[How are governance practices propagated across firms? This article proposes, and empirically verifies, that observed governance practices are partly the outcome of network effects among firms with common directors. While firms attempt to select directors whose other directorships are at firms with similar governance practices ("familiarity effect"), this matching of governance practices is imperfect because other factors also affect the director choice. This generates an "influence effect" as directors acquainted with different practices at other firms influence the firm's governance to move toward the practices of those other firms. These network effects cause governance practices to converge.]

How are governance practices propagated across firms? This article proposes, and empirically verifies, that observed governance practices are partly the outcome of network effects among firms with common directors. While firms attempt to select directors whose other directorships are at firms with similar governance practices (“familiarity effect”), this matching of governance practices is imperfect because other factors also affect the director choice. This generates an “influence effect” as directors acquainted with different practices at other firms influence the firm's governance to move toward the practices of those other firms. These network effects cause governance practices to converge.

This paper empirically examines how CEO optimism affects earnings smoothing and earnings surprises. The main finding is that optimistic managers smooth earnings more than rational managers and are associated with smaller (in absolute value) earnings surprises. A possible theoretical explanation is offered for these results based on a combination of the “torpedo effect,” the innate behavior of optimists, and the risk of litigation/prosecution for over-reporting earnings.

This paper examines the interplay among bank liquidity creation (which incorporates all bank on- and off-balance sheet activities), monetary policy, and financial crises. We find that: (1) high liquidity creation (relative to trend) – particularly off-balance sheet liquidity creation – helps predict crises, controlling for other factors; (2) monetary policy has statistically significant, but economically minor effects on liquidity creation by small banks during normal times, and these effects are even weaker during financial crises; (3) monetary policy has very little effects on medium and large bank liquidity creation during both normal times and crises. These findings suggest that authorities may wish to monitor bank liquidity creation closely in order to predict and perhaps lessen the likelihood of financial crises. They might also consider other tools to control bank liquidity creation, such as capital and liquidity requirements.

This paper empirically examines how capital affects a bank’s performance (survival and market share) and how this effect varies across banking crises, market crises, and normal times that occurred in the US over the past quarter century. We have two main results. First, capital helps small banks to increase their probability of survival and market share at all times (during banking crises, market crises, and normal times). Second, capital enhances the performance of medium and large banks primarily during banking crises. Additional tests explore channels through which capital generates these effects. Numerous robustness checks and additional tests are performed.

Although the modern theory of financial intermediation portrays liquidity creation as an essential role of banks, comprehensive measures of bank liquidity creation do not exist. We construct four measures and apply them to data on virtually all U.S. banks from 1993 to 2003. We find that bank liquidity creation increased every year and exceeded $2.8 trillion in 2003. Large banks, multibank holding company members, retail banks, and recently merged banks created the most liquidity. Bank liquidity creation is positively correlated with bank value. Testing recent theories of the relationship between capital and liquidity creation, we find that the relationship is positive for large banks and negative for small banks.

We use novel monthly survey data from 1993 to 2012 on small business managerial perceptions of financial constraints and other conditions, matched with information on banks in their local markets. The data suggest that small banks have comparative advantages in alleviating these constraints. These advantages tend to be greater during adverse economic conditions and do not appear to decrease or increase secularly. Small banks also appear to have comparative advantages in providing liquidity insurance to small business customers of large banks experiencing liquidity shocks during financial crises. Our findings suggest a source of social costs from ongoing consolidation of the banking industry. Received December 28, 2015; editorial decision January 13, 2017 by Editor Philip Strahan.

We use novel monthly survey data from 1993 to 2012 on small business managerial perceptions of financial constraints and other conditions, matched with information on banks in their local markets. The data suggest that small banks have comparative advantages in alleviating these constraints. These advantages tend to be greater during adverse economic conditions and do not appear to decrease or increase secularly. Small banks also appear to have comparative advantages in providing liquidity insurance to small business customers of large banks experiencing liquidity shocks during financial crises. Our findings suggest a source of social costs from ongoing consolidation of the banking industry.

[Existing research shows that significantly more acquisitions occur when stock markets are booming than when markets are depressed. Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) hypothesize that firm-specific and market-wide (mis-)valuations lead to an excess of mergers, and these will be value destroying. This article investigates whether acquisitions occurring during booming markets are fundamentally different from those occurring during depressed markets. We find that acquirers buying during high-valuation markets have significantly higher announcement returns but lower long-run abnormal stock and operating performance than those buying during low-valuation markets. We investigate possible explanations for the long-run underperformance and conclude it is consistent with managerial herding.]

We ask whether past macro-economic and bank-specific shocks experienced and survived by a bank affect its current capitalization and risk-taking. Using Call Report data from 1984 to 2010, we find that a bank's experience shapes its capital structure and risk appetite. Banks that have survived periods of undercapitalization tend to implement higher equity ratios and take less risk in the periods following such crises, as measured by net charge-offs, non-performing loans, or earnings volatility 10-25 years later. However, observing high rates of failure among other banks stirs banks in the opposite direction. The evidence is suggestive of institutional memory affecting banks' capital and risk-taking.