Knowledge that Transforms

Journal Article A Note on the Interpretation and Estimation of Parkin's Discount House Portfolio Model Get access Kenneth W. Clements Kenneth W. Clements The University of Western Australia Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 48, Issue 3, July 1981, Pages 533–535, https://doi.org/10.2307/2297165 Published: 01 July 1981 Article history Received: 01 July 1980 Accepted: 01 December 1980 Published: 01 July 1981

Benjamin Eden, Ariél Pakes; On Measuring the Variance-Age Profile of Lifetime Earnings, The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 48, Issue 3, 1 July 1981, Pa

of Mannheim University has brought to my attention an error in my paper "Large Economies with Trading Uncertainty". The example of an allocation mechanism described on pp. 329-332 does not satisfy the condition of relative continuity as claimed on p.332. The reason is that the definition, as given in the paper, is a rather gross misstatement of what I had in mind and makes some of the accompanying analysis nonsensical. Fortunately, the matter is not hard to put right. Two passages in the text must be rewritten as follows.

Journal Article On the Complete Solution of the Linear Cournot Oligopoly Model Get access Wilhelm Gehrig Wilhelm Gehrig Universität Karlsruhe Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 48, Issue 4, October 1981, Pages 667–670, https://doi.org/10.2307/2297208 Published: 01 October 1981 Article history Received: 01 March 1981 Accepted: 01 June 1981 Published: 01 October 1981

In a recent paper, Markusen and Scheffman (1978) (M & S) have examined the effects of ownership concentration in urban land markets on the equilibrium land use pattern in a circular city. At the heart of their approach is the observation that (a) the natural upper bound on the supply of land within any fixed distance x from the CBD constitutes an effective barrier to entry, and therefore, (b) a who owns a significant proportion of land at x has market power to the extent that he can affect the rent profile for the city by withholding some or all of his land. In particular M & S show that the existence of a landowner in the above sense may imply the existence of vacant land at points inside the city boundary as the withholds some of his land in order to force up rents and make a higher profit on the land which he does not leave vacant. The city analysed by M & S is the familiar circular one with all employment in the CBD and all residents located in a sequence of concentric dormitory suburbs. In particular housing is assumed perfectly malleable and divisible (or, equivalently, M & S are looking at cities which are instantaneously built from nothing to their present form). It has been demonstrated by the author in Vousden (1980) that such an approach to urban housing cannot be assumed to provide a valid description of a city even in the long run. In addition it prevents us from looking at a range of interesting real-world urban phenomena such as demolition of older housing. This paper extends the M & S model to allow for non-malleable, indivisible housing. The general framework is a simplified version of that employed in Vousden (1980). As in that paper and in M & S, developers and households will be assumed to hold static price expectations. The general outline of the paper is as follows. Section 1 presents those basic elements of the model which are common to a competitive city and a city with a large landowner. Section 2 summarizes the properties of a non-malleable competitive city. Section 3 presents the problem faced by a profit maximizing large (LL) and compares the competitive city of Section 2 with a city containing a single LL as well as a large number of competitive developers (CD's).' The broad spirit of M & S' results are shown to carry over here. In particular, it is shown that the large will act in a way which pushes up the rent profile for the city and thereby increases the radius of the city.2 However LL has a widei range of devices for bringing about an upward shift in the rent function than is the case in [M & S]. In the malleable model his choice is between supplying the same output of housing services as CD's at a given location or simply withholding land from the market. In our model he can affect urban rents by (a) withholding vacant land (as in M & S); (b) supplying housing of a lower density than CD's at a given location; (c) delaying upward redevelopment at a particular location longer than CD's; (d) leaving existing structures unoccupied (abandonment). In particular M & S' result that LL will withhold land near the city boundary carries over

Several recent papers have developed partial or complete characterization of classes of social decision functions in terms of constructs based upon the associated collections of decisive sets. Hansson (1976) interpreted Arrow’s impossibility theorem in terms of the associated ultrafilter of decisive sets. Brown (1973) extended this correspondence to the case of acyclic choice functions and prefilters. To deal with the multiplicity of social decision functions having the same collection of decisive sets, Brown restricted the class of social decision functions while Ferejohn and Fishburn (1979) and Blau and Brown (1980) added structure to the collections of decisive sets, and thereby obtained a characterization of certain social decision functions.

Journal Article Transaction Costs, Uncertainty and Generally Inactive Futures Markets Get access H. M. Shefrin H. M. Shefrin University of Santa Clara Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 48, Issue 1, January 1981, Pages 131–137, https://doi.org/10.2307/2297125 Published: 01 January 1981 Article history Received: 01 October 1978 Accepted: 01 April 1980 Published: 01 January 1981

Journal Article A Note on Pasinetti's “Ricardian System” Get access P. J. Eygelshoven, P. J. Eygelshoven University of Groningen Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar S. K. Kuipers S. K. Kuipers University of Groningen Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 48, Issue 1, January 1981, Pages 185–186, https://doi.org/10.2307/2297132 Published: 01 January 1981 Article history Received: 01 October 1979 Accepted: 01 May 1980 Published: 01 January 1981

In this paper I develop an N-person stochastic game in which each player views himself as facing a Markov decision process. Specifically, every player is assumed to choose his strategy as a policy which is optimal with respect to the process in question. It is clear that such a strategy need not be a best reply to the strategy choices of the other players, so a Nash equilibrium might not be appropriate for this game. Consider the following alternative equilibrium concept. Every player compares the subjective transition probabilities from his Markov decision process with the objective frequencies which he encounters during the course of the game. If no player receives disconfirming evidence about the subjective probabilities he is using, then the game is said to be in informational equilibrium. In this case the subjective probabilities are termed self-generating. Clearly, an informational equilibrium falls into the class of fulfilled expectations or rational equilibria. The main result of the paper is that an informational equilibrium exists for the game under consideration. The motivation for studying this particular class of games derives from the microeconomic treatment of household and firm intertemporal decisions under uncertainty. In economic theory it is common to treat these decision problems within a dynamic programming Markov decision process framework.' Here Markov transistion probabilities are used to describe the random prices faced by households and the random demand functions faced by firms. A question which would seem to be of considerable interest involves the problem of how one might model a complete economy in which each agent treats his own decision problem as a Markov decision process. Choosing an appropriate equilibrium concept would naturally be of paramount importance. This is the essential issue with which the present paper is concerned. It is important though to emphasize that the underlying approach does not really depend upon the specification of any particular economy. Therefore the general framework is described in terms of an