Abbie J. Smith, The SEC "Reversal" of FASB Statement No. 19: An Investigation of Information Effects, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 19, Studies on Standardization of Accounting Practices: An Assessment of Alternative Institutional Arrangements (1981), pp. 174-211

I investigate changes in operating performance after 58 management buyouts of public companies completed during 1977–1986. Operating returns increase significantly from the year before to the year after buyouts as measured by operating cash flows (before interest and taxes) per employee and per dollar of operating assets. Subsequent changes in operating returns suggest that this increase is sustained. Adjustments in the management of working capital contribute to the increase in operating returns. The increase is not, however, the result of layoffs or reductions in expenditures for advertising, maintenance and repairs, research and development, or property, plant, and equipment.

Relative performance evaluation, Firm performance, Peer group evaluation, Corporate executives

Executive compensation, Contracting, Stock options

This article studies the impact of accounting regulation on the stock market in the context of oil and gas companies. The issuance of the Exposure Draft was associated with a "moderate" downward revision of security prices of oil and gas firms, especially full-costers. Moreover, that the underlying market effect is of greater consequence than his tests reveal. Since substantial uncertainty with respect to the financial-statement impact of the proposed accounting change and its adoption by the U.S. Financial Accounting Standards Board and the Securities and Exchange Commission existed during test period, results understate the importance of the accounting change to the capital market. Furthermore, doubts regarding the validity of three assumptions upon which the analysis of individual stock-return behavior depends jeopardize the interpretation of results. In the light of difficulties with regard to the validity of assumptions, it appears to be crucial to investigate the robustness of his procedure over an extensive Pre-Announcement period.

This paper examines the empirical relation between corporate ownership structure and innovation. We test the hypothesis that diffusely-held firms are less innovative than firms with either a high concentration of management ownership or a significant equity block held by an outside investor. Overall, the evidence indicates that diffusely-held firms are less innovative along the dimensions we examine: patent activity, growth by acquisition versus internal development, and timing of long-term investment spending. These results are consistent with the conjecture that concentrated ownership and shareholder monitoring are effective at alleviating the high agency and contracting costs associated with innovation.

This paper investigates share price reactions of parent firms to announcements of public offerings of stock of wholly-owned subsidiaries. The average abnormal gains associated with ‘equity carve-out’ announcements contrast with the average abnormal losses documented here and elsewhere upon announcements of public offerings of parent equity. Four features distinguishing equity carve-outs from parent equity offerings are discussed. Evidence is provided on these features as potential explanations for the positive average share price reaction associated with announcements of equity carve-outs.