American options on the S&P 500 index futures that violate the stochastic dominance bounds of Constantinides and Perrakis (2009) from 1983 to 2006 are identified as potentially profitable trades. Call bid prices more frequently violate their upper bound than put bid prices do, while violations of the lower bounds by ask prices are infrequent. In out‐of‐sample tests of stochastic dominance, the writing of options that violate the upper bound increases the expected utility of any risk‐averse investor holding the market and cash, net of transaction costs and bid‐ask spreads. The results are economically significant and robust.

Intermediaries such as financial advisers serve as an interface between portfolio managers and investors. A large fraction of their compensation is often provided through kickbacks from the portfolio manager. We provide an explanation for the widespread use of intermediaries and kickbacks. Depending on the degree of investor sophistication, kickbacks are used either for price discrimination or aggressive marketing. We explore the effects of these arrangements on fund size, flows, performance, and investor welfare. Kickbacks allow higher management fees to be charged, thereby lowering net returns. Competition among active portfolio managers reduces kickbacks and increases the independence of advisory services.

This study explores how initial control choice influences the ease with which outsourcing firms switch suppliers. We recognize that firms invest in controls to manage collaborative relationships, and argue that these investments generate switching costs, namely, opportunity and reinvestment costs. We collect data on outsourcing transactions by conducting semi-structured interviews across multiple field sites. Observed patterns across 53 cases show that firms with trust-based controls experience the most difficulty in switching suppliers, whereas firms with market-based controls experience the greatest ease. Firms with bureaucratic-based and hybrid controls generally lie between these extremes. Furthermore, in nearly 50 percent of our sample (25 cases), respondents indicate that the switching costs associated with control choices increase the difficulty of switching suppliers. We also find evidence that the magnitude and nature of switching costs vary with the types of controls chosen. Data Availability: Data used in this study cannot be made public due to confidentiality agreements with participating firms.

We explore the relationship between outcomes in a coordination game and a pre-play asset market where asset values are determined by outcomes in the subsequent coordination game. Across two experiments, we vary the payoffs from the market relative to the game, the degree of interdependence in the game, and whether traders' asset payoffs are dependent on outcomes in their own or another game. Markets lead to significantly lower efficiency across treatments, even when they produce no distortion of incentives in the game. Market prices forecast game outcomes. Our experiments shed light on how financial markets may influence affiliated economic outcomes.

Algorithmic trading (AT) has increased sharply over the past decade. Does it improve market quality, and should it be encouraged? We provide the first analysis of this question. The New York Stock Exchange automated quote dissemination in 2003, and we use this change in market structure that increases AT as an exogenous instrument to measure the causal effect of AT on liquidity. For large stocks in particular, AT narrows spreads, reduces adverse selection, and reduces trade‐related price discovery. The findings indicate that AT improves liquidity and enhances the informativeness of quotes.

From 1997 to March 2000, as technology stocks rose more than five‐fold, institutions bought more new technology supply than individuals. Among institutions, hedge funds were the most aggressive investors, but independent investment advisors and mutual funds (net of flows) actively invested the most capital in the technology sector. The technology stock reversal in March 2000 was accompanied by a broad sell‐off from institutional investors but accelerated buying by individuals, particularly discount brokerage clients. Overall, our evidence supports the bubble model of Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003), in which rational arbitrageurs fail to trade against bubbles until a coordinated selling effort occurs.