Fundamentals of EC structural change underwriting new issues of securities corporate financial advisory services rules and precedures governing European mergers and acquisitions secondary market brokerage and trading investment management services securities industry regulation in the EC competitive positioning of investment banking players conclusions and implications.

Results from the Iowa Political Stock Market are analyzed to ascertain how well markets work as aggregators of information. The authors find that the market worked extremely well, dominating opinion polls in forecasting the outcome of the 1988 presidential election, even though traders in the market exhibited substantial amounts of judgment biases. Their explanation is that judgment bias refers to average behavior, while in markets it is marginal traders who influence price. They present evidence that in this market a sufficient number of traders were free of judgment bias so that the market was able to work well.

What causes individual suppliers to allocate goods in such a way that the aggregate allocation satisfies the law of one price? A satisfactory answer to this question must confront two related problems: Equal net prices at all allocations provide no information to suppliers about the quantity to deliver to a specific location, and strategic uncertainty makes an observed violation of the law of one price an unreliable indicator of a profit opportunity. This paper develops a simple analytical framework to formalize these two problems, reviews some solutions found in the literature, and reports laboratory evidence on how people solve them. In addressing these issues, we focus on the role historical prices play in coordinating decentralized allocation decisions.

What causes individual suppliers to allocate goods in such a way that the aggregate allocation satisfies the law of one price? A satisfactory answer to this question must confront two related problems: Equal net prices at all allocations provide no information to suppliers about the quantity to deliver to a specific location, and strategic uncertainty makes an observed violation of the law of one price an unreliable indicator of a profit opportunity. This paper develops a simple analytical framework to formalize these two problems, reviews some solutions found in the literature, and reports laboratory evidence on how people solve them. In addressing these issues, we focus on the role historical prices play in coordinating decentralized allocation decisions.

Most of the evidence on consumption-based asset pricing is based on seasonally adjusted consumption data. The consumption-based models have not worked well for explaining asset returns, but with seasonally adjusted data there are reasons to expect spurious rejections of the models. This paper examines asset pricing models using not seasonally adjusted aggregate consumption data. We find evidence against models with time-separable preferences, even when the models incorporate seasonality and allow seasonal heteroskedasticity. A model that uses not seasonally adjusted consumption data and nonseparable preferences with seasonal effects works better according to several criteria. The parameter estimates imply a form of seasonal habit persistence in aggregate consumption expenditures.

Most of the evidence on consumption‐based asset pricing is based on seasonally adjusted consumption data. The consumption‐based models have not worked well for explaining asset returns, but with seasonally adjusted data there are reasons to expect spurious rejections of the models. This paper examines asset pricing models using not seasonally adjusted aggregate consumption data. We find evidence against models with time‐separable preferences, even when the models incorporate seasonality and allow seasonal heteroskedasticity. A model that uses not seasonally adjusted consumption data and nonseparable preferences with seasonal effects works better according to several criteria. The parameter estimates imply a form of seasonal habit persistence in aggregate consumption expenditures.

This paper examines daily excess bond returns associated with announcements of additions to Standard and Poor's Credit Watch List, and to rating changes by Moody's and Standard and Poor's. Reliably nonzero average excess bond returns are observed for additions to Standard and Poor's Credit Watch List when an expectations model is used to classify additions as either expected or unexpected. Bond price effects are also observed for actual downgrade and upgrade announcements by rating agencies. Excluding announcements with concurrent disclosures weakens the results for downgrades, but not upgrades. The stock price effects of rating agency announcements are also examined and contrasted with the bond price effects.