Knowledge that Transforms

How should we assess the changing economic status of workers and families in the United States? The answer is obvious to many, including outstanding economists who decry the meager wage growth and rising wage and income inequality in the United States since 1979 (Paul Krugman, 1992; Richard Freeman, 1996/1997; James Tobin, 1996/1997 ) . According to Freeman (1996/1997) the following ‘‘facts are not in dispute’’:

The fundamental importance of economic institutions for economic growth through their impact on technological change has long been argued by Joseph Schumpter and others. Recent empirical studies have reconfirmed such arguments. Robert Barro (1997) finds that economic and political institutions are the most important factors in explaining differences in growth across economies. New growth theory has made major breakthroughs in endogenizing technological changes. However, although some insightful and inspiring discussions of institutional impacts of innovation are provided, there is little attempt in these models to explain what, aside from capital, labor inputs, and knowledge accumulation, determines innovation. An attempt is made to fill the gap in literature by examining how financial institutions affect technological innovation and thus affect growth.

We propose a unified theoretical framework within which to interpret and evaluate the foundational principles of GATT. Working within a general equilibrium trade model, we represent government preferences in a way that is consistent with national income maximization but also allows for the possibility of distributional concerns as emphasized in leading political-economy models. Using this general framework, we establish that GATT's principles of reciprocity and non-discrimination can be viewed as simple rules that assist governments in their effort to implement efficient trade agreements. From this perspective, we argue that preferential agreements undermine GATT's ability to deliver efficient multilateral outcomes. (JEL F02, F13, F15)

Cracks in the Glass Ceiling: Gender and Promotion in the Economics Profession by John M. McDowell, Larry D. Singell and James P. Ziliak. Published in volume 89, issue 2, pages 392-396 of American Economic Review, May 1999

ABSTRACT We document strong positive correlation between changes in institutional ownership and returns measured over the same period. The result suggests that either institutional investors positive‐feedback trade more than individual investors or institutional herding impacts prices more than herding by individual investors. We find evidence that both factors play a role in explaining the relation. We find no evidence, however, of return mean‐reversion in the year following large changes in institutional ownership—stocks institutional investors purchase subsequently outperform those they sell. Moreover, institutional herding is positively correlated with lag returns and appears to be related to stock return momentum.

We analyze the trading activity of the mutual fund industry from 1975 through 1994 to determine whether funds “herd” when they trade stocks and to investigate the impact of herding on stock prices. Although we find little herding by mutual funds in the average stock, we find much higher levels in trades of small stocks and in trading by growth‐oriented funds. Stocks that herds buy outperform stocks that they sell by 4 percent during the following six months; this return difference is much more pronounced among small stocks. Our results are consistent with mutual fund herding speeding the price‐adjustment process.

This paper documents a strong and prevalent momentum effect in industry components of stock returns which accounts for much of the individual stock momentum anomaly. Specifically, momentum investment strategies, which buy past winning stocks and sell past losing stocks, are significantly less profitable once we control for industry momentum. By contrast, industry momentum investment strategies, which buy stocks from past winning industries and sell stocks from past losing industries, appear highly profitable, even after controlling for size, book‐to‐market equity, individual stock momentum, the cross‐sectional dispersion in mean returns, and potential microstructure influences.

We analyze tests for long‐run abnormal returns and document that two approaches yield well‐specified test statistics in random samples. The first uses a traditional event study framework and buy‐and‐hold abnormal returns calculated using carefully constructed reference portfolios. Inference is based on either a skewness‐adjusted t ‐statistic or the empirically generated distribution of long‐run abnormal returns. The second approach is based on calculation of mean monthly abnormal returns using calendar‐time portfolios and a time‐series t ‐statistic. Though both approaches perform well in random samples, misspecification in nonrandom samples is pervasive. Thus, analysis of long‐run abnormal returns is treacherous.

ABSTRACT Cash‐rich firms are more likely than other firms to attempt acquisitions. Stock return evidence shows that acquisitions by cash‐rich firms are value decreasing. Cash‐rich bidders destroy seven cents in value for every excess dollar of cash reserves held. Cash‐rich firms are more likely to make diversifying acquisitions and their targets are less likely to attract other bidders. Consistent with the stock return evidence, mergers in which the bidder is cash‐rich are followed by abnormal declines in operating performance. Overall, the evidence supports the agency costs of free cash flow explanation for acquisitions by cash‐rich firms.

ABSTRACT The strong bias in favor of domestic securities is a well‐documented characteristic of international investment portfolios, yet we show that the preference for investing close to home also applies to portfolios of domestic stocks. Specifically, U.S. investment managers exhibit a strong preference for locally headquartered firms, particularly small, highly levered firms that produce nontraded goods. These results suggest that asymmetric information between local and nonlocal investors may drive the preference for geographically proximate investments, and the relation between investment proximity and firm size and leverage may shed light on several well‐documented asset pricing anomalies.