We trace the impact of formative experiences on portfolio choice. Plausibly exogenous variation in workers’ exposure to a depression allows us to identify the effects and a new estimation approach makes addressing wealth and income effects possible. We find that adversely affected workers are less likely to invest in risky assets. This result is robust to a number of control variables and it holds for individuals whose income, employment, and wealth were unaffected. The effects travel through social networks: individuals whose neighbors and family members experienced adverse circumstances also avoid risky investments.

Financial investment behavior is highly correlated between parents and their children. Using Swedish data, we find that the decision of adoptees to hold equities is associated with the behavior of both biological and adoptive parents, implying a role for both genetic and environmental influences. However, we find that nurture has a stronger influence on the share of financial assets invested in equities and on portfolio volatility, suggesting that financial risk‐taking is substantially environmentally determined. The parental investment variables substantially increase the explanatory power of cross‐sectional regressions and so may play an important role in understanding cross‐sectional heterogeneity in investment behavior.

We introduce the class of linear‐rational term structure models in which the state price density is modeled such that bond prices become linear‐rational functions of the factors. This class is highly tractable with several distinct advantages: (i) ensures nonnegative interest rates, (ii) easily accommodates unspanned factors affecting volatility and risk premiums, and (iii) admits semi‐analytical solutions to swaptions. A parsimonious model specification within the linear‐rational class has a very good fit to both interest rate swaps and swaptions since 1997 and captures many features of term structure, volatility, and risk premium dynamics—including when interest rates are close to the zero lower bound.

This paper provides an explanation for why garbage implies a much lower relative risk aversion in the consumption‐based asset pricing model than National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) consumption expenditure: Unlike garbage, NIPA consumption is filtered to mitigate measurement error. I apply a simple model of the filtering process that allows one to undo the filtering inherent in NIPA consumption. “Unfiltered NIPA consumption” well explains the equity premium and is priced in the cross‐section of stock returns. I discuss the likely properties of true consumption (i.e., without measurement error and filtering) and quantify implications for habit and long‐run risk models.

We study intraday market intermediation in an electronic market before and during a period of large and temporary selling pressure. On May 6, 2010, U.S. financial markets experienced a systemic intraday event—the Flash Crash—where a large automated selling program was rapidly executed in the E‐mini S&P 500 stock index futures market. Using audit trail transaction‐level data for the E‐mini on May 6 and the previous three days, we find that the trading pattern of the most active nondesignated intraday intermediaries (classified as High‐Frequency Traders) did not change when prices fell during the Flash Crash.

Using error‐free data on life‐cycle portfolio allocations of a large sample of Norwegian households, we document a double adjustment as households age: a rebalancing of the portfolio composition away from stocks as they approach retirement and stock market exit after retirement. When structurally estimating an extended life‐cycle model, the parameter combination that best fits the data is one with a relatively large risk aversion, a small per‐period participation cost, and a yearly probability of a large stock market loss in line with the frequency of stock market crashes in Norway.

We examine how an increase in stock option grants affects CEO risk‐taking. The overall net effect of option grants is theoretically ambiguous for risk‐averse CEOs. To overcome the endogeneity of option grants, we exploit institutional features of multiyear compensation plans, which generate two distinct types of variation in the timing of when large increases in new at‐the‐money options are granted. We find that, given average grant levels during our sample period, a 10% increase in new options granted leads to a 2.8% to 4.2% increase in equity volatility. This increase in risk is driven largely by increased leverage.

I decompose the variation of credit spreads for corporate bonds into changing expected returns and changing expectation of credit losses. Using a log‐linearized pricing identity and a vector autoregression applied to microlevel data from 1973 to 2011, I find that expected returns contribute to the cross‐sectional variance of credit spreads nearly as much as expected credit loss does. However, most of the time‐series variation in credit spreads for the market portfolio corresponds to risk premiums.

We study the design of credit default swaps (CDS) auctions, which determine the payments by CDS sellers to CDS buyers following defaults of bonds. Using a simple model, we find that the current design of CDS auctions leads to biased prices and inefficient allocations. This is because various restrictions imposed in CDS auctions prevent certain investors from participating in the price discovery and allocation process. The imposition of a price cap or floor also gives dealers large influence on the final auction price. We propose an alternative double auction design that delivers more efficient price discovery and allocations.

During the 2008–2009 financial crisis, firms with high social capital, as measured by corporate social responsibility (CSR) intensity, had stock returns that were four to seven percentage points higher than firms with low social capital. High‐CSR firms also experienced higher profitability, growth, and sales per employee relative to low‐CSR firms, and they raised more debt. This evidence suggests that the trust between a firm and both its stakeholders and investors, built through investments in social capital, pays off when the overall level of trust in corporations and markets suffers a negative shock.