Ronald Findlay's analysis of the long-run equilibrium (uniform international growth rates) determinants of the terms of trade, in the context of North-South models of trade and growth, is reconsidered when the North is a Keynesian and a Kaleckian economy. Also examined are the determinants of the terms of trade in long-period equilibrium (uniform profit rates), so that the consequences of capital mobility are accounted for. Two surprising results are noted: first, the long-run terms of trade when the North is a Kaleckian economy will be independent of the North's markup and, second, in the long-period it is theoretically possible for the North to raise its markup but experience a deterioration in its own terms of trade.

This article provides an overview of the origins and development of stratification economics as a subfield that centers the importance of identity, social ranking, and relative group position. Stratification economics developed in response to explanations for interracial/ethnic/gender inequality that invoked group-based dysfunction on the part of the subordinate community. Influences, detailed here, include the works of W. E. B. DuBois, Thorstein Veblen, Karl Marx, Eric Williams, Herbert Blumer, Claude Steele, Cecilia Ridgeway, Thomas Pettigrew, and Linda Tropp. The article concludes with an exploration of unique insights and extensions stratification economics affords a variety of themes: the impact of multiple identities, the determinants of individual productivity, variation in intensity of group identification, “passing,” sources of intergroup differences in wealth, and social mobility and immigration.

Ronald Findlay's analysis of the long-run equilibrium (uniform international growth rates) determinants of the terms of trade, in the context of North-South models of trade and growth, is reconsidered when the North is a Keynesian and a Kaleckian economy. Also examined are the determinants of the terms of trade in long-period equilibrium (uniform profit rates), so that the consequences of capital mobility are accounted for. Two surprising results are noted: first, the long-run terms of trade when the North is a Kaleckian economy will be independent of the North's markup and, second, in the long-period it is theoretically possible for the North to raise its markup, but experience a deterioration in its own terms of trade.