If controlling shareholders can divert profits, equity ownership is more concentrated the higher the stock returns correlation. A higher returns correlation reduces the benefits of diversification, giving rise to both a higher investment by the controlling shareholder in the asset that he controls and a lower investment by the non-controlling shareholders. The empirical analysis supports the predictions of the model: equity ownership is more concentrated in countries where the stock returns correlation is higher; moreover the intensity of the relationship between the stock returns correlation and ownership concentration is amplified by poor investor protection.

In this paper we study the optimal design of credit derivative contracts when banks have private information about their ability in the loan market and are subject to capital requirements. First, we prove that when banks are subject to a maximum loss capital requirement the optimal signaling contract is a binary credit default basket. Second, we show that if credit derivative markets are opaque then banks cannot commit to terminal-date risk exposure, and therefore the optimal signaling contract is more costly. The above results allow us to discuss the potential implications of different capital adequacy rules for the credit derivative markets.

Central clearing counterparties (CCPs) were established to mitigate default losses resulting from counterparty risk in derivatives markets. In a parsimonious model, we show that clearing benefits are unevenly distributed across market participants. Loss sharing rules determine who wins or loses from clearing. Current rules disproportionately benefit market participants with flat portfolios. Instead, those with directional portfolios are relatively worse off, consistent with their reluctance to voluntarily use central clearing. Alternative loss sharing rules can address cross-sectional disparities in clearing benefits. However, we show that CCPs may favor current rules to maximize fee income, with externalities on clearing participation.

We derive three testable predictions from a bank-P2P lender model of competition: (a) P2P lending grows when some banks are faced with exogenously higher regulatory costs; (b) P2P loans are riskier than bank loans; and (c) the risk-adjusted interest rates on P2P loans are lower than those on bank loans. We test these predictions against data on P2P loans and the consumer bank credit market in Germany and find empirical support. Overall, our analysis indicates that P2P lenders are bottom fishing, especially when regulatory shocks create a competitive disadvantage for some banks.

Standard tests of portfolio efficiency neglect the existence of illiquid wealth. The most important illiquid asset in household portfolios is housing: if housing stock adjustments are infrequent, optimal portfolios in periods of no adjustment are affected by housing price risk through a hedge term and tests for portfolio efficiency of financial assets must be run conditionally upon housing wealth. We use Italian household portfolio data and time series on financial assets and housing stock returns to assess whether actual portfolios are efficient. We find that housing wealth plays a key role in determining whether portfolios chosen by homeowners are efficient.

We address the issue of the efficiency of household portfolios in the presence of housing risk. We treat housing stock as an asset and rents as a stochastic liability stream: over the life cycle, households can be short or long in their net-housing position. Efficient financial portfolios are the sum of a standard Markowitz portfolio and a housing risk hedge term that multiplies net housing wealth. Our empirical results show that net housing plays a key role in determining which household portfolios are inefficient. The largest proportion of inefficient portfolios obtains among those with positive net housing, who should invest more in stocks.

We employ a representative sample of 80,972 Italian firms to forecast the drop in profits and the equity shortfall triggered by the COVID-19 lockdown. A 3-month lockdown generates an aggregate yearly drop in profits of about 10% of GDP, and 17% of sample firms, which employ 8.8% of the sample's employees, become financially distressed. Distress is more frequent for small and medium-sized enterprises, for firms with high pre-COVID-19 leverage, and for firms belonging to the Manufacturing and Wholesale Trading sectors. Listed companies are less likely to enter distress, whereas the correlation between distress rates and family firm ownership is unclear.

We study the role mutual funds play in the recovery from fast intraday crashes based on data from the National Stock Exchange of India for a single large stock. During normal times, trading activity and liquidity provision by mutual funds is negligible compared to other traders at around 4% of overall activity. Nevertheless, for the two intraday market-wide crashes in our sample, price recovery took place only after mutual funds moved in. Market stability may require the presence of well-capitalized standby liquidity providers for recovery from fast crashes.

This paper analyzes sovereign risk shift-contagion, i.e. positive and significant changes in the propagation mechanisms, using bond yield spreads for the major eurozone countries. By emphasizing the use of two econometric approaches based on quantile regressions (standard quantile regression and Bayesian quantile regression with heteroskedasticity) we find that the propagation of shocks in euro's bond yield spreads shows almost no presence of shift-contagion in the sample periods considered (2003–2006, Nov. 2008–Nov. 2011, Dec. 2011–Apr. 2013). Shock transmission is no different on days with big spread changes and small changes. This is the case even though a significant number of the countries in our sample have been extremely affected by their sovereign debt and fiscal situations. The risk spillover among these countries is not affected by the size or sign of the shock, implying that so far contagion has remained subdued. However, the US crisis does generate a change in the intensity of the propagation of shocks in the eurozone between the 2003–2006 pre-crisis period and the Nov. 2008–Nov. 2011 post-Lehman one, but the coefficients actually go down, not up! All the increases in correlation we have witnessed over the last years come from larger shocks and the heteroskedasticity in the data, not from similar shocks propagated with higher intensity across Europe. These surprising, but robust, results emerge because this is the first paper, to our knowledge, in which a Bayesian quantile regression approach allowing for heteroskedasticity is used to measure contagion. This methodology is particularly well-suited to deal with nonlinear and unstable transmission mechanisms especially when asymmetric responses to sign and size are suspected.

We explore whether Quantitative Easing (QE) negatively affected the functioning of the treasury market. Focusing on the arbitrage between European sovereign bonds and their futures contracts, we show that the scarcity of treasuries created by QE led to a disconnect between the prices of identical assets. We identify three channels: reduced bond market liquidity, increased funding costs in the repo market, and a higher cost of carry. A change in a policy instrument allows us to identify scarcity as the main driver and rule out alternatives, such as balance sheet costs. Our results extend to other arbitrage relations involving treasuries.