This paper studies how firm disclosure activity affects the relation between current annual stock returns, contemporaneous annual earnings and future earnings. Our results show that firms with relatively more informative disclosures “bring the future forward” so that current returns reflect more future earnings news. We also find that changes in disclosure activity are positively related to changes in the importance of future earnings news for current returns. These results suggest that a firm’s disclosure activity reveals credible, relevant information not in current earnings, and that this information is incorporated into the current stock price.

Accounting rules for valuing retained interest from securitizations require management to make assumptions concerning discount rates, default rates, and prepayment rates. These assumptions provide management with discretion to determine the “gain on sale” of the receivables. We investigate whether CEO compensation is less sensitive to securitization gains than to other earnings components in the presence of proxies for how independent (outsiders, females, fewer CEO-selected directors) and informed (financial expertise) directors are. Overall, our results do not suggest that better “monitoring” reduces earnings management or CEO pay-sensitivity to reported securitization gains. Our results suggest that CEOs are rewarded for the gains they report and boards do not intervene.

Calls for eliminating differences between accounting earnings and taxable income in the US have been debated extensively. Proponents of increased book-tax conformity argue that tax compliance will increase and earnings quality will improve. Opponents argue that earnings quality will decline. We examine whether the level of required book-tax conformity affects earnings persistence and the association between earnings and future cash flows. We develop a comprehensive book-tax conformity measure and find that earnings have lower persistence and a lower association with future cash flows when conformity is higher. Our evidence suggests that increased book-tax conformity may reduce earnings quality.

Prior research documents that mergers and acquisitions result in significant financial reporting risks. In this article, we examine whether acquirers that share a common auditor with the target experience higher post‐acquisition financial reporting quality (FRQ) and reduced audit fees. We find that same‐office, but not different‐office, common auditors are associated with improved post‐acquisition FRQ, as evidenced by a decreased likelihood of misstatement, lower F ‐score, and a lower likelihood of meeting or just beating analyst forecasts. We also find that same‐office common auditors are associated with a lower percentage change in audit fees. In additional tests, we find that these inferences are robust to limiting the sample to acquirers with multiple acquisitions or to acquirers and targets with no auditor switches in the prior 3 years. Together, our findings suggest that same‐office common auditors facilitate knowledge transfer about the target and provide important post‐acquisition benefits.

Prior studies use fundamental earnings forecasts to proxy for the market's expectations of earnings because analyst forecasts are biased and are available for only a subset of firms. We find that as a proxy for market expectations, fundamental forecasts contain systematic measurement errors analogous to those in analysts' biased forecasts. Therefore, these forecasts are not representative of investors' beliefs. The systematic measurement errors from using fundamental forecasts to proxy for market expectations occur because investors misweight the information in many firm‐level variables when estimating future earnings, but fundamental forecasts are formed using the historically efficient weights on firm‐level variables. Thus, we develop an alternative ex ante proxy for the market's expectations of future earnings (“the implied market forecast”) using the historical (and inefficient) weights, as reflected in stock returns, that the market places on firm‐level variables. A trading strategy based on the implied market forecast error, which is measured as the difference between the implied market forecast and the fundamental forecast, generates excess returns of approximately 9 percent per year. These returns cannot be explained by investors' reliance on analysts' biased forecasts. Overall, our results reveal that market expectations differ from both fundamental forecasts and analysts' forecasts.