Knowledge that Transforms

We re-examine the day-of-the-week effect for eleven indexes from nine countries during the 1969–1992 period. The standard methodology as well as the moving average methodology are used and we find returns to be lower at the beginning of the week (but not necessarily on Monday) for the full period. As in Chang et al. (International evidence on the robustness of the day-of-the-week effect, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 28 (1993), 497–514), the anomaly disappears for the most recent period in the USA. However, the effect is still strong for European countries, Hong-Kong and Toronto.

Using 1989–1992 individual data of 757 German cooperative banks and applying the intermediation approach we specify a multi-product translog cost function for this part of the German banking industry. For all size classes moderate economies of scale can be identified. There is also evidence of economies of scope which supports the notion of universal banking. As for cost efficiency, we find that the average banks in all size classes deviate considerably from the best practice cost frontier. All banks enjoy growth of total factor productivity, which is higher for the smaller banks in the sample.

This paper compares the intra-day patterns on the NYSE and AMEX of volatility, trading volume and bid-ask spreads for European and Japanese dually-listed stocks with American stocks of comparable average trading volume and volatility. It is shown that the intra-day patterns for these stocks are remarkably similar even though public information flows differ markedly across these stocks during the trading day. In the early morning, all stocks have higher volatility than later in the day, but this phenomenon is most pronounced for Japanese stocks and affects American stocks the least. We argue that these patterns are consistent with markets reacting to the overnight accumulation of public information but are inconsistent with the view that early morning volatility can be attributed to monopolistic specialist behavior.

This paper takes a novel approach to derive a central bank intervention reaction function. A GARCH model for exchange rates is amended to allow interventions to have an effect on both the mean and the variance of exchange rate returns. An intervention reaction function is obtained by combining the model with a loss function for the central bank. Estimation results for the implied friction model reproduce the familiar ‘leaning against the wind’ policy by the Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve. Furthermore, the central banks appear to have reacted to increases in the conditional variance of daily DM/$-returns.

This study presents an integrated investigation into the factors affecting executive ownership, the market value of the firm, and executive compensation by explicitly incorporating the simultaneity of the process determining these variables into the empirical estimation. Overall, the results of the study support the notion that a firm's market value, executive stock ownership, and executive compensation are jointly determined. Further, the findings suggest that executive stock ownership and executive compensation may serve as a type of bond by which top executives are induced to act in the best interests of shareholders. The study also finds that a firm's q ratio and an executive's job-specific experience (as well as firm size) are important determinants of executive compensation. This result is generally consistent with the view that the firm optimally establishes its managerial compensation plan in response to both its operating environment and the specific personal characteristics of its chief executive(s).

Using a sample of Finnish initial public offerings, we find that the fraction of equity retained by the original shareholders is significantly positively related to the market-to-brook ratio. The result is consistent with the Leland and Pyle (1977) hypothesis suggesting that the original shareholders can signal the quality of their firm by their willingness to retain equity. Moreover, we find that management ownership's association with relative firm value is significantly positive at low ownership levels but insignificant at high ownership levels. This gives some support for the agency hypothesis which suggests that corporate value is a function of managerial equity ownership.

In providing financial services jointly, banks may reduce costs due to complementarities in production (cost economies of scope) or raise revenues from complementarities in consumption (revenue economies of scope). Cost economies of scope between bank deposits and loans have been found to be small. Revenue economies of scope are investigated here for the first time and found to be insignificant over 1978–1990 for both small and large banks and for those on or off the revenue-efficient frontier. The lack of complementarities between deposits and loans — where benefits are most likely to occur — suggests that claims of important synergies from an expansion of banking powers be taken with caution.

This study provides further empirical investigation, in the context of giant Japanese banks, of the recent claim by Pulley and Braunstein (1992, A composite cost function for multiproduct firms with an application to economies of scope in banking, Review of Economics and Statistics 74, 221–230), that their new composite model for the multiproduct cost function has important advantages over the separable quadratic, generalized translog and standard translog models. In addition to assessing the composite model's relative ability in measuring global scope and scale economies, the study also extends the P-B analysis to assess measurement of product-specific scope and scale economies, pairwise cost complementarities between outputs, changes in the marginal costs of outputs and technological change. The results appear to confirm P-B's chain. The persistent finding of scale economies for large Japanese banks is also investigated and confirmed.

Based on a sample of 492 takeovers we examine the performance effects of acquisitions and mergers between EC credit institutions over the period 1988–1993. The sample is subdivided according to the degree of managerial leverage on the part of the acquirer and the degree of operational integration. The results indicate that domestic mergers among equal-sized partners significantly increase the performance of the merged banks. Improvement of cost efficiency is also found in cross-border acquisitions. On the other hand, domestic takeovers are found to be influenced predominantly by defensive and managerial motives such as size maximization.

The goal of this paper is to determine whether the tax-timing option effect documented in the U.S. bond market exists outside the U.S. Examining Canadian tax rules suggests that the tax option effect is simpler and less valuable than in the U.S. This view is supported by simulations in the spirit of Constantinides and Ingersoll (1984) as well as by empirical tests conducted on bond triplets following Jordan and Jordan (1991).