition, less standard. We compare the PCAOB's current inspection approach (which focuses on reporting audit deficiencies) to a balanced inspection approach that discloses examples of audit strengths as well as deficiencies discovered during inspections. We predict and find that when the risk of material misstatement (RMM) is moderate, a balanced inspection approach leads auditors to consider the potential effectiveness of innovative audit procedures to a greater extent, ultimately prioritizing more of them in audit plans. Our findings contribute to both research and practice by enhancing our understanding of ways to encourage audit innovation and ultimately improve overall audit quality.

Auditor communication on critical audit matters: Timing, inspection likelihood, and the audit committee

Contemporary Accounting Research 2024 41(2), 976-999 open access
In response to the extended audit report regulations implemented in the United States and internationally, both audit firms and regulators have increased scrutiny over critical audit matters/key audit matters (collectively referred to as CAMs) through internal and external inspections. At the same time, auditors and audit committees (ACs) have altered the content and timing of CAM‐related discussions by communicating specific planned audit procedures earlier in the audit process. This study explores the effect of early communication of CAM‐related audit procedures to the AC and increased scrutiny from inspections on auditors' propensity to adjust planned audit procedures in the presence of newly identified audit risks. Based on self‐justification theory, we predict and find that early communication of planned audit procedures to the AC causes auditors to be less likely to adjust planned audit procedures even when additional risks arise that necessitate change, especially when inspection is likely. This has the potential for diminished audit quality. Interviews with audit partners provide context for how these findings relate to the current auditing environment.

Motivated Perspective Taking: Why Prompting Auditors to Take an Investor's Perspective Makes Them Treat Identified Audit Differences as Less Material*

Contemporary Accounting Research 2022 39(1), 339-370 open access
Audit regulators and commentators propose prompting auditors to more fully take an investor's perspective as a remedy to their concern that auditors underreact to material misstatements. By contrast, we predict that prompting auditors in this manner will backfire, making them less (more) heavily weight indicia that misstatements are (not) material. We further predict auditors will apply this asymmetric weighting instrumentally —to a greater degree as needed—to justify management‐preferred conclusions. We test these predictions in two experiments in which in‐charge audit seniors judge the likelihood that identified audit differences are material and choose required adjustment amounts. Between‐participants, we manipulate whether or not auditors are prompted to take an investor's perspective and, within‐participants, whether these audit differences would or would not violate a qualitative criterion—by breaking or not breaking a favorable profitability trend. Study 1 uses a context in which a relatively low degree of motivated perspective taking is needed, as the audit difference is just below tolerable misstatement (TM). Investor‐prompted auditors assess audit differences as less likely to be material than do unprompted auditors, but only when the qualitative criterion is not violated. Study 2 adds a between‐participant manipulation of misstatement tolerability—that is, whether the audit difference is just below or well above TM. Consistent with an instrumental increase in motivated perspective taking, investor‐prompted auditors assess audit differences that simultaneously are less tolerable and violate a qualitative criterion as significantly less likely to be material. Overall, our theory and experimental evidence suggest prompting auditors to take the investor perspective may have unintended consequences.