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Why do stock prices drop by less than the value of the dividend? Evidence from a country without taxes

Journal of Financial Economics 1998 47(2), 161-188
It is well documented that stock prices on ex-dividend days drop by less than the value of the dividend, on average. This has commonly been attributed to the effect of tax clienteles. We examine data from the Hong Kong stock market, where neither dividends nor capital gains are taxed. As in the U.S., the average stock price drop is less than the value of the dividend; specifically, the average dividend for the period 1980–1993 is HK 0.12 and the average price drop is HK 0.06. We are able to account for this both theoretically and empirically through market microstructure arguments.

IPO-mechanisms, monitoring and ownership structure11We would like to thank the referee, Larry Benveniste, and the editor, William Schwert, as well as Bruno Biais, Patrik Bolton, Susanne Espenlaub, Michael Fishman, Thierry Foucault, Gunther Franke, Julian Franks, Mark Grinblatt, Jean Jacque Laffont, Alexander Ljungqvist, Ernst Maug, Gerhard Orosel, Pegaret Pichler, Raguram Rajan, Jay Ritter, Ailsa Röell, Kristian Rydquist, Jean Tirole, Elu von Thadden, Ivo Welch, William Wilhelm, Joe Williams and Andrew Winton for helpful comments. This paper has been presented at the University of Alberta, Baruch College, the Free University of Brussels, the University of Gothenburg, HEC, the University of California, Irvine, the University of Lausanne, the London School of Economics, the University of Odense, Stockholm School of Economics, the University of British Columbia, UCLA, the University of Utah, the CEPR conferences in Tolouse and Gerzensee, the American Finance Association, the Western Finance Association and the European Finance Association. This paper was written while Stoughton visited the University of Vienna. He expresses his appreciation to the faculty and staff for an enjoyable stay.

Journal of Financial Economics 1998 49(1), 45-77
This paper analyzes the effect of different IPO mechanisms on the structure of share ownership and explores the role of underpricing and rationing in determining investors’ shareholdings. We focus on the agency problem that results when large institutions are the only investors capable of monitoring the firm whereas small shareholders free-ride on these activities. The major conclusion is that some well-known aspects of IPOs may be explained as rational responses by the issuer to the existence of regulatory constraints in public capital markets. There is a two-stage offering mechanism in which the investment banker, acting in the interests of the issuer, optimally rations the allotment of shares to small investors in order to capture the benefits associated with better monitoring by institutions. Importantly, in our model, the existence of underpricing (and oversubscription) is an indication that the issuer has received a higher ex ante price than would have been obtained through a competitive Walrasian-type offering process.

Risk management, capital budgeting, and capital structure policy for financial institutions: An integrated approach

Journal of Financial Economics 1998 47(1), 55-82
We develop a framework for analyzing the capital allocation and capital structure decisions facing financial institutions. Our model incorporates two key features: (i) value-maximizing banks have a well-founded concern with risk management; and (ii) not all the risks they face can be frictionlessly hedged in the capital market. This approach allows us to show how bank-level risk management considerations should factor into the pricing of those risks that cannot be easily hedged. We examine several applications, including: the evaluation of proprietary trading operations, and the pricing of unhedgeable derivatives positions. We also compare our approach to the RAROC methodology that has been adopted by a number of banks.

Efficiency loss and constraints on portfolio holdings

Journal of Financial Economics 1998 48(3), 359-375 open access
This paper examines the degree of portfolio inefficiency subject to various constraints on portfolio weights. When portfolio weights are unconstrained, the posterior loss in expected return on the NYSE-AMEX market portfolio is over 20% (annualized). In contrast, when portfolio weights are constrained to be nonnegative, the posterior loss in expected return is only about 4% (annualized). In addition, short-sale constraints greatly reduce uncertainty in inferences about portfolio efficiency.

Information problems, conflicts of interest, and asset stripping:

Journal of Financial Economics 1998 48(1), 55-97
Eastern Airlines' bankruptcy illustrates the devastating effect on firm value of court-sponsored asset stripping, i.e., the use of creditors' collateral to invest in high-variance negative net present value projects. During its bankruptcy, Eastern's value dropped over 50%. A substantial portion of this value decline occurred because an overprotective court insulated Eastern from market forces and allowed value-destroying operations to continue long after it was clear that Eastern should have been shut down. The failure of Eastern's Chapter 11 demonstrates the importance of having a bankruptcy process that protects a distressed firm's assets, not simply from a run by creditors, but also from overly optimistic managers and misguided judges.

Earnings signals in fixed-price and Dutch auction self-tender offers

Journal of Financial Economics 1998 49(2), 161-186
Studies by Vermaelen (1981) and others indicate that the positive excess stock returns around self-tender offer announcements are the result of a signal of future earnings improvements. Comment and Jarrell (1991), Lee, Mikkelson and Partch (1992) and Persons (1994) argue that the signal in fixed-price self-tender offers should be stronger than the signal in Dutch auction self-tender offers. This study tests whether the earnings improvement following fixed-price self-tender offers is greater than that following Dutch auction self-tender offers. We find some evidence that earnings improve following both types of self-tender offers. However, we find no difference in earnings improvement between the two types of offers.

How big is the premium for currency risk?1We thank Geert Bekaert, Tim Bollerslev, Peter Bossaerts, Mark Carhart, John Cochrane, Magnus Dahlquist, Wayne Ferson, Linda Goldberg, Campbell Harvey, Pierre Hillion, Robert Hodrick (the referee), Olivier Ledoit, John Matsusaka, Hans Mikkelsen, Angel Serrat and Ivo Welch, as well as workshop participants at INSEAD, University of California at Los Angeles, University of Southern California, University of Rochester, Southern Methodist University, University of California – Irvine, Koc University and participants at the 1996 UBC Global Investment Conference (Whistler, BC), 1996 Western Finance Association meetings (Sunriver, OR), 1996 European Finance Association meetings (Oslo, Norway), 1996 NBER Asset Pricing meeting (Evanston, IL), and the 1997 Econometric Society winter meetings (New Orleans, LA) for their comments. The paper was written while the second author was visiting the Anderson School at UCLA. Both authors acknowledge the financial support of a CIBEAR grant.1

Journal of Financial Economics 1998 49(3), 375-412
We estimate and test the conditional version of an International Capital Asset Pricing Model using a parsimonious multivariate GARCH process. Since our approach is fully parametric, we can recover any quantity that is a function of the first two conditional moments. Our findings strongly support a model which includes both market and foreign exchange risk. However, both sources of risk are only detected when their prices are allowed to change over time. The evidence also indicates that, with the exception of the U.S. equity market, the premium for bearing currency risk often represents a significant fraction of the total premium.

The trading profits of SOES bandits

Journal of Financial Economics 1998 50(1), 39-62 open access
SOES bandits are individual investors who use Nasdaq's Small Order Execution System (SOES) for day trading. Their average profit per trade is small, but they trade dozens or hundreds of times per week. Bandits usually establish a position before most market-makers have updated their quotes, and lay off the position at favorable prices through Instinet or SelectNet. It is noteworthy that they trade profitably with market-makers despite having less information. Bandits keep the profits and bear the losses from their trades. Thus they have greater incentives to trade well than the employees of market-making firms.

On the uses of corporate governance provisions

Journal of Corporate Finance 1998 4(4), 347-371
We document a large and broad-based increase in the use of corporate governance provisions in the late 1980s. As a result, most large publicly traded firms have complex governance structures. This violates an assumption implicit in many empirical studies that provision use is mutually independent. While overall provision use is not systematically related to industry grouping, the uses of some types of provisions are correlated. Most notably, supermajority vote requirements, classified boards, and shareholder meeting requirements tend to be used in concert. Firms reincorporating to Delaware tend to eliminate cumulative voting, and coverages by certain types of state antitakeover laws are correlated. We also find that firms with poison pills tend to have relatively high institutional ownership, low managerial ownership, and a high proportion of independent directors.