Analysts follow disproportionally firms whose fundamentals correlate more with those of their industry peers. This coverage pattern supports models of profit-maximizing information intermediaries producing preferentially information valuable in pricing more stocks. We designate highly followed firms whose fundamentals best predict those of peer firms as bellwether firms. When analysts revise a bellwether firm's earning forecast, it changes the prices of other firms significantly; however, revisions for firms that are less intensely followed do not change the prices of heavily followed firms. Unidirectional information spillovers explain how the more accurately priced stocks might exhibit more comovement.

John Mutti, Bernard Yeung, Section 337 and the Protection of Intellectual Property in the United States: The Complainants and the Impact, The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 78, No. 3 (Aug., 1996), pp. 510-520

Around the world, large corporations usually have controlling owners, who are usually very wealthy families. Outside the U.S. and the U.K., pyramidal control structures, cross shareholding and super voting rights are common. Using these devices, a family can control corporations without making a commensurate capital investment. In many countries, such families end up controlling considerable proportions of their countries'' economies. Three points emerge. First, at the firm level, these ownership structures vest dominant control rights with families who often have little real capital invested n creating agency and entrenchment problem simultaneously. In addition, controlling shareholders can divert corporate resources for private benefits using transactions within the pyramidal group. The result is a poor utilization of resources. At the economy level, extensive control of corporate assets by a few families distorts capital allocation and reduces the rate of innovation. The result is an economy-wide misallocation of resources, and slower economic growth.

Stock prices move together more in poor economies than in rich economies. This finding is not due to market size and is only partially explained by higher fundamentals correlation in low-income economies. However, measures of property rights do explain this difference. The systematic component of returns variation is large in emerging markets, and appears unrelated to fundamentals co-movement, consistent with noise trader risk. Among developed economy stock markets, higher firm-specific returns variation is associated with stronger public investor property rights. We propose that strong property rights promote informed arbitrage, which capitalizes detailed firm-specific information.

We observe less efficient capital allocation in countries whose banking systems are more thoroughly controlled by tycoons or families. The magnitude of this effect is similar to that of state control over banking. Unlike state control, tycoon or family control also correlates with slower economic and productivity growth, greater financial instability, and worse income inequality. These findings are consistent with theories that elite-capture of a country’s financial system can embed “crony capitalism.”

Extant literature suggests that bank monitoring improves corporate governance. This paper demonstrates that inefficiency in banking can also significantly reduce the equity capital markets' disciplinary power. Specifically, we show that in an environment in which the banking system is dominated by inefficient state-owned banks, controlling shareholders' tunneling activity is positively associated with firms' bank loan access. This relation is particularly strong in firms with high borrowing capacity, as measured by tangibility, and in regions where the banking industry is severely inefficient. As firms with high tunneling can continue to receive new loans with interest cost compatible to others, equity capital market disciplinary forces do not apply to them. Indeed, we further show that through tunneling, bank financing is negatively associated with future firm performance. These results suggest that, for an economy to develop mature capital markets, it is imperative to improve banking efficiency because its inefficiency dilutes the monitoring role of the market.

We document a robust cross‐sectional positive association across industries between a measure of the economic efficiency of corporate investment and the magnitude of firm‐specific variation in stock returns. This finding is interesting for two reasons, neither of which is a priori obvious. First, it adds further support to the view that firm‐specific return variation gauges the extent to which information about the firm is quickly and accurately reflected in share prices. Second, it can be interpreted as evidence that more informative stock prices facilitate more efficient corporate investment.

Disequilibrating macro shocks affect different firms’ prospects differently, increasing idiosyncratic variation in forward-looking stock returns before affecting economic growth. Consistent with most such shocks from 1947 to 2020 enhancing productivity, increased idiosyncratic stock return variation forecasts next-quarter real GDP growth, industrial production growth, and consumption growth both in-sample and out-of-sample. These effects persist after controlling for other leading economic indicators.

Roll [1988] observes low R 2 statistics for common asset pricing models due to vigorous firm‐specific return variation not associated with public information. He concludes that this implies “either private information or else occasional frenzy unrelated to concrete information”[p. 56]. We show that firms and industries with lower market model R 2 statistics exhibit higher association between current returns and future earnings, indicating more information about future earnings in current stock returns. This supports Roll's first interpretation: higher firm‐specific return variation as a fraction of total variation signals more information‐laden stock prices and, therefore, more efficient stock markets.

China’s monetary stimulation after the global financial crisis rapidly boosted its GDP. We argue that its efficacy derives from state control over its banking and corporate sectors. Beijing ordered state-owned banks to lend and they lent. Beijing ordered centrally-controlled state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to invest and they invested. Our data show much of this investment was highly leveraged purchases of real estate and land prices rises occurred where these SOEs were active buyers. This episode mimics the credit channel for monetary policy, but actually entails internal transfers between arms of the government pressuring on real estate prices upwards.