I. The conceptual framework, 396. — II. The model, 402. — III. Empirical application, 406. — IV. Some extensions of the analysis, 411. — V. Conclusion, 421.

This article suggests that the lack of use of rights offerings in the United States, a phenomenon referred to as the equity underwriting paradox, can be explained by transaction costs. A sample of underwritten rights offerings provides support for the explanation. Firms making underwritten rights offerings paid lower underwriter fees but incurred significantly larger price drops just prior to the offering than did firms making underwritten offerings. Further analysis reveals that the underwritten-rights-offering price concessions are a form of transaction cost that is not found in underwritten public offerings.

OUR empirical knowledge of the demand and structural interrelationships of the economy at the regional level is indeed limited. Some understanding of these interrelationships can be gained through (1) the economic baseforeign trade multiplier approach, (2) the regional interindustry (input-output) approach, and (3) various other approaches, involving linear programming and the like, which are not of concern here.' Although the interindustry approach seems superior to the base-multiplier approach for most, though not all, purposes, the real difficulty lies in translating either approach into an operational one so that meaningful estimates of these interrelationships can be generated at a reasonable cost. This is a rather unfortunate state of affairs because it means that decision makers have no firm guidelines to use in attempting to assess the impact of autonomous demand forces upon regional economies or specific sectors within them. In an attempt to at least partially remedy this situation, we have developed an alternative type of framework which, for the lack of a better name, can be called an intersectoral flows model. This model incorporates certain features of the base-multiplier approach in addition to certain features of a regional interindustry approach hopefully some of the best features of each in terms of our objectives. In designing the model, one of the main concerns was that it be operational, in the sense that the necessary data could be obtained at a reasonable cost. Thus, to the extent that this objective is achieved, the restrictions on making such studies and repeating them may no longer be so formidable. The particular region chosen for study is California and the three major subregions within the State. Since the interest here is in the model and its implementation, as contrasted with the implications for the California economy, major attention will be focused on these topics.

The paper studies the effects and the determinants of interregional redistribution in a model of residential and political choice. We find that paradoxical consequences of interjurisdictional transfers arise if people are mobile: while self-sufficient regions are necessarily identical with respect to policies and average incomes in our model, interregional redistribution always leads to the divergence of regional policies and per capita incomes. Thus, interregional redistribution prevents inter regional equality. At the same time, however, transfers may allow for more inter personal equality among the inhabitants of each region. The voting population may therefore in a decision over the fiscal constitution deliberately implement such a transfer scheme to foster regional divergence. Empirical evidence from panel data from OECD countries and Canadian provinces is consistent with the theory.

In this article, the authors develop alternative ways to compare asset pricing models when it is understood that their implied stochastic discount factors do not price all portfolios correctly. Unlike comparisons based on chi square statistics associated with null hypotheses that models are correct, the authors' measures of model performance do not reward variability of discount factor proxies. One of their measures is designed to exploit fully the implications of arbitrage-free pricing of derivative claims. The authors demonstrate empirically the usefulness of their methods in assessing some alternative stochastic factor models that have been proposed in asset pricing literature.

Studies suggest that underwriting syndicates provide marketing services and certify the fairness of offer prices. The authors argue that syndicate lead banks also monitor manager effort, increasing the value of capital-raising companies. A given level of monitoring is associated with a given level of intrinsic value, so there is a "schedule" of certifiable offer prices, depending on the level of monitoring. Monitoring, marketing, and certification are, therefore, all legitimate syndicate functions. New evidence supporting the conclusion that syndicates provide corporate monitoring is presented.