Boquist, Racette, and Schlarbaum [3] and Livingston [6] show that a security systematic risk may be expressed as a function of its duration. These results have led to research examining the role of duration in explaining systematic risk, but Lanstein and Sharpe [5] indicate that Livingston's expression relies on the implicit assumption that extra-market covariances between securities are insignificant. Lanstein and Sharpe argue that such an assumption is unwarranted. They find a significant negative relationship between extra-market covariances and differences in duration between paired samples of common stock. Their paper suggests that duration may be associated with unsystematic risk and that any relation between duration and systematic risk is more complex than implied in [3] and [6].

Predictability of future returns using ex ante information (e.g., analyst forecasts) violates market efficiency. We show that predictability can be due to non-random data deletion, especially in skewed distributions of long-horizon security returns. Passive deletion arises because some firms do not survive the post-event long horizon. Active deletion arises when extreme observations are truncated by the researcher. Simulations demonstrate that data deletion induces a negative relation between future returns and ex ante information variables. Analysis of actual data suggests a 30–50% bias in the estimated relations. We recommend specific robustness checks when testing return predictability using ex ante information.

Assessing the predictive ability of behavioral finance theories using out-of-sample data is important. Otherwise, the potentially boundless set of psychological biases underlying the behavioral explanations for security price behavior can lead to overfitting of theories to data. We test pricing effects attributed to two psychological biases, representativeness and conservatism, which underlie many behavioral finance theories. Using trends and consistency of accounting performance, we look for the pricing consequences of representativeness and conservatism. We find mixed evidence consistent with behavioral finance. Specifically, the theories based on representativeness are not supported, but we find some evidence of the pricing implications of conservatism.

This study examines the determinants and implications of the volume of tax-related numbers reported in the financial statements. I document that the volume of tax numbers increases with tax reporting requirements and decreases with the complexity of the tax rate, implying that firms with greater proprietary costs decrease their numeric disclosures once they meet mandatory reporting requirements. With respect to implications, I document that firms reporting more tax numbers improve the transparency of the information environment, reducing the errors and dispersion of analysts’ implied effective tax rate forecasts. In contrast, greater emphasis on narrative tax disclosure does not reduce information frictions, highlighting an important trade-off between numeric detail and strategic narratives. Further investigation suggests that this relationship is driven by more tax numbers in the financial statement footnotes rather than in the face financial statements. These findings suggest firms’ tax information environment improves with a greater volume of numeric tax-related disclosures.

This paper combines traditional fundamentals, such as earnings and cash flows, with measures tailored for growth firms, such as earnings stability, growth stability and intensity of R&D, capital expenditure and advertising, to create an index – GSCORE. A long–short strategy based on GSCORE earns significant excess returns, though most of the returns come from the short side. Results are robust in partitions of size, analyst following and liquidity and persist after controlling for momentum, book-to-market, accruals and size. High GSCORE firms have greater market reaction and analyst forecast surprises with respect to future earnings announcements. Further, the results are inconsistent with a risk-based explanation as returns are positive in most years, and firms with lower risk earn higher returns. Finally, a contextual approach towards fundamental analysis works best, with traditional analysis appropriate for high BM stocks and growth oriented fundamental analysis appropriate for low BM stocks.

Corporate debt sales have been regarded as “no news” events because there is no significant price reaction on average to their announcement. We explore the hypothesis that this lack of average price reaction to debt sale announcements is explained by the partial anticipation of debt offers. Theory suggests that the demand for debt capital is fundamentally related to changes in the sources and uses of funds, and we find evidence that earnings are significantly lower, investment growth is significantly higher, and, for some issuers, debt refunding requirements are significantly greater in the period immediately prior to issue than in periods well before and after the issue. We find that this preissue information conditions investors’ expectations of issue, thereby affecting the cross-sectional announcement date price reaction to debt sales in two ways. First, announcement date price reactions are negative, on average, for unanticipated offers or for those offers where prior information suggests that an issue is unlikely. Second, holding the probability of issue constant, announcement date price reactions are significantly more negative for offers that raise more capital than investors expected. These results are consistent with cash flow signaling and asymmetric information models of corporate financings.

Firms with low Tobin's Q and high cash flow have significantly more positive dividend initiation announcement returns than do other firms. I interpret this result as consistent with the hypothesis that reductions in the agency costs of overinvestment at firms with poor investment opportunities and ample cash flow are reflected in higher dividend initiation announcement returns. Further tests, such as examining the impact of governance metrics on initiation announcement returns following the dividend tax cut of 2003 and examining the long-run cash-retention policies of dividend-initiating firms, are consistent with this interpretation. There is also some evidence that is consistent with the cash flow signaling hypothesis, as dividend-initiating firms with low Tobin's Q and low pre-initiation cash flow experience substantial revisions in analysts' earnings forecasts and significantly positive initiation announcement returns.

This paper examines the predictions of the performance based arbitrage hypothesis for the merger arbitrage market. Performance based arbitrage [Shleifer, A., Vishny, R.W., 1997. The limits of arbitrage. Journal of Finance, 52 (1), 35–55] is the notion that funds under management are withdrawn from arbitrageurs following trading losses, resulting in inefficient prices for securities subject to arbitrage trades. I examine general comovement in merger arbitrage spreads and the response of spreads to large arbitrage losses and substantial changes in deal flow. I find little evidence that merger arbitrage spreads exhibit systematic comovement or are substantially affected by important liquidity events in this market.

Previous work by Aggarwal and Samwick [Aggarwal, R., Samwick, A., 1999. The other side of the tradeoff: the impact of risk on executive compensation. Journal of Political Economy 107 pp. 65–105] has documented the importance of controlling for the variance of firm stock returns when estimating pay–performance sensitivities. They find that pay–performance sensitivities are an order of magnitude greater for small vs. large variance firms. Using a comparable sample of CEOs, I provide evidence that when properly controlling for firm size, the negative effect of variance in stock returns on estimated pay–performance sensitivities is greatly diminished. In particular, when using dollar returns as the measure of firm performance, it is imperative to properly control for firm size.

This paper examines the relationship between the likelihood a firm is acquired and the governance and financial characteristics of the firm. Given many of the developments in the corporate control market in the late 1980s, I suspect that the process governing takeover likelihood may have changed in the 1990s. I examine a sample of 342 NYSE/AMEX firms that were acquired during the 1990–1997 period and compare them to a matched sample of nonacquired firms. I find that firms that were acquired over this period can be characterized as having lower managerial ownership and higher ownership by outsiders, particularly higher ownership by nonmanagement blockholders with board representation. The fact that managerial ownership is negatively related to takeover likelihood is consistent with studies using data from 1970s and 1980s. This suggests that managerial ownership helps managers maintain control, or alternatively that ownership proxies for how much managers care about control.