We develop a pair of risk measures, health and mortality delta, for the universe of life and health insurance products. A life‐cycle model of insurance choice simplifies to replicating the optimal health and mortality delta through a portfolio of insurance products. We estimate the model to explain the observed variation in health and mortality delta implied by the ownership of life insurance, annuities including private pensions, and long‐term care insurance in the Health and Retirement Study. For the median household aged 51 to 57, the lifetime welfare cost of market incompleteness and suboptimal choice is 3.2% of total wealth.

This paper characterizes U.S. consumption dynamics from the perspective of a Bayesian agent who does not know the underlying model structure but learns over time from macroeconomic data. Realistic, high‐dimensional macroeconomic learning problems, which entail parameter, model, and state learning, generate substantially different subjective beliefs about consumption dynamics compared to the standard, full‐information rational expectations benchmark. Beliefs about long‐run dynamics are volatile, with counter‐cyclical conditional volatility, and drift over time. Embedding these beliefs in a standard asset pricing model significantly improves the model's ability to match the stylized facts, as well as the sample path of the market price‐dividend ratio.

We develop a model of performance evaluation and fund flows for mutual funds in a family. Family performance has two effects on a member fund's estimated skill and inflows: a positive common‐skill effect, and a negative correlated‐noise effect. The overall spillover can be either positive or negative, depending on the weight of common skill and correlation of noise in returns. Its absolute value increases with family size, and declines over time. The sensitivity of flows to a fund's own performance is affected accordingly. Empirical estimates of fund flow sensitivities show patterns consistent with rational cross‐fund learning within families.

We study the Lucas asset pricing model in a controlled setting. Participants trade two long‐lived securities in a continuous open‐book system. The experimental design emulates the stationary, infinite‐horizon setting of the model and incentivizes participants to smooth consumption across periods. Consistent with the model, prices align with consumption betas and comove with aggregate dividends, particularly so when risk premia are higher. Trading significantly increases consumption smoothing compared to autarky. Nevertheless, as in field markets, prices are excessively volatile. The noise corrupts traditional generalized method of moment tests. Choices display substantial heterogeneity, with no subject representative for pricing.

We show that unpriced cash flow shocks contain information about future priced risk. A positive idiosyncratic shock decreases the sensitivity of firm value to priced risk factors and simultaneously increases firm size and idiosyncratic risk. A simple model can therefore explain book‐to‐market and size anomalies, as well as the negative relation between idiosyncratic volatility and stock returns. Empirically, we find that anomalies are more pronounced for firms with high idiosyncratic cash flow volatility. More generally, our results imply that any economic variable correlated with the history of idiosyncratic shocks can help to explain expected stock returns.

Do behavioral biases of executives matter for corporate investment decisions? Using segment‐level capital allocation in multisegment firms (“conglomerates”) as a laboratory, we show that capital expenditure is increasing in the expected skewness of segment returns. Conglomerates invest more in high‐skewness segments than matched stand‐alone firms, and trade at a discount, which indicates overinvestment that is detrimental to shareholder wealth. Using geographical variation in gambling norms, we find that the skewness‐investment relation is particularly pronounced when CEOs are likely to find long shots attractive. Our findings suggest that CEOs allocate capital with a long‐shot bias.

Using five‐year credit default swap (CDS) spreads on 2,364 companies in 54 countries from 2004 to 2011, we find that firms exposed to stronger property rights through their foreign asset positions (institutional channel) and firms cross‐listed on exchanges with stricter disclosure requirements (informational channel) reduce their CDS spreads by 40 bps for a one‐standard‐deviation increase in their exposure to the two channels. These channels capture effects beyond those associated with firm‐ and country‐level fundamentals. Overall, we find that firm‐level global asset and information connections are important mechanisms to delink firms from their sovereign and country risks.

We propose a labor market model in which financial firms compete for a scarce supply of workers who can be employed as either bankers or traders. While hiring bankers helps create a surplus that can be split between a firm and its trading counterparties, hiring traders helps the firm appropriate a greater share of that surplus away from its counterparties. Firms bid defensively for workers bound to become traders, who then earn more than bankers. As counterparties employ more traders, the benefit of employing bankers decreases. The model sheds light on the historical evolution of compensation in finance.