We have constructed a simple two‐sector model of the demand for housing and corporate capital. Economic growth and an increase in the inflation rate were then simulated with a number of model variants. The model and simulation experiments illustrate both the tax bias in favor of housing and the manner in which the increase in inflation between 1965 and 1978 magnified it. The existence of capital‐market constraints offsets the bias against corporate capital, but it introduces a sharp, inefficient reallocation of housing from less wealthy, constrained households to wealthy households who do not have gains on mortgages and are not financially constrained.

BANKRUPTCY COSTS are the deadweight economic costs of firms going bankrupt. They include both ex post bankruptcy costs incurred after a firm's bankruptcy filing, such as transactions costs, and ex ante bankruptcy costs incurred before the filing, such as those resulting from creditors' attempts to reduce their losses if bankruptcy occurs and/or managers' attempts to raise the expected return to equity by increasing the firm's risk.1 This paper has two purposes. First it proposes a model of bankruptcy costs which focuses on the costs of inefficient decision making before the firm's actual bankruptcy filing. The model implies upper bound expressions for total bankruptcy costs. Second, the new U.S. Bankruptcy Code2 went into effect late in 1979 and made important changes in bankruptcy reorganization procedures. The paper poses the question of whether the changes made under the new Code tend to raise or lower aggregate U.S. bankruptcy costs. We approach this question by calculating the upper bound expressions suggested by the model, using parameter values from both before and after the new Code took effect.

In this paper we extend the recent work on the choice of input mix under uncertainty. In particular, we demonstrate that the qualitative nature of the disturbance term, along with the decision sequence, is a crucial determinant of the overall effect of uncertainty on the optimal input mix of a firm. Using general demand and production functions in conjunction with a mean-variance framework for financial valuation, we demonstrate the differential effects of systematic and non-systematic risk on the firm's choice of an optimal input mix. Consistent with earlier work in economics, this analysis demonstrates that uncertainty, regardless of the source, has important implications for the firm's choice of technology.

In this paper we examine the factors affecting the structure of executives' compensation packages. We focus particularly on the role of various types of delayed compensation as means of “bonding” executives to their firms. The basic problem is to design a compensation package that rewards actions that are in the long‐run interest of the stockholders. Firms must take into account their ability to discern unfortunate circumstances from mismanagement, the extent to which a compensation package forces the executive to face risks beyond his control, and the willingness of a given executive to bear this risk. We use our theory to interpret some executive compensation data from the early 1970s.

In the United States, local government expenditures are heavily sub- sidized through a variety of sources. This paper explores theoretically and then simulates empirically the effects of eliminating either of two federal subsidies encouraging local government expenditures: (1) income tax deductibility of local tax payments, and (2) the tax exempt status of interest on municipal bonds.