Knowledge that Transforms

We introduce two simple new variants of the jackknife instrumental variables (JIVE) estimator for overidentified linear models and show that they are superior to the existing JIVE estimator, significantly improving on its small-sample-bias properties. We also compare our new estimators to existing Nagar (1959) type estimators. We show that, in models with heteroskedasticity, our estimators have superior properties to both the Nagar estimator and the related B2SLS estimator suggested in Donald and Newey (2001). These theoretical results are verified in a set of Monte Carlo experiments and then applied to estimating the returns to schooling using actual data.

The contingent valuation method for estimating willingness to pay for public goods typically adopts a single referendum question format, which is relatively statistically inefficient. As an alternative, Cooper, Hanemann, and Signorello (2002) propose the one-and-one-half bound (OOHB) format, allowing researchers to question respondents about both a lower and higher limit on project costs, thereby securing substantial gains in statistical efficiency. Using an experimental design, we find that responses to OOHB valuation questions fail crucial tests of procedural invariance. We test various competing models of observed response patterns including strategic misrepresentation of standard preferences and nonstandard models of preference formation.

We exploit variation in gasoline and cigarettes taxes in adjacent political jurisdictions for northern Illinois and Indiana to examine consumers' trade-off between prices and travel. We develop a model that relates activity in the retail gasoline industry around the tax borders to consumer locations. Our results indicate that the willingness of a typical Chicagoland consumer to travel an additional mile to buy gasoline corresponds to about $0.065 to $0.084 per gallon. According to our estimates, the observed area of Chicago, the jurisdiction with the highest taxes, is missing approximately 40% of the capacity that would exist were taxes equalized.

We propose an industry-level index of capital resalability—the share of used capital in aggregate industry capital expenditure—that relates (inversely) to sunkenness of investments. Using data from U.S. manufacturing, we then test the effect of capital resalability on industry productivity dispersion, mean productivity, and industry concentration. As predicted by standard models of industry equilibrium with heterogeneous firms, we find that increases in capital resalability are associated with a reduction in productivity dispersion, and an increase in the mean and median of the productivity distribution. Furthermore, we find that capital resalability is negatively correlated with industry concentration.

I first replicate Donohue and Levitt's results for violent and property crime arrest rates. I apply their data and specification to an analysis of age-specific homicide rates and murder arrest rates. The coefficients on the abortion rate have the wrong sign for two of the four measures of crime and none is statistically significant at conventional levels. I then use the legalization of abortion in 1973 to exploit two sources of variation: between-state changes in abortion rates before and after Roe, and cross-cohort differences in exposure to legalized abortion. I find no meaningful association between abortion and age-specific crime rates.

Alwyn Young (2000) argues that barriers to interprovincial trade in China have increased during the reform period. This paper critically examines each of his five arguments and the evidence he presents. In all five instances, the argument is problematic and the evidence not robust. A comparison with the United States shows the Chinese evidence to be well within the range of that of a normal, relatively integrated large economy.

An important issue with conducting economic analysis in the lab is whether the results generalize to real-world environments where the stakes and subject pool are considerably different. We examine data from the game show The Weakest Link to determine whether the gender of one's opponent affects performance. We then attempt to replicate the competitive structure of the game show in the lab with an undergraduate subject pool. The results in the lab only match when we both employ high stakes in the lab (≥ $50) and limit our analysis to young contestants in the game show (age < 33).

This paper investigates the effect of disadvantaged business enterprise subcontractor goals on the winning bids for highway construction contracts using California's Proposition 209, which prohibited the consideration of race or gender in awarding state-funded contracts. After Proposition 209, prices on state-funded contracts fell by 5.6% relative to federally funded projects, for which preferences still applied. Most of the price decline after Proposition 209 resulted from the mix of subcontractors employed, which seems to arise from the higher costs of firms located in high-minority areas. Finally, short-run barriers to entry and expansion may increase the cost of affirmative action.

Quota restrictions on United States imports of apparel and textiles under the multifiber arrangement (MFA) ended abruptly in January 2005. This change in policy was large, predetermined, and fully anticipated, making it an ideal natural experiment for testing the theory of trade policy. Prices of quota-constrained categories from China fell by 38% in 2005, with smaller declines from other exporters. Prices in unconstrained categories from all countries changed little. We also find substantial quality downgrading in imports from China in previously constrained categories. The annual cost of the MFAto U.S. consumers was $63 per household.

Consumption by couples rises sharply in the beginning and falls later in life; the causes of the early rise are hotly contested. Among the suggestions are rule of thumb behavior, demographics, liquidity constraints, the precautionary motive, and nonseparabilities between consumption and labor supply. We develop two tests of the extreme hypothesis that only changes in family structure matter. We estimate effects of the numbers and ages of children on consumption. These estimates allow us to rationalize all of the increase in consumption without recourse to any of the causal mechanisms. Our estimates can be interpreted either as giving upper bounds on the effects of children or as evidence that the other causes are not important.