Attempts to characterize stock return predictability have resulted in little consensus on the important conditioning variables, giving rise to model uncertainty and data snooping fears. We introduce a new methodology that explicitly incorporates model uncertainty by comparing all possible models simultaneously and in which the priors are calibrated to reflect economically meaningful information. Our approach minimizes data snooping given the information set and the priors. We compare the prior views of a skeptic and a confident investor. The data imply posterior probabilities that are in general more supportive of stock return predictability than the priors for both types of investors.

Attempts to characterize stock return predictability have resulted in little consensus on the important conditioning variables, giving rise to model uncertainty and data snooping fears. We introduce a new methodology that explicitly incorporates model uncertainty by comparing all possible models simultaneously and in which the priors are calibrated to reflect economically meaningful information. Our approach minimizes data snooping given the information set and the priors. We compare the prior views of a skeptic and a confident investor. The data imply posterior probabilities that are in general more supportive of stock return predictability than the priors for both types of investors.

Benchmarking, pay for luck, and the large compensation packages given to CEOs in recent years are three major controversial compensation practices. We examine the extent to which variation in the market for CEO talent explains these practices. We find that CEO compensation is benchmarked against other firms only in industries where CEO talent is not firm-specific, and that pay for luck is more prevalent there also. These findings are consistent with theories based on the market for CEO talent. However, CEO compensation levels do not depend on whether CEO talent is firm-specific, which seems inconsistent with the talent competition argument.

[We introduce a new measure of active portfolio management, Active Share, which represents the share of portfolio holdings that differ from the benchmark index holdings. We compute Active Share for domestic equity mutual funds from 1980 to 2003. We relate Active Share to fund characteristics such as size, expenses, and turnover in the cross-section, and we also examine its evolution over time. Active Share predicts fund performance: funds with the highest Active Share significantly outperform their benchmarks, both before and after expenses, and they exhibit strong performance persistence. Nonindex funds with the lowest Active Share underperform their benchmarks.]

We introduce a new measure of active portfolio management, Active Share, which represents the share of portfolio holdings that differ from the benchmark index holdings. We compute Active Share for domestic equity mutual funds from 1980 to 2003. We relate Active Share to fund characteristics such as size, expenses, and turnover in the cross-section, and we also examine its evolution over time. Active Share predicts fund performance: funds with the highest Active Share significantly outperform their benchmarks, both before and after expenses, and they exhibit strong performance persistence. Nonindex funds with the lowest Active Share underperform their benchmarks.

[This article applies the methodology of Bai and Ng (2002, 2004) for decomposing panel data into systematic and idiosyncratic components to both stock returns and turnover panels. This approach works well for both returns and turnover, despite the presence of severe heteroscedasticity and nonstationarity of individual stocks' turnover. We test the mutual fund separation model of Lo and Wang (2000). Trading due to systematic risk in returns can account for 66% of systematic turnover. Thus, portfolio rebalancing due to systematic risk is a very important motive for stock trading. Finally, several common turnover measures may understate the impact of stock trading.]

This article examines how the extent of short-term trading relates to the efficiency of stock prices. We employ a new duration measure based on quarterly institutional investors’ portfolio holdings, next to existing proxies such as trading volume, the percentage of transient institutions, and fund turnover. Momentum returns and subsequent returns reversal are generally much stronger for stocks held primarily by short-term investors, especially if these investors recently had superior recent performance which could make them overconfident. Our results point toward the behavioral theory in Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998) and seem inconsistent with short-term institutions improving efficiency.

Among high active share portfolios—whose holdings differ substantially from their benchmark—only those with patient investment strategies (with holding durations of over two years) on average outperform, over 2% per year. Funds trading frequently generally underperform, including those with high active share. Among patient funds, separating closet index from high active share funds matters, as low active share funds on average underperform even with patient strategies. Our results suggest that U.S. equity markets provide opportunities for longer-term active managers, perhaps because of the limited arbitrage capital devoted to patient and active investment strategies. The Online Appendix is available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2810798.

[We analyze proprietary internal capital allocation data from a large retail banking group consisting of member banks and a headquarters organization. We find that capital allocations from headquarters compensate for deposit shortfalls on the bank level, suggesting that the headquarters offers deposit smoothing to member banks. We then analyze how the distribution of influence within the group relates to capital allocations and lending behavior. More influential banks are allocated more funds from headquarters, and their loan growth is less sensitive to their deposit base. The effects of influence are stronger if banks have a greater demand for deposit smoothing.]

[We study whether option-implied jump risk premia can explain the high observed level of credit spreads. We use a structural jump-diffusion firm value model to assess the level of credit spreads generated by option-implied jump risk premia. Prices and returns of equity index and individual options are used to estimate the jump parameters. We further calibrate the model to historical information on default risk and the equity premium. The results show that incorporating option-implied jump risk premia brings predicted credit spread levels much closer to observed levels. The introduction of jumps also helps to improve the fit of the volatility of credit spreads and equity returns.]