ABSTRACT Constantinides (1986) documents how the impact of transaction costs on per‐annum liquidity premia in the standard dynamic allocation problem with i.i.d. returns is an order of magnitude smaller than the cost rate itself. Recent papers form portfolios sorted on liquidity measures and find spreads in expected per‐annum return that are the same order of magnitude as the transaction cost spread. When we allow returns to be predictable and introduce wealth shocks calibrated to labor income, transaction costs are able to produce per‐annum liquidity premia that are the same order of magnitude as the transaction cost spread.

Historically, attempts to solve the liquidity puzzle focus on narrowly defined monetary aggregates, such as non-borrowed reserves, the monetary base, or M1. Many of these efforts fail to find a short-term negative correlation between interest rates and monetary policy innovations. More recent research uses sophisticated macroeconomic and econometric modeling. However, little research has investigated the role measurement error plays in the liquidity puzzle, since in nearly every case, work investigating the liquidity puzzle has used one of the official monetary aggregates, which have been shown to exhibit significant measurement error. In this paper, we examine the role that measurement error plays in the liquidity puzzle by (i) providing a theoretical framework explaining how the official simple-sum methodology can lead to a liquidity puzzle, and (ii) testing for the liquidity effect by estimating an unrestricted VAR.

A direct consequence of restricting the price of a good for which secondary markets do not exist is that, in the presence of excess demand, the good will not be allocated to the buyers who value it the most. We demonstrate the empirical importance of this allocative cost for the U.S. residential market for natural gas, which was subject to price ceilings during 1954–89. Using a household-level, discrete-continuous model of natural gas demand, we estimate that the allocative cost in this market averaged $3.6 billion annually, nearly tripling previous estimates of the net welfare loss to U.S. consumers.

Because wines are aged for several years before they are released, newly hired winemakers arrive as wines made by their predecessors enter the market. An analysis of winemaker hiring events reveals that wines released right after a new winemaker's arrival from a prominent competitor are priced significantly higher than corresponding wines released in the preceding year. However, the wines released before and after the hiring event are indistinguishable in terms of quality. These findings isolate a “purely symbolic” effect of employee mobility, which affirm sociological accounts of markets—under conditions of uncertainty, inter-organizational affiliations condition producers' returns to quality demonstrations.

In Project STAR, 11,571 students in Tennessee and their teachers were randomly assigned to classrooms within their schools from kindergarten to third grade. This article evaluates the long-term impacts of STAR by linking the experimental data to administrative records. We first demonstrate that kindergarten test scores are highly correlated with outcomes such as earnings at age 27, college attendance, home ownership, and retirement savings. We then document four sets of experimental impacts. First, students in small classes are significantly more likely to attend college and exhibit improvements on other outcomes. Class size does not have a significant effect on earnings at age 27, but this effect is imprecisely estimated. Second, students who had a more experienced teacher in kindergarten have higher earnings. Third, an analysis of variance reveals significant classroom effects on earnings. Students who were randomly assigned to higher quality classrooms in grades K–3—as measured by classmates' end-of-class test scores—have higher earnings, college attendance rates, and other outcomes. Finally, the effects of class quality fade out on test scores in later grades, but gains in noncognitive measures persist.

ABSTRACT Agency theory and optimal contracting theory posit opposing roles and shareholder wealth effects for corporate inside directors. We evaluate these theories using the market for outside directorships to differentiate among inside directors. Firms with inside directors holding outside directorships have better operating performance and market‐to‐book ratios, especially when monitoring is more difficult. These firms make better acquisition decisions, have greater cash holdings, and overstate earnings less often. Announcements of outside board appointments improve shareholder wealth, while departure announcements reduce it, consistent with these inside directors improving board performance and outside directorships being an important source of inside director incentives.

Evidence from a nationally representative sample of households illuminates the determinants of recycling behavior for plastic water bottles. Private values of the environment are influential in promoting recycling, as are personal norms for pro-environmental behavior. However, social norms with respect to the assessment of the household's recycling behaviors by others have little independent effect. Particularly influential are policies that create economic incentives to promote recycling either through state recycling laws that reduce the time and inconvenience costs of recycling or through bottle deposits. Effective policies can have a discontinuous effect at the individual level, transforming non-recyclers into avid recyclers.

ABSTRACT: This study examines disaggregated management forecasts as a mechanism to reduce investors’ fixation on announced earnings. Our experimental results suggest that investors’ earnings fixation is reduced when they initially observe a disaggregated management forecast (earnings and its components) versus when they observe an aggregated forecast (earnings only). We also provide theory-consistent evidence that this reduction in earnings fixation is associated with investors interpreting the summary net income figure as one of several similarly important evaluation inputs rather than a substantially more important input (relative to its components). Finally, we provide evidence that suggests our results are not bounded by the level of emphasis on net income in the subsequent earnings announcement, and not fully explained by three plausible alternative explanations. Our study extends the voluntary disclosure literature by providing evidence that the form of management disclosures can influence investors’ interpretation of subsequently announced information, and contributes to practice by providing a potential alternative to stopping earnings guidance.

ABSTRACT We extend the literature on earnings management through real operating decisions by providing insight into the types of expenditures (core versus noncore and operating versus non-operating activities) affected by earnings management. We partition a sample of California nonprofit hospitals based on their earnings management incentives. We find that expenditures on non-operating and non-revenue-generating activities appear to decrease in hospitals with incentives to engage in such behavior, while core patient care activities remain unchanged. We also find evidence of earnings management in non-core operational expenses. Second, we analyze real earnings management related to pay-for-performance incentives and find that hospitals with stronger performance incentives exhibit a significant incremental decrease in expenditures. Finally, we examine two different kinds of behavior to discriminate between earnings management and good operational decisions and provide weak evidence to support opportunism rather than good management. Together, these results provide evidence of the use of real operating decisions to manage earnings.

Using factor methods, we decompose industrial production (IP) into components arising from aggregate and sector-specific shocks. An approximate factor model finds that nearly all of IP variability is associated with common factors. We then use a multisector growth model to adjust for the effects of input-output linkages in the factor analysis. Thus, a structural factor analysis indicates that the Great Moderation was characterized by a fall in the importance of aggregate shocks while the volatility of sectoral shocks was essentially unchanged. Consequently, the role of idiosyncratic shocks increased considerably after the mid-1980s, explaining half of the quarterly variation in IP.