The philosophy adopted and the literature coverage demonstrated owe mnuch to the assistance of: Thomas W. Calmus, Graduate School of Management and Business, University of Oregon; Karl Haiiser, Seminar fur Volkswirtschaftslehre, Universitdt Frankfurt/Al; J. C. L. Hulqkamp, International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation; and T. A. Kennedy, National Economic Development Office of the U.K. Errors of fact and interpretation are, of course, entirely of my doing.

Estimation and Inference in Econometrics, Russell Davidson and James G. MacKinnon, Oxford University Press, 1993, 874 + xx pages (Designated DM). A Course in Econometrics, Arthur S. Goldberger, Harvard University Press, 1991, 405 + xvii pages (Designated GO). Econometric Analysis, second edition, William H. Greene, Macmillan, New York, 1993, 791 + xxii pages (Designated GR). Learning and Practicing Econometrics, William E. Griffiths, R. Carter Hill, and George G. Judge, John Wiley, New York, 1993, 866 + xxv pages (Designated GHJ).

IN THIS PAPER the reader will find a review of econometric studies of investment in fixed capital. A review of these studies through 1953 was given in 1957 by J. Meyer and E. Kuh [86], and a detailed review through 1960 was presented by R. Eisner and R. H. Strotz in 1963 [36]. In this review we concentrate on recent research on time series of investment expenditures for individual firms and industries. Our point of departure is the flexible accelerator model of investment originated by H. B. Chenery [13, 1952] and L. M. Koyck [74, 1954]. In this model attention is focused on the time structure of the investment process. The desired level of capital is determined by longrun considerations. Changes in desired capital are transformed into actual investment expenditures by a geometric distributed lag fuinction-the specification of desired capital has been the subject of a wide variety of alternative theories; the alternative theories do agree on the validity of the flexible accelerator mechanism. Denoting the actual level of capital by K and the desired level by K+, capital is adjusted toward its desired level by a constant proportion of the difference between desired and actual capital,

For articles eventually published in the top twenty academic finance journals and top-tier academic business journals, I examine the acceptance time (the time from first-round submission to final-round acceptance) and online/print publication times (the time from first-round submission to online/print publication). I find that the median acceptance times of the top five general-interest finance journals are: Journal of Financial Economics (9.9 months), Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis (10.6 months), Review of Finance (11.7 months), Review of Financial Studies (15.5 months), and Journal of Finance (19.8 months). The three fastest in finance are Review of Corporate Finance Studies, Review of Asset Pricing Studies, and Financial Management. Journal of Finance is one of the slowest top-tier business journals. Large and significant time differences support the editorial differences hypothesis. Received December 14, 2016; editorial decision December 22, 2016 by Editor Paolo Fulghieri.

Abstract We analyze the supply-side disruptions associated with COVID-19. We find that sectors in which a higher fraction of the workforce is not able to work remotely experienced greater declines in employment and expected revenue growth, worse stock market performance, and higher likelihood of default. The stock market overweights low-exposure industries. Thus, our findings cast light on the disconnect between stock market indices and aggregate outcomes. We combine these ex ante heterogeneous industry exposures with daily financial market data to create a stock return portfolio that tracks news about the supply-side disruptions resulting from the pandemic. (JEL G12, D22, H25, J20, E00)

In this paper, we review research into the economic consequences of voluntary and mandatory choices of accounting techniques and standards. We discuss how the predictions of extant economic consequence theories are driven by contracting and monitoring costs associated with management compensation contracts, bond covenants, regulation, and/or political visibility. We review empirical tests of economic consequence theories, categorize those tests, and discuss their strengths and weaknesses. The empirical tests reveal two systematic associations with accounting choice: size, a proxy for political visibility, and leverage, a proxy for contracting and monitoring costs of lending agreements. Interpretation of the results is difficult, due to general limitations of the tests. We conclude by suggesting some directions for future research, based on our analysis of the potential payoffs associated with different types of empirical tests.