Knowledge that Transforms

We document strong positive correlation between changes in institutional ownership and returns measured over the same period. The result suggests that either institutional investors positive‐feedback trade more than individual investors or institutional herding impacts prices more than herding by individual investors. We find evidence that both factors play a role in explaining the relation. We find no evidence, however, of return mean‐reversion in the year following large changes in institutional ownership—stocks institutional investors purchase subsequently outperform those they sell. Moreover, institutional herding is positively correlated with lag returns and appears to be related to stock return momentum.

We analyze the trading activity of the mutual fund industry from 1975 through 1994 to determine whether funds “herd” when they trade stocks and to investigate the impact of herding on stock prices. Although we find little herding by mutual funds in the average stock, we find much higher levels in trades of small stocks and in trading by growth‐oriented funds. Stocks that herds buy outperform stocks that they sell by 4 percent during the following six months; this return difference is much more pronounced among small stocks. Our results are consistent with mutual fund herding speeding the price‐adjustment process.

This paper documents a strong and prevalent momentum effect in industry components of stock returns which accounts for much of the individual stock momentum anomaly. Specifically, momentum investment strategies, which buy past winning stocks and sell past losing stocks, are significantly less profitable once we control for industry momentum. By contrast, industry momentum investment strategies, which buy stocks from past winning industries and sell stocks from past losing industries, appear highly profitable, even after controlling for size, book‐to‐market equity, individual stock momentum, the cross‐sectional dispersion in mean returns, and potential microstructure influences.

We analyze tests for long‐run abnormal returns and document that two approaches yield well‐specified test statistics in random samples. The first uses a traditional event study framework and buy‐and‐hold abnormal returns calculated using carefully constructed reference portfolios. Inference is based on either a skewness‐adjusted t ‐statistic or the empirically generated distribution of long‐run abnormal returns. The second approach is based on calculation of mean monthly abnormal returns using calendar‐time portfolios and a time‐series t ‐statistic. Though both approaches perform well in random samples, misspecification in nonrandom samples is pervasive. Thus, analysis of long‐run abnormal returns is treacherous.

Cash‐rich firms are more likely than other firms to attempt acquisitions. Stock return evidence shows that acquisitions by cash‐rich firms are value decreasing. Cash‐rich bidders destroy seven cents in value for every excess dollar of cash reserves held. Cash‐rich firms are more likely to make diversifying acquisitions and their targets are less likely to attract other bidders. Consistent with the stock return evidence, mergers in which the bidder is cash‐rich are followed by abnormal declines in operating performance. Overall, the evidence supports the agency costs of free cash flow explanation for acquisitions by cash‐rich firms.

The strong bias in favor of domestic securities is a well‐documented characteristic of international investment portfolios, yet we show that the preference for investing close to home also applies to portfolios of domestic stocks. Specifically, U.S. investment managers exhibit a strong preference for locally headquartered firms, particularly small, highly levered firms that produce nontraded goods. These results suggest that asymmetric information between local and nonlocal investors may drive the preference for geographically proximate investments, and the relation between investment proximity and firm size and leverage may shed light on several well‐documented asset pricing anomalies.

We use data on ownership structures of large corporations in 27 wealthy economies to identify the ultimate controlling shareholders of these firms. We find that, except in economies with very good shareholder protection, relatively few of these firms are widely held, in contrast to Berle and Means's image of ownership of the modern corporation. Rather, these firms are typically controlled by families or the State. Equity control by financial institutions is far less common. The controlling shareholders typically have power over firms significantly in excess of their cash flow rights, primarily through the use of pyramids and participation in management.