Knowledge that Transforms

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The State of Economic Education

American Economic Review 1999 89(2), 355-361
During the first fifty years of the American Economic Association (AEA), its leaders considered the teaching of economics to be an important subject for discussion and debate. AEA founders set as a goal ... to educate public opinion about economic questions and economic literature (Elton Hinshaw and Siegfried, 1991 p. 373). During the last 50 years, AEA leaders have largely ceded questions on teaching to specialists. In 1955, the Association created the Committee on Economic Education (CEE) and charged it with improving the status of economic within the profession, stimulating and encouraging professional work on economic education, and arranging economics-education sessions at the AEA meetings. The Association later revised the charge to include actively ... improving the quality of economic at all levels, from pre-college to college, adult and general economic education (Hinshaw and Siegfried, 1991). It is time to direct the attention of the entire profession, not just economic specialists, toward the importance of educating a broad spectrum of the public about economics.

Land Reform and Farm Restructuring: What Has Been Accomplished to Date?

American Economic Review 1999 89(2), 271-275
The countries of East Central Europe (ECE) and the former Soviet Union (FSU) entered the transition in 1989–1990 with a common heritage in agriculture: most land, regardless of its ownership, was cultivated collectively in large-scale farms with thousands of hectares and hundreds of member-workers; the commercial production from the collective sector was supplemented by subsistence-oriented individual agriculture based on rural household plots of less than one hectare; product markets and input supply channels were largely controlled by state organizations within an administrative command framework; budget constraints virtually did not exist. The persistent inefficiency of socialized agriculture was usually attributed to collective production, which is rare in countries with a marketoriented economy, and to farm sizes that were too large compared to the observed market ‘‘best practice.’’ The strategy of agricultural transition formulated in the early 1990’s accordingly envisaged a transformation from collective to individual agriculture as the ultimate goal. Individual farmers could form associations to ensure efficient farm services and engage in land transactions to achieve optimal farm sizes. Pragmatic considerations suggested an intermediate stage involving transition to downsized but still relatively large corporate or cooperative farms based on private ownership of land and assets and with radically modified, profit-motivated management.

Fertility Decline in the Developed World: Where Will It End?

American Economic Review 1999 89(2), 256-260
This paper presents a brief overview of fertility trends in post-transitional societies. Average fertility in the developed world reached a post-World War II maximum at 2.8 births per woman (bpw) during the peak of the baby boom in the late 1950s. Steep declines in the 1960s and 1970s left fertility below replacement reaching just 1.7 bpw during 1990-95. Below replacement fertility is now the norm in the developed world as well as in a small but growing number of populations elsewhere particularly Asian countries. This paper uses the total fertility rate (TFR) which is the most widely used indicator of period fertility to measure levels and trends in the fertility of populations. However ongoing changes in the timing of childbearing affect the fertility level measured in a given year or period. Examining parents childbearing intentions would be useful since TFR and other period measures of fertility may give misleading information. The findings state the reasons why current low fertility is unlikely to decline much further and may even rise in the future in a number of countries. The first reason is that the TFR is a hypothetical measure that can and often does give an inaccurate indication of the actual rate of childbearing of women. This rate is not as slow as implied by the TFR in many developed countries. A second reason for expecting fertility not to decline further is that couples in most post-transitional societies plan to have about two children.

Intrinsic Bubbles: The Case of Stock Prices: Comment

American Economic Review 1999 89(5), 1372-1376
Some recent empirical evidence suggests that stock prices are not properly modelled as the present discounted value of expected dividends and that empirical models incorporating nonlinear bubble components better fit the data. In this paper we show that the nonlinearity in the relationship between prices and dividends may arise from how managers choose dividend payout. In particular, we propose a model of managed dividends which can explain observed long-term trends in stock prices. This model of managed dividends is shown to be observationally equivalent to the popular intrinsic bubbles model.(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Gender Differences in Salary and Promotion in the Humanities

American Economic Review 1999 89(2), 397-402
In their annual review of academic salaries, the American Association of University Professors observes large gender-related salary differentials. At doctoral-level institutions, male professors at the rank of full professor earn 11.4% more than women full professors. Data on academic labor markets from the Survey of Doctorate Recipients to evaluate gender differences in salaries and promotion probabilities. Differences in employment outcomes by gender are found using two methods: the Oaxaca decomposition is used to examine salary differentials, and duration analysis is used to estimate promotion to tenure. While gender salary differences can largely be explained by academic rank, substantial gender differences in promotion to tenure exist after controlling for productivity, demographic characteristics, and primary work activity.

Toward a General Theory of Wage and Price Rigidities and Economic Fluctuations

American Economic Review 1999 89(2), 75-80 open access
This article begins with the hypothesis that large economic fluctuations--the marked changes in the unemployment rate that characterize market economies--are a consequence of problems of adjustment to disturbances, especially adjustments of wages and prices. The article argues that because different prices (including prices of labor and capital) are determined in different ways, shocks lead to marked changes in relative prices, and those disturbances in relative prices greatly exacerbate economic fluctuations. The author looks closely at the price-setting process, providing further insights into why prices exhibit rigidities and why different prices may adjust at different rates. He then explores the consequences of asymmetric price responses.

Economic Growth: How Good Can It Get?

American Economic Review 1999 89(2), 40-44
Can we know how good future economic growth can be if we do not know how good it has been? Apparent changes in the structure of the economy, notably, the rise of information technology, skill-extensive technical change, and a potential reversion to nonmarket production, will serve to increase the effort needed to maintain our already tenuous grasp on measuring income, wages, and well-being. Piecing together available measures, the United States appears to have been experiencing substantial economic growth as measured by both per-family income and wealth. The well-known dispersion of income by education is evident, with earnings of those with less than high-school education on the decline, but rising for those with college education or more. For families in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) headed by a male aged 25–64, mean family income rose by 11.5 percent, from $58,585 (1997 CPI-U dollars) for 1983 to $65,292 for 1993. If one factors in a 1-percent per annum correction factor to the CPI (Matthew D. Shapiro and David W. Wilcox, 1997; Michael J. Boskin et al., 1998), average real family income grew on the order of 22 percent in 10 years. Rising family income is not explained simply by more workers per family, since the civilian labor-force participation rate rose only 1.5 percentage points, from 65.3 percent in 1986 to 66.8 percent in 1996. Nor does the rise in income appear to be the result of more market hours per week. If anything, hours per worker may have declined, overall. Average weekly hours in the private sector are reported to have changed only trivially, declining from