Modern insurance products are becoming increasingly complex, offering various guarantees, surrender options and bonus provisions. A case in point are the with-profits insurance policies offered by UK insurers. While these policies have been offered in some form for centuries, in recent years their structure and management have become substantially more involved. The products are particularly complicated due to the wide discretion they afford insurers in determining the bonuses policyholders receive. In this paper, we study the problem of an insurance firm attempting to structure the portfolio underlying its with-profits fund. The resulting optimization problem, a non-linear program with stochastic variables, is presented in detail. Numerical results show how the model can be used to analyze the alternatives available to the insurer, such as different bonus policies and reserving methods.

This article examines managerial ownership structure and return premia on corporate bonds. It is argued that when managerial ownership is low, an increase in managerial ownership increases management's incentives to increase stockholder wealth at the expense of bondholder wealth. When ownership increases more, however, it is argued that management becomes more risk averse, with incentives more closely aligned with bondholders. This study finds a positive relation between managerial ownership and bond return premia in the low to medium (5 to 25 percent) ownership range. There is also weak evidence for a nonpositive relation in the large (over 25 percent) ownership range.

We examine the impact on a firm when it is forced to switch its bank relationship from one branch to another branch of the same bank, and how the firm’s information opacity (as proxied by the frequency with which the firm provides financial statements to the bank) moderates the consequences of relationship loss. We find the effect depends on the relative balance between the hard accounting information provided to the bank and the soft information about the firm due to its prior branch relationship. We show the loss of soft information provided to loan officers at the new branch, as a result of the forced branch switch, has a significant effect on the cost, maturity, and availability of loans from the new branch. Furthermore, we document the moderating effect of accounting information opacity on loan conditions upon relationship loss.

Journal Article New Books on the Principle of Population Get access C. P. Wright C. P. Wright Food Research Institute, Stanford University, Calif. Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 38, Issue 4, August 1924, Pages 666–682, https://doi.org/10.2307/1884596 Published: 01 August 1924