We pose good markets frictions on top of an otherwise standard two-country international real business cycle (IRBC) model. Shopping for goods takes effort, which prevents perfect matching between customers and producers. An increase in search effort implies increased measured productivity. Demand shocks increase expenditures and search effort simultaneously increasing output, consumption, productivity, and the trade deficit and appreciating the real exchange rate. Thus we solve the Backus-Smith puzzle and we show that the cross country correlation of consumption is higher than that of output. Standard IRBC models cannot account for these puzzles along with movements in TFP.

This study examines whether the implementation of a mature enterprise risk management (ERM) framework by property and liability insurers improved their resilience in the face of the COVID-19 pandemic. To address the potential problem of endogeneity, we analyze a panel dataset of listed property and liability insurers from around the world using the propensity score matching method. Subsequently, a two-step “doubly robust” estimation method is employed. The results reveal that the performance of insurers with less mature ERM frameworks was adversely affected by the pandemic but that of insurers with more mature ERM frameworks was not. These findings remain consistent after conducting various robustness checks. Separate consideration of each ERM component reveals that no component independently enhanced insurers' resilience; rather, the components collectively enhanced their resilience. Overall, this study provides valuable insights for insurers and regulators aiming to enhance the industry's ability to withstand future challenges.

This study documents an unexplored corporate rent-seeking phenomenon in non-representative regimes—relocating headquarters (HQ) to the political center. Focusing on China, we find that firms that relocate their HQs to Beijing (the political center) enjoy increased political favors, but those that move to Shanghai or Shenzhen (the country's two main economic centers) do not. Although both groups of movers experience improved profitability, their sustainable growth paths diverge after relocating. Firm productivity and innovation worsen after relocating to Beijing, but improve after moving to Shanghai or Shenzhen. Overall, these findings support the argument that political favoritism benefits firms' profitability but impairs their productivity and innovation.

Recent scandals involving late trading, market timing, and other trading abuses have prompted the SEC to propose changes in the governance of mutual funds. Among these changes are the requirements for an independent chairman and a board consisting of at least 75% independent directors. Using a large sample of mutual fund families for 2002, we find that neither the probability of a fund scandal nor overall fund performance is related to either chair or board independence. Overall, our results question the usefulness of these recently proposed SEC changes in mutual fund governance.

Identifying the factors that drive the cross-section of expected returns is challenging for at least three reasons. First, the choice of testing approach (time series versus cross-sectional) will deliver different sets of factors. Second, varying test portfolio sorts changes the importance of candidate factors. Finally, given the hundreds of factors that have been proposed, test multiplicity must be dealt with. We propose a new method that makes measured progress in addressing these key challenges. We apply our method in a panel regression setting and shed some light on the puzzling empirical result that the market factor drives the bulk of the variance of stock returns, but is often knocked out in cross-sectional tests. In our setup, the market factor is not eliminated. Further, we bypass arbitrary portfolio sorts and instead execute our tests on individual stocks with no loss in power. Finally, our bootstrap implementation, which allows us to impose the null hypothesis of no cross-sectional explanatory power, naturally controls for the multiple testing problem.

The constant maturity zero-coupon yield curve for the US Treasuries is one of the most studied datasets. We construct a new yield curve using a non-parametric kernel-smoothing method with a novel adaptive bandwidth specifically designed to fit the Treasury yields. Our curve is globally smooth while still capturing important local variation. Economically, we show that applying our data leads to different conclusions from using the leading alternative data of Gürkaynak et al. (2007) (GSW) when we repeat two popular studies of Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005) and Giglio and Kelly (2018). Statistically, we show our dataset preserves information in the raw data and has much smaller pricing errors than GSW. Our new yield curve is maintained and updated online, complemented by bandwidths that summarize information content in the raw data.

Our paper explores the link between cross-sectional fund return dispersion and performance evaluation. The foundation of our model is the simple intuition that in periods of high return dispersion, which is associated with high levels of idiosyncratic risk for zero-alpha funds, unskilled managers can more easily disguise themselves as skilled. Rational investors should be more skeptical and apply larger discounts to reported performance in high dispersion environments. Our empirical results are consistent with this prediction. Using fund flow data, we show that a one standard deviation increase in cross-sectional return dispersion is associated with an 11% to 17% decline in flow-performance sensitivity. The effect is stronger for recent data and among outperforming funds.

We develop a new rationale for corporate spin-offs, and for the performance and value improvements following them, based on corporate control considerations. We consider a firm with multiple divisions, with incumbent management having different abilities for managing these divisions. If the incumbent loses control to a more able rival, it benefits all shareholders (including the incumbent) by increasing equity value, but involves the incumbent losing his private benefits of control. We show that a spin-off increases the incumbent's chance of losing control to such a rival. This, in turn, motivates the incumbent either to work harder at managing the firm (in order to avoid any loss of control), or to relinquish control of one of the firms resulting from the spin-off (either immediately following the spin-off, or subsequently in a control contest). We show that spin-offs will be associated with positive announcement effects and increases in long-term operating performance. Further, certain categories of spin-offs will exhibit long-term positive abnormal stock returns.