Using the geographic location data of 218,554 commercial bank branches in China, we find that an increasing number of bank branches in the vicinity of enterprises, namely bank competition, leads to higher corporate employment, particularly for non-SOEs and SOEs with less government influence. Channel analyses reveal that better access to banking facilitates information extraction and eases credit constraints for surrounding firms, which thus increases labor investment. In addition, fintech development moderates the positive effect of bank competition on corporate employment. An exogenous policy shock as well as two instrumental variables, are used to correct for endogeneity and our results remain consistent. The findings are also robust to alternative samples, proxies, and different fixed effects. Further analyses show that bank competition improves firms’ labor investment efficiency and upgrades their employment structures. Lastly, increased employment improves the firm performance of non-SOEs.

In a cross-country setting, we document that stronger religiosity is associated with lower loan interest spread. In addition, we show that this negative association is more pronounced in countries with weaker creditor rights, suggesting that religious values play a more significant role in constraining opportunistic behavior in a weaker legal environment. Our analysis reveals that stronger religiosity is also related to other favorable terms in loan contracting, such as larger facility amount, use of accounting-based performance pricing, and lower upfront fee. Corroborating our cross-country findings, we also show that in the U.S. setting, firms in regions with stronger religiosity enjoy lower loan interest spread. Our study contributes to understanding the important role religiosity plays in debt financing.

We examine the relation between the use of collateral and financial reporting conservatism for a sample of Chinese firms. In the absence of flexibility in risk pricing through interest rates and strong contract enforcement in China, we find that lenders reduce collateral requirements from more conservative borrowers and that this negative relation is significantly moderated by borrowers’ poor credit quality and low asset tangibility. Our finding that conservatism can result in a tangible benefit in the form of lower collateral requirements indicates that lenders value financial reporting conservatism. However, the benefit from financial reporting conservatism is muted as lenders become more concerned about borrowers’ default risk or ability to pledge tangible assets as collateral against loans.

Using a novel database that tracks web traffic on the Security Exchange Commission's EDGAR server between 2004 and 2015, we show that institutional investors gather information on a very particular subset of firms and insiders, and their surveillance is very persistent over time. This tracking behavior has powerful implications for their portfolio choice and its information content. An institution that downloaded an insider trading filing by a given firm last quarter increases its likelihood of downloading an insider trading filing on the same firm by more than 41.3 percentage points this quarter. Moreover, the average tracked stock that an institution buys generates annualized alphas of over 12% relative to the purchase of an average non tracked stock. We find that institutional managers tend to track top executives and to share educational and locational commonalities with the specific insiders they choose to follow. Collectively, our results suggest that the information in tracked trades is important for fundamental firm value and is only revealed following the information-rich dual trading by insiders and linked institutions.

We design a field experiment to explore the use of social comparison to increase contributions to an online community. We find that, after receiving behavioral information about the median user's total number of movie ratings, users below the median demonstrate a 530 percent increase in the number of monthly movie ratings, while those above the median decrease their ratings by 62 percent. When given outcome information about the average user's net benefit score, above-average users mainly engage in activities that help others. Our findings suggest that effective personalized social information can increase the level of public goods provision.

We present a new method for solving asset pricing models, which yields an analytic price-dividend function of one state variable. To illustrate our method we give a detailed analysis of Abel's asset pricing model. A function is analytic in an open interval if it can be represented as a convergent power series near every point of that interval. In addition to allowing us to solve for the exact equilibrium price-dividend function, the analyticity property also lets us assess the accuracy of any numerical solution procedure used in the asset pricing literature. Copyright The Econometric Society 2005.

Over three-quarters of U.S. taxpayers receive federal tax refunds, largely due to income tax over-withholding. This study explores how over-withholding impacts investments by comparing individuals’ investment behavior following wage receipts and tax refunds. We find a significantly higher marginal propensity to invest out of wages than refunds, suggesting that over-withholding, which alters the labeling and timing of income, meaningfully influences financial decision-making. Our cross-sectional analysis indicates that the differential investment rates are more pronounced for individuals with automatic investment setups and lower financial sophistication. The difference cannot be fully explained by alternative explanations such as lack of awareness, fixed dollar investment goals, timing differences between wages and refunds, uncertainty of refunds, transaction costs, or the perception of refunds as additional windfall income. Our findings underscore the importance of considering behavioral factors in the formulation of tax policies and contribute to the accounting literature that examines taxes and investment behavior.

We employ a sharp regression discontinuity design to identify the causal effects of investor-base disclosure (IB DISCLOSE) on funding outcomes and entrepreneurship success. Since February 2016, Kickstarter has disclosed IB information, namely, backer statistics including geographic locations and previous funding experience of the backers, once the number of backers for a project reaches ten. Exploiting this discontinuity, we show the disclosure increases the likelihood of funding success by 10 percent and the amount of funds pledged by 13 percent. The effect is more pronounced when the project quality is high and for projects with less credible creators, high ex ante uncertainty, high information asymmetry between creators and backers, and high financial costs to backers. We also find IB DISCLOSE increases the likelihood of product delivery. Our study highlights the importance of platform-provided disclosure in improving the efficiency of capital allocation.

In China's political selection system, officials capable of growing local economies are rewarded with promotions. Eager to demonstrate economic achievements, newly appointed local leaders may raise tax revenues to expand fiscal expenditures on infrastructure projects. Against this backdrop, we study how political appointments influence local firms' tax planning. Based on a sample of locally administered state-owned enterprises (SOEs), we find that firms decrease their tax avoidance after new leaders take office. The political-turnover effect on these firms' tax positions is more evident when the incoming leaders have more political clout over SOE managers, the incentives to divert resources are stronger, or politician-manager networks are present, and subsides following the launch of the anticorruption campaign. Furthermore, firms with higher post-turnover tax payments subsequently receive more government contracts or subsidies. Overall, our findings suggest political incentives shape the tax-planning activities of SOE managers in a “two-way favor exchange” manner.

Rainfall measures may be imperfect proxies for floods, given factors such as upstream water balance, proximity to rivers, and topography. We check the robustness of flooding-migration relationships by combining nationally-representative survey data with measures of flooding derived from weather stations, gridded products, and remote sensing tools. Linear probability models reveal that extreme flooding is negatively associated with out-migration. Rainfall-based proxies produce results qualitatively similar to those using the satellite-based measure of inundation, but only the latter is able to discern non-monotonic effects throughout the distribution. Moreover, estimates differ widely across areas, suggesting that households respond differently to rainfall and flooding.