We investigate predictability in national equity market returns, and its relation to global economic risks. We show how to consistently estimate the fraction of the predictable variation that is captured by an asset pricing model for the expected returns. We use a model in which conditional betas of the national equity markets depend on local information variables, while global risk premia depend on global variables. We examine single- and multiple-beta models, using monthly data for 1970 to 1989. The models capture much of the predictability for many countries. Most of this is related to time variation in the global risk premia.

When firms face menu costs, the relation between their output and money is highly non-linear. At the aggregate level, however, this needs not be so. In this paper we study the dynamic behaviour of a menu-cost economy where firms are heterogeneous in the shocks they perceive, and the demands and adjustment costs they face. In this context we (i) generalize the Caplin and Spulber (1987) steady-state monetary-neutrality result; (ii) show that uniqueness of equilibria depends not only on the degree of strategic complementarities but also on the degree of dispersion of firms' positions in their price-cycle; (iii) characterize the path of output outside the steady state and show that as strategic complementarities become more important, expansions become longer and smoother than contractions; and (iv) show that the potential impact of monetary shocks is an increasing function of the distance of the economy from its steady state, but that an uninformed policy maker will have no effect on output on average.

The authors develop a simple model in which the presence of portfolio insurers in a market of risk-averse traders leads to multiple equilibria for the pricing of financial assets and can cause an increase in volatility, including insurance-induced price drops. They demonstrate, however, that centralized portfolio insurance firms may actually reduce, not increase, volatility even if the existence of these firms increases the total amount of funds under insurance.

This article focuses on the use of incentive regulation in the telephone industry in the United States. We first characterize some of the difficulties that have led regulators to move away from traditional rate-ofreturn (cost-based) regulation and toward systems of regulation that provide incentives for increasingly efficient production, allowing firms to share in the social gains from efficiency with increased profits. We then discuss the basic structure of incentive regulation as it has most commonly been adopted in the telephone industry in the United States. The first is price-cap (PC) regulation, which typically allows the firm to

This paper analyzes the relationship between changes in unionization and firm growth. Average growth is significantly lower in manufacturing firms that experience successful union elections, but these strong "effects" are largely illusory. We find no evidence of a significant relationship between unionization and firm growth, despite a strong cyclical pattern in election activity. Our results suggest that the significant negative effect of organizing activity on a firm's market value is not accompanied by any growth changes. We therefore cannot reject the hypothesis that the equity losses from union election activity represent a simple transfer of wealth from shareholders to workers.

This paper analyzes the relationship between changes in unionization and firm growth. Average growth is significantly low er in manufacturing firms that experience successful union elections bu t these strong "effects" are largely illusory. The authors find no evidence of a significant relationship between unionization and firm growth, despite a strong cyclical pattern in election activity. Thei r results suggest that the significant negative effect of organizing activity on a firm's market value is not accompanied by any growth changes. The authors, therefore, cannot reject the hypothesis that t he equity losses from union election activity represent a simple transf er of wealth from shareholders to workers.

Comments on the valuation of executive stock options (ESO) and the fair value proposal of the Financial Accounting and Standards Board. Stability of the added parameter; Compatibility of lambda and the numerical method with accounting policy; Analysis of the ESO estimation.