This paper presents a model that provides an explanation, based on regime switching in the real interest rate and learning, of why tests based on stock-adjustment models, Euler equations, or decision rules—which emphasize short-run fluctuations in inventories and the interest rate—are unlikely to uncover a negative relationship between inventories and the real interest rate. The model, however, predicts that inventories will respond to long-run movements, that is, to regime shifts in the real interest rate. Tests emphasizing cointegration techniques confirm this prediction and show a significant long-run relationship between inventories and the real interest rate.

[This study investigates the influence of both the state corporate income tax rate and the form of the income tax base structure on foreign investment in manufacturing assets. An econometric model of foreign investment is derived from a supply-oriented theory of regional investment. That is, the decision to develop productive capacity in one region as opposed to another is due to regional advantages. Empirical results suggest that tax structures that use the unitary method of accounting have a substantial impact on the amounts of foreign investment. On the other hand, business income tax rates appear to have little impact.]

[Little is known about the speed and accuracy of aggregate taxpayer response to an income tax law change. Using a multiple time series model, it was found that individuals and corporations quickly and relatively accurately adjust their income tax prepayments in response to a tax increase.]

We obtain daily data for warrants traded on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange between 1909 and 1922, and for a broker's call option quotes on stocks from 1908 to 1911. We use this new data set to test how close derivative prices are to Black–Scholes (1973) prices and to compute profits for investors using a simple trading rule for call options. We examine whether investors exercised warrants optimally and how they reacted to extensions of the warrants' durations. We show that long before the development of the formal theory, investors had an intuitive grasp of the determinants of derivative pricing.

Blaine Huntsman, Basil J. Moore, Robert M. Soldofsky, Session Topic: Asset Management and Monetary Policy: Discussion, The Journal of Finance, Vol. 24, No. 2, Papers and Proceedings of the Twenty-Seventh Annual Meeting of the American Finance Association Chicago, Illinois December 28-30, 1968 (May, 1969), pp. 239-247

We consider an economy that has to decide how assets are to be used. Agents have ideas, but these ideas conflict. We suppose that decision‐making authority is determined by hierarchy: each asset has a chain of command, and the most senior person with an idea exercises authority. We analyze the optimal hierarchical structure given that some agents coordinate and other specialize. Among other things, our theory explains why coordinators should typically be senior to specialists and why pyramidal hierarchies may be optimal. Our theory also throws light on the optimal degree of decentralization inside a firm and on firm boundaries.

This paper provides a framework for addressing the question of when transactions should be carried out within a firm and when through the market. Following Grossman and Hart, we identify a firm with the assets that its owners control. We argue that the crucial difference for party 1 between owning a firm (integration) and contracting for a service from another party 2 who owns this firm (nonintegration) is that, under integration, party 1 can selectively fire the workers of the firm (including party 2), whereas under nonintegration he can "fire" (i.e., stop dealing with) only the entire firm: the combination of party 2, the workers, and the firm's assets. We use this idea to study how changes in ownership affect the incentives of employees as well as those of owner-managers.

Charles Bean, Mathias Dewatripont, John Moore; Special Issue: The Econometrics of Financial Markets, The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 58, Issue 3, 1