ABSTRACT We study the effects of alternative halt and reopening procedures on prices, transaction costs, and trading activity for a sample of news‐related trading halts on Nasdaq. For intraday halts that reopen after only a five‐minute quotation period, inside quoted spreads more than double following halts and volatility increases to more than nine times normal levels. In contrast, halts that reopen the following day with a longer 90‐minute quotation period are associated with insignificant spread effects and significantly dampened volatility effects. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that increased information transmission during the halt results in reduced posthalt uncertainty.

We investigate factors that explain firms' decisions to disclose and record contingent tax liabilities. Our findings are based on confidential Internal Revenue Service audit data and financial statement footnotes for 100 large industrial firms from 1987 to 1995. Descriptive statistics indicate that these firms often fail to disclose IRS claims for tax deficiencies that exceed a 5-percent-of-income rule of thumb. We find that the probability of disclosure increases in the relative amount of the claim or the expected loss, although the largest claims drive this result. Our evidence is consistent with firms using a stable measure of size, such as assets or normal income, to gauge materiality, rather than relying only on current period reported income. We also find that the amount accrued for the contingent liability increases in the amount of the expected loss. However, our inferences may not generalize beyond a population of large, frequently audited firms.

We consider a setting in which a firm uses residual income to motivate a manager's investment decision. Textbooks often recommend adjusting the residual income capital charge for market risk, but not for firmspecific risk. We demonstrate two basic flaws in this recommendation. First, the capital charge should not be adjusted for market risk. Charging a market risk premium results in “double” counting because a risk-averse manager will personally consider this risk. Second, while investors can avoid firm-specific risk through diversification, a manager cannot. If the manager faces significant firm-specific risk at the time he makes his investment decision, then it is optimal to charge him less than the riskless return so as to partially offset his reluctance to undertake risky investments. On the other hand, the manager will vary his investment decisions with the pre-decision information he receives, which accentuates his compensation risk, and the firm must compensate him for bearing this additional risk. Hence, if the manager will receive relatively precise pre-decision information, then it is optimal to charge him more than the riskless return to reduce the variability of his investment decisions.

ABSTRACT Prior literature finds that diversified firms sell at a discount relative to the sum of the imputed values of their business segments. We explore this documented discount and argue that it stems from risk‐reducing effects of corporate diversification. Consistent with this risk‐reduction hypothesis, we find that (a) shareholder losses in diversification are a function of firm leverage, (b) all equity firms do not exhibit a diversification discount, and (c) using book values of debt to compute excess value creates a downward bias for diversified firms. Overall, the results indicate that diversification is insignificantly related to excess firm value.

The distance between small firms and their lenders is increasing, and they are communicating in more impersonal ways. After documenting these systematic changes, we demonstrate they do not arise from small firms locating differently, consolidation in the banking industry, or biases in the sample. Instead, improvements in lender productivity appear to explain our findings. We also find distant firms no longer have to be the highest quality credits, indicating they have greater access to credit. The evidence indicates there has been substantial development of the financial sector, even in areas such as small business lending.

We present a method for decomposing wholesale electricity payments into production costs, inframarginal competitive rents, and payments resulting from the exercise of market power. Using data from June 1998 to October 2000 in California, we find significant departures from competitive pricing during the high-demand summer months and near-competitive pricing during the lower-demand months of the first two years. In summer 2000, wholesale electricity expenditures were $8.98 billion up from $2.04 billion in summer 1999. We find that 21 percent of this increase was due to production costs, 20 percent to competitive rents, and 59 percent to market power.

We study the residential choice of siblings who are altruistic towards their parents. The first-born child’s location choice influences the behavior of the second-born child and can shift some of the burden of providing care for the parents from one child to the other. These strategic considerations lead to an equilibrium location pattern with firstborn children locating further away from their parents than second-born children. We also analyze the location choices empirically using German data. These data confirm our theoretical predictions.

In 1998, the SEC expressed concern that conference calls encourage selective disclosure by revealing new information to financial analysts privy to the call. This study investigates whether the regular use of earnings-related conference calls increases the amount of information available to financial analysts by examining the effect of conference calls on analysts' forecast error and dispersion. Results indicate that conference calls increase analysts' ability to forecast earnings accurately, suggesting that these calls increase the total information available about a firm. We also find some evidence that conference calls decrease dispersion among analysts. Given conference calls were generally restricted during our sample period, our evidence suggests that conference calls may have contributed to an information gap between analysts privy to the call and the remainder of the investment community. We also investigate whether conference calls differentially affect analysts' forecast errors depending on analysts' prior forecasting ability or brokerage-house affiliation. We find evidence suggesting that analysts with relatively weak prior forecasting performance benefit more from conference calls, suggesting that conference calls help “level the playing field” across analysts.