We introduce the concept of subtle discrimination —biased acts that cannot be objectively ascertained as discriminatory. When candidates compete for promotions by investing in skills, firms' subtle biases induce discriminated candidates to overinvest when promotions are low‐stakes (to distinguish themselves from favored candidates) but underinvest in high‐stakes settings (anticipating low promotion probabilities). This asymmetry implies that subtle discrimination raises profits in low‐productivity firms but lowers them in high‐productivity firms. Although subtle biases are small, they generate large gaps in skills and promotion outcomes. We derive further predictions in contexts such as equity analysis, lending, fund flows, banking careers, and entrepreneurial finance.

Homeowners insurance is central to managing the rising losses from climate‐related disasters. We show that insurance premiums are subject to starkly different regulations across states, creating persistent cross‐subsidies and price distortions. We employ states' regulatory rules in an instrumental variable estimation and a border discontinuity design to show insurers do not adjust rates in highly regulated states and compensate by raising rates in less regulated states. Rates and risks diverge in the long run, distorting cross‐state risk‐sharing and increasing insurer exits from highly regulated states. We argue these patterns stem from the interactions between rate regulation and insurers' financing constraints.

The impact of uncertainty shocks on firm‐level economic activity depends on their origin in supply chains. Upstream (downstream) uncertainty from suppliers (customers) is associated with variability over future input (output) prices. Consequently, a real‐option production model with time‐to‐build suggests that only upstream uncertainty suppresses investment, since upstream (downstream) uncertainty affects the shorter (longer) run. Production network data show that upstream uncertainty negatively affects firm‐level outcomes. Conversely, downstream uncertainty affects firm‐level outcomes more weakly but positively. At the macro level, these two uncertainties oppositely predict aggregate growth and asset prices. Overall, downstream uncertainty has an expansionary effect, in contrast to other facets of uncertainty.

Using proprietary transaction‐level data on nonsyndicated construction loans, we provide some of the first empirical evidence on the drivers and consequences of bank monitoring through on‐site inspections. Banks trade off monitoring intensity with favorable origination terms. Monitoring intensity escalates in response to local economic downturns or the bank's financial instability. Borrowers with negative inspection reports have more draw requests denied, suggesting that monitoring outcomes impact credit decisions. Both the occurrence and threat of increased inspection frequency correspond to reduced defaults. Overall, our results provide empirical support for a substantial body of theoretical literature on bank monitoring.

We study the role of risk preferences and frictions in portfolio choice using variation in 401(k) default options. Patterns of active choice in response to different default funds imply that, absent participation frictions, 94% of investors prefer holding stocks, with an equity share of retirement wealth declining with age—patterns markedly different from observed allocations. We use this quasi‐experiment to estimate a life‐cycle model and find a relative risk aversion of 2.5, elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS) of 0.25, and $160 portfolio adjustment cost. The results suggest that low levels of stock market participation in retirement accounts are due to participation frictions rather than nonstandard preferences such as loss aversion.