Knowledge that Transforms

This paper examines the performance of the leading methods for setting capital requirements for securities firms' trading books. Tests are conducted on a large sample of UK equity market makers' books over a substantial number of periods of equity market stress from 1985 to 1995. The comprehensive and building-block approaches, favoured by US and European regulators, fail to provide effective cover. Only portfolio-based, value-at-risk (VaR) type models are efficient in providing appropriate levels of capital to cover the position risk of equity trading books.

This study empirically examines volatility in US and Japanese commodity futures markets. The US futures market, COMEX, is double auction with continuous trading, whereas the Japanese futures market, TOCOM, was Walrasian with discrete trading until April 1991. We find intraday volatility for gold futures contracts to be significantly higher on COMEX than TOCOM throughout the sample period and is attributable to differences in information flows and market micro-structures. Evidence is also provided that exchange volume conveys information both within and across markets, which is consistent with the French and Roll, 1986 (French, K.R., Roll, R., 1986. Stock return variances: The arrival of information and the reaction of traders. Journal of Financial Economics 17, 5–26) private-information based rational trading model. Finally, daily variance and autocorrelation estimates within COMEX are consistent with the extant literature on equity markets.

Measured with intraday data in a 1987–1991 sample period, the mark/dollar exchange rate was affected by unanticipated information about the trade deficit and the consumer price index. The exchange rate showed no significant response to news about money supply, industrial production, the producer price index, or unemployment. Trade deficit surprises were negatively correlated with the value of the dollar as expected. CPI surprises showed a positive correlation, as would be predicted by sticky price models of exchange rates. The market's reaction to the 8:30am trade deficit announcement was complete by 9am, but the market's response to the CPI announcement was not as immediate. No significant reaction had occurred by 9am, and the spot price did not fully digest the information until 1pm. Significant responses were present in the 9am, 11am, and noon hours. Alternate measures of currency returns failed to explain this delayed response.

This short comment reinterprets some of the results found by Linda Allen and Anoop Rai in their paper, ‘Operational efficiency in banking: An international perspective’ (Journal of Banking and Finance 20, 1996, 655–672).

In this paper earnings, dividends and stock prices are modelled within a plausible economic framework. The first stage in the analysis involves characterization of the dynamic behavior of earnings, evidence was found for mean reverting behavior in the long term, and weaker evidence for mean reversion in the short term. The relationship between dividends and earnings is then examined using a modified form of the Lintner model. The empirical results suggest the modified formulation performs as effectively as the original Lintner approach. Using these findings, we then develop the functional form of the corresponding share price relationship. As a consequence of using a generalized model for earnings we are able to examine theoretically, the effect of different earnings processes on share price behavior. The empirical results imply that changes in earnings per share and earnings per share are important in explaining returns.

To avoid problems associated with Jensen's inequality, we use a corrected inefficiency measure to compare the estimate of inefficiency obtained using the distribution free (DF) method with the estimate obtained using the stochastic cost frontier (SCF). The results of the paper are unchanged. The DF method yields measures of inefficiency that are significantly higher than measures obtained using the SCF.

In a sample of 251 Swedish IPOs, evidence is provided that employees, customers, suppliers, and others with non-arm length connections with the issuing firm and the investment bank are favored investors. The allocation suggests that underpricing serves as indirect compensation. The hypothesis is supported by the significant drop in average initial return from 41% to 8% around a regulatory tax change which reduced the incentive to favor employees of the issuing firm and of the investment bank. The paper concludes that the tax wedge between ordinary income and capital gains contributed to a portion of the underpricing before the regulatory change.

Forty-nine states and the District of Columbia enacted legislation reducing interstate banking restrictions between July 1982 and April 1993. For these 50 banking bills, deregulation increased the average price of bank stocks. Returns vary cross-sectionally by firm characteristics, regulatory features, and economic conditions. Returns are positively related to the characteristics of acquisition targets. Furthermore, returns are positively related to legislative features that increase the bargaining power of potential targets and economic conditions that are likely to encourage bank acquisition. These findings are consistent with the relaxation of geographic restrictions increasing activity in the corporate control market.

Recent models of IPO underpricing suggest that high-quality firms underprice their IPOs to differentiate themselves from low-quality firms and, thus, receive a more favorable market response to subsequent equity offerings. We test this suggestion for 172 industrial firms that made an initial public offering during 1987–1991 and made a subsequent seasoned equity offering within three years of their IPO. We examine two measures of the impact of the hypothesized underpricing signal net of the cost of employing that signal. Inconsistent with the underpricing signal hypothesis, we find no evidence that firms recover the cost of an underpriced IPO in either higher issue proceeds or in greater wealth for the firm's initial owners.

This paper examines whether golden parachute adoptions in the banking industry during the eighties aligned the interests of CEOs with those of regulators and or shareholders. Our results provide evidence supporting concerns expressed by regulators: that boards of directors behaved opportunistically by adopting golden parachutes prior to large bank failures in order to exploit the FDIC guarantee. Parachute adoption was correlated with poor performance ex ante and ex post. Moreover, adoption of parachutes virtually ceased when the FDIC guarantee was withdrawn by FDICIA.