Based on high frequency S & P 500 exchange-traded fund (ETF) data from 1993–2013, we show an intraday momentum pattern: the first half-hour return on the market as measured from the previous day’s market close predicts the last half-hour return. This predictability, which is both statistically and economically significant, is stronger on more volatile days, on higher volume days, on recession days, and on major macroeconomic news release days. Intraday momentum also exists for ten other most actively traded domestic and international ETFs. Theoretically, the intraday momentum is consistent not only with Bogousslavsky’s (2016) model of infrequent portfolio rebalancing but also with a model of late-informed trading near the market close.

Using a corporate culture measure based on the textual analysis of the Q&A section of earnings conference calls, we document robust evidence that similar corporate cultural values between supply chain partners improve the financial performance of suppliers. Consistent with the view that supplier–customer cultural similarity facilitates communication, promotes altruistic attitudes, and builds trust between trading partners, we find that culturally similar suppliers experience higher cost efficiency, fewer problems with underinvestment, and better innovation performance. Our results also indicate that cultural similarity benefits customers, although to a lesser extent. Overall, our study sheds new light on how inter-firm cultural similarity influences firm performance along the supply chain.

We use common factor analysis on seven individual management quality measures to extract a management quality factor and examine its relationship with corporate social performance. Using managers’ draft risk during the Vietnam War as an instrumental variable for management quality, we find that firms with higher-quality managers score better in Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). The cross-sectional results suggest that high-quality managers strategically invest in CSR when potential benefits outweigh the costs. Specifically, the positive relationship between management quality and CSR is more pronounced for firms under fierce product market competition when CSR is crucial for differentiating the firm from its competitors. Moreover, CSR becomes more sensitive to management quality when customer awareness and investor attention are high, increasing the likelihood that CSR enhances customer perception and investor trust. Finally, we find that CSR investment by high-quality managers creates more shareholder value, suggesting that higher-quality managers are more capable of “doing well by doing good.”

Hong and Kacperczyk (2010) document that decreases in analyst competition due to broker mergers encourage analysts to please managers, leading to greater consensus optimism bias. We propose three additional effects of analyst competition. The analyst effort hypothesis suggests that weaker competition reduces analysts’ incentives to collect and analyze information. The herding hypothesis argues that weaker competition reduces analysts’ career concerns, which in turn reduces herding incentives. The strategic deviation hypothesis implies that weaker competition alleviates analysts’ incentives to strategically deviate from others. We find that after broker mergers, analysts follow fewer firms and switch their coverage from firms with more to those with less R&D expenses. They weigh their private information less when it is unfavorable. At the same time, their forecasts become more dispersed. All these findings appear to be more consistent with the analyst effort hypothesis than the herding or strategic deviation hypothesis.

Using trade and quote data from the NYSE, we examine the relation between dealer attention, dealer revenue, and the probability of informed trade. We find that dealer revenue net of losses to better-informed traders in NYSE stocks is positively related to the speed at which quotes adjust to full information levels. The speed of quote adjustment is faster for stocks with greater dealer attention, as measured by a stock’s relative prominence at its post and panel location on the NYSE floor. The level of dealer attention in turn is positively related to a stock’s probability of information-based trading. The results are consistent with a theoretical model we derive in which dealers trade multiple securities and must optimally allocate their limited attention to monitoring order flow to minimize losses to better-informed traders.

This paper examines how credit risk spillovers affect corporate financial flexibility. We construct separate empirical proxies to disentangle the two channels of credit risk spillovers—credit risk contagion (CRC), where one firm's default increases the distress likelihood of another; and product market rivalry (PMR), where the same default strengthens the position of a competitor. We show that firms facing greater CRC have weaker subsequent operating performance and must contend with less favorable bank loan terms. Meanwhile, they accumulate more cash by issuing equity, selling assets, and reducing investment and payout. In contrast, PMR generally has opposite, albeit weaker, effects. Our findings suggest that credit risk spillovers, especially CRC, play an important role in corporate liquidity management.

Downside risks are ubiquitous and can profoundly impact firm operations and valuation. Failure to adequately assess and manage target firms' downside risks hinders acquirers' ability to integrate and manage these businesses. This article introduces a novel measure of firms' downside risk similarity (DRS) based on risk factor descriptions and examines its implications for mergers and acquisitions (M&A) outcomes. We first validate that the measure is distinct from existing similarity measures and that it captures similarity in firms' potential significant downside. Using the new measure, we find that the market reacts more positively to deals in which acquirers and targets share more downside risks. Additional analyses show that this beneficial effect of DRS is driven primarily by risks that are idiosyncratic or firm‐specific, consistent with these risks requiring acquirers' relevant expertise to manage. Last, we document that in deals with more similar downside risks, the acquirers experience fewer risk profile changes and are less likely to suffer from adverse outcomes, such as deal‐specific goodwill impairment, divestitures, and significant profitability declines. Overall, we conclude that DRS plays a significant role in the M&A process.

Enforcement of non‐compete agreements could affect executives' and directors' incentives to profit from their information advantage. This is because excessive trading profits could result in job termination, which would trigger the restrictions imposed by the non‐compete agreements. We find that executives' and directors' insider trading profits from sales are lower for companies headquartered in states with greater enforcement of non‐compete agreements. The path analyses suggest that high enforcement of non‐compete agreements disincentivizes managers to profit from their information advantage to avoid the possibility of job termination and the cost of job terminations. We also find that insiders in companies headquartered in states with greater enforcement of non‐compete agreements are less likely to exploit their information advantage by timing their sales before unfavorable corporate earnings announcements. The results suggest that enforcement of non‐compete agreements reduces executives' and directors' incentives by imposing costs on future outside employment opportunities.