This paper identifies the optimal restrictiveness of a financing covenant in a debt contract. We examine the decision of a debt-issuing company that has current operations as well as a future growth opportunity. The optimal financing covenant can substantially reduce the cost of debt financing, and generally allows the issuance of some debt for financing the expansion. Comparative static analysis indicates that the covenant is less likely to be included when growth opportunities, earnings volatility, earnings drift rate, interest rate and tax rate are higher; and when bankruptcy cost is lower. Also, the financing covenant is more likely when the leverage ratio is higher (bankruptcy risk is greater) but becomes less likely for very high leverage ratio (when the firm is in or close to financial distress). These results are generally consistent with existing empirical results in the literature.

The standard modeling practice in corporate finance has been to assume a linear tax schedule. This paper extends the structural contingent-claim model of corporate finance to incorporate a more realistic convex tax schedule. It is shown that tax convexity raises the optimal default boundary and thus increases the likelihood of default, and also reduces the optimal leverage ratio. While the former effect seems insignificant in general, the effect of tax convexity on the optimal leverage ratio can be quantitatively significant. We conclude that tax convexity should not be ignored in corporate financing decisions, and theoretical models should use a convex tax schedule instead of a linear one. Thus, the short answer to the question in the title is “No”.

Many convertible bonds are called too early or too late relative to the perfect markets decision rule of Ingersoll, 1977a, Ingersoll, 1977b. We re-examine the convertible call decision under corporate taxation and possible default prior to maturity. Our model predicts that early calls will be associated with high coupon and low call premium, dividend income, volatility, tax rate and interest rate; and late calls will be associated with high call premium, dividend income, tax rate and interest rate, and low coupon and volatility. These implications are supported by empirical tests carried out with five years of convertible call data.

This paper suggests a new way of predicting the likelihood of a corporate bond being callable. We compute the probability that a bond, if callable, would actually be called within a certain period. We also hypothesize a positive relationship between this probability and the likelihood of the bond being issued with a call feature. Comparative static results yield the following empirical implications: the likelihood of a call feature should be an increasing function of coupon rate, corporate tax rate and leverage ratio, and a decreasing function of interest rate and firm risk (volatility). Tests with recently issued corporate bonds provide fairly strong support for the model’s predictions.

The learning curve has a significant impact on production cost (hence corporate profit) in a number of industries. While the learning curve is well recognized in the Economics literature and its effect on operating costs and production decisions widely studied, its effect on corporate investment has been largely unexplored. To our knowledge, there is one paper that examines this issue, but it is limited to unlevered firms. We therefore examine a levered firm's optimal investment and financing choices when using learning-curve technology. The main findings are as follows. The effect of leverage on the investment decision depends on the level of debt. Using the optimal debt level will result in earlier and larger investment. Thus, leverage has a positive effect on investment overall, and the difference between levered and unlevered firm is an increasing function of learning speed. The optimal leverage ratio (without a borrowing constraint) is an increasing function of learning speed. With a borrowing constraint, the investment decision is similar to the unconstrained-borrowing case, but the leverage ratio is initially increasing and subsequently decreasing in learning speed. Moreover, it is a decreasing function over a wider range for a more stringent borrowing constraint, for decreasing-returns-to-scale technology and for a less volatile product market.

Most capital projects have an implementation lag. We examine the effect of implementation lag on a levered firm’s investment decision. The main finding is that implementation lag can potentially have a substantial effect on a levered company’s investment trigger, and this effect can be significantly different from that of an unlevered company. The exact relationship between lag and investment trigger depends on the level of debt used by the firm. For an optimally-levered firm, a crucial determinant of the lag-investment relationship is the fraction of investment cost that has to be incurred upfront. If this fraction is small, investment trigger is a decreasing function of implementation lag and the effect can be economically significant. If this fraction is large, investment trigger can be either increasing or decreasing in lag, depending on parameter values, but the magnitude of the effect is not large. Optimally levering a firm makes the implementation lag more investment-friendly relative to an unlevered firm, thus it is possible that the lag has a negative effect on investment if the firm is unlevered but a positive effect if the same firm is optimally-levered. For an optimally-levered firm, implementation lag generally has a non-negative effect on investment.

This paper provides a theoretical derivation of commodity beta (stock price sensitivity to commodity price) using a contingent-claim model. The model incorporates operating leverage, financial leverage, costly financial distress, and mean reverting commodity prices; and highlights the important role played by the speed of reversion of the commodity price. It is used to identify theoretically the main determinants of commodity beta. Commodity beta is predicted to be an increasing function of the operating and financial leverage of the firm, and a decreasing function of the company’s tax rate and the level, volatility and speed of reversion of the commodity price. Empirical tests with a sample of gold mining firms provide support for these predictions, particularly the new implications of the model (the effect of the commodity price’s speed of reversion and the company’s tax rate).

This paper computes the effective duration of callable corporate bonds, using a contingent-claims model that incorporates both default risk and call risk. The model generates empirical implications regarding the cross-sectional variation and the firm-specific determinants of duration, and demonstrates that the effect of the call feature is to shorten duration (except for low-grade bonds). The effective duration is also estimated empirically for a large sample of long-term corporate bonds, using monthly bond price and interest rate data. Cross-sectional regression analysis is used to test the empirical implications of the model regarding the determinants of effective duration, and the empirical results are quite supportive of the model’s predictions.