ABSTRACT Focusing on data from the United States and the United Kingdom, we document that both the anomaly identified by Backus and Smith, which concerns the low correlation between consumption differentials and exchange rates, and the forward premium anomaly, which concerns the tendency of high interest rate currencies to appreciate, have become more severe over time. Taking into account different capital mobility regimes, we show that these anomalies turn into general equilibrium regularities in a two‐country and two‐good economy with Epstein and Zin preferences, frictionless markets, and correlated long‐run growth prospects.

ABSTRACT This paper examines the stock market reaction to 15 events relating to IFRS adoption in the United States. The goal is to assess whether investors perceive the switch to IFRS as beneficial or costly. Our findings suggest that investors' reaction to IFRS adoption is more positive in cases where IFRS is expected to lead to convergence benefits. Our results also indicate a less positive market reaction for firms with higher litigation risk, which is consistent with investors' concerns about greater discretion and less implementation guidance under IFRS for these firms. Overall, the findings are relevant to the current debate on IFRS adoption in the U.S. and highlight the importance of convergence to investors. Data Availability: All data are publicly available from the sources indicated in the paper (see Appendices A and B).

ABSTRACT This study examines the effect of timing (gradual versus immediate) and direction (tax increase or decrease) of a tax change on taxpayer behavior. Specifically, we focus on capital gain tax changes and preferences for investment in riskier assets. We run an experiment with 117 participants who allocate investment dollars between two funds of differing risk. Drawing on mental accounting and hedonic editing (Thaler 1985; Thaler and Johnson 1990), we posit that a tax decrease (a “gain”) implemented gradually over several years will result in a greater increase in risky investment once the decrease is fully implemented than when the tax change is implemented all at once. In contrast, once a tax increase (a “loss”) is fully implemented, a smaller decrease in risky investment will result when the change occurs all at once rather than gradually. Our findings support these expectations, suggesting that the manner of implementing a tax law change may impact decisions. Data Availability: Contact the authors.

One long-standing hypothesis about science and engineering labor markets is that the supply of highly skilled workers is likely to be inelastic in the short run. We consider the market for computer scientists and electrical engineers (IT workers) and the evolution of wages and employment through two periods of increased demand. Relative to the boom of the 1970s, the demand shock in the 1990s generated relatively greater changes in employment and smaller changes in wages. The growth in the pool of skilled workers abroad, combined with increased immigration in high-skill fields, is central to this story.

ABSTRACT: Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) comment letters provide independent and timely feedback on the clarity of disclosures and on the extent to which filings comply with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles and SEC reporting regulations. We investigate factors that affect the probability of receiving a 10-K comment letter, the extent of comments received, and the cost of remediation. We find that in addition to factors explicitly stated to increase SEC scrutiny in Section 408 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, low profitability, high complexity, engaging a small audit firm, and weaknesses in governance are positively associated with the receipt of a comment letter, the extent of comments, and the cost of remediation. The probability that the comment letter results in a restatement is higher for smaller companies and for companies engaging a small audit firm. We also provide evidence that comments relating to accounting issues result in higher remediation costs, largely due to the additional time required to resolve comments relating to classification issues and fair value issues. Our findings should be of interest to stakeholders who use SEC comment letters to assess disclosure quality and reporting compliance, and to managers and other stakeholders impacted by costs associated with the SEC's review process. Data Availability All data used in the study are publicly available from the sources cited in the text.

ABSTRACT We investigate whether politically sensitive contractors pay higher taxes and whether their bargaining power reduces these tax costs. Using federal contractor data, we develop a new composite measure of political sensitivity that captures both the political visibility arising from federal contracts and the importance of federal contracts to the firm. We proxy for bargaining power using the firm-level proportion of contract revenues not subject to competition, the firm-level proportion of contract revenues arising from defense contracts, and industry-level concentration ratios. We find that politically sensitive firms pay higher federal taxes, all else equal. However, firms with greater bargaining power incur fewer tax-related political costs. Our study provides new evidence on the political cost hypothesis in a tax setting and the first evidence of the interactive effects of a firm's political sensitivity and bargaining power on tax-related political costs. JEL Classifications: M41; H26

We explain a counterintuitive empirical finding: Firms facing more import competition do more innovation. In our model, factors are trapped inside a firm. An increase in import competition encourages a firm to innovate by reducing the opportunity cost of inputs. Without trapped factors, trade liberalization leads to a small permanent increase in the worldwide rate of growth. With trapped factors, firms that face more import competition do relatively more innovation. The extra innovation induced by trapped factors induces a small permanent increase in aggregate output, consumption, and welfare, generalizing the appropriate estimate of the gains from trade.

Firms’ inability to commit to future funding choices has profound consequences for capital structure dynamics. With debt in place, shareholders pervasively resist leverage reductions no matter how much such reductions may enhance firm value. Shareholders would instead choose to increase leverage even if the new debt is junior and would reduce firm value. These asymmetric forces in leverage adjustments, which we call the leverage ratchet effect, cause equilibrium leverage outcomes to be history-dependent. If forced to reduce leverage, shareholders are biased toward selling assets relative to potentially more efficient alternatives such as pure recapitalizations.

Report: Ad Hoc Search Committee for the Editor of the American Economic Journal: Economic Policy by David Cutler, Amy Finkelstein, Adriana Lleras-Muney, James Poterba, David Romer and Robert Shimer. Published in volume 103, issue 3, pages 774 of American Economic Review, May 2013

ABSTRACT: This study focuses on the relation between current compensation and past performance measures as signals of a chief executive officer's (CEO's) ability. We develop a simple two-period principal-agent model with moral hazard and adverse selection and test theoretical predictions using CEO compensation data from 1993–2006. Consistent with the predictions, we find that salary (bonus) is positively (negatively) associated with past performance for both continuing and newly hired CEOs. We also find that while current salary is positively associated with future performance, current bonus is not. As the model suggests, salary is adjusted to meet the reservation utility and information rent, and is positively correlated over time to reflect ability. Bonus serves to address moral hazard and adverse selection by separating high-ability agents into riskier contracts. Our results indicate that it is important to disaggregate cash compensation into salary and bonus components to understand the dynamic interaction between incentives and performance. Data Availability: Data are available from public sources indicated in the text.