Knowledge that Transforms

Many studies find that parental resources importantly determine children's human capital, schooling returns, and earnings. The collective household approach suggests that, in addition, parental resources of marital partners may importantly affect resource distributions within marriage. This paper presents empirical results consistent with this framework. They suggest that parental wealth continues to play roles in augmenting welfare of children into adulthood beyond provision of human capital in early life-cycle stages or direct financial aid during adulthood, and that actual transfers from parents to adult children do not fully measure influences of parental wealth on behaviors and welfare of adult children.

We study the effects of a change in financial aid policy introduced by a Northeastern university in 1998. Prior to that time, the university s financial aid packages for low income students consisted of grants, loans, and campus jobs. After the change, the entire loan portion of the package for low-income students was replaced with grants. We find the program increased the likelihood of matriculation by low-income students by about 3 percentage points, although the effect is not statistically significant. The effect among low-income minority students was about twice that size and statistically significant at the 10 percent level.

In popular discussion much has been made recently of the susceptibility of government policies to lobbying by foreigners. The general presumption has also been that such interactions have a deleterious effect on the home economy. However, it can be argued that, in a trade policy context, bending policy in a direction that would suit foreigners may not in fact be harmful: If the policy outcome absent any lobbying by foreigners is characterized by welfare-reducing trade barriers, lobbying by foreigners may result in reductions in such barriers and raise consumer surplus (and possibly improve welfare). Using a new data set on foreign political activity in the US, this paper investigates the relationship between trade protection and lobbying activity empirically. The approach taken in this paper is primarily a structural one. To model the role of foreign and domestic lobbies in determining trade policy, we develop first a theoretical framework building on the wellknown work of Our analysis of the data suggests that foreign lobbying activity has significant impact on trade policy -and in the predicted direction: Tariffs and non-tariff barriers (NTBs) are both found to be negatively related with foreign lobbying activity. We consider also extended specifications in which we include a large number of additional explanatory variables that have been suggested in the literature as determinants of trade policy (but that emerge from outside of the theoretical structure described above) and confirm the robustness of our findings in this setting.

The maturity date of a mortgage loan marks the end of monthly mortgage payments for homeowners. In the period after the last payment, homeowners experience an increase in their disposable income. Our study interprets this event as an anticipated increase in income, and tests whether households smooth consumption over the transition period as predicted by the rational expectation Life-Cycle/Permanent-Income Hypothesis. We find households do not alter nondurable goods consumption in the period following the last mortgage payment. Instead, they increase both financial savings and savings in durable goods such as housefurnishings and entertainment equipments in the year of the last mortgage payment.

A structural labor demand model is developed that allows for worker heterogeneity regarding firing costs and productivity. It is estimated for a firm in demise when 3,650 workers were made redundant in a restructuring following bankruptcy. This was the largest mass layoff in the history of the Netherlands. The model produces sharp predictions on how firing thresholds depend on individual worker characteristics. The signs of the estimated coefficients are consistent with these predictions. The model correctly predicts 68% of individual worker displacement. The results provide new in-depth knowledge on how firing costs influence personnel decisions.

Employers became more willing to hire a range of disadvantaged workers during the 1990s boom—including minorities, workers with certain stigmas (such as welfare recipients), and those without recent experience or high school diplomas. The wages paid to newly hired less-skilled workers also increased. On the other hand, employers' demand for specific skill certification rose over time, as did their use of certain screens. The results suggest that the tight labor markets of the late 1990s, in conjunction with other secular changes, raised hiring costs and induced employers to shift toward screens that seemed more cost-effective.

We would expect that the process of globalization between 1870 and 1914 and subsequent disintegration of the world economy during the interwar period would have led first to income convergence and then to income divergence between the participating countries. But in fact we find stronger evidence for income convergence during the interwar period than during the first globalization. Similarly, the average level of import protection in the world cannot be shown to have either helped or hampered convergence. The evidence for trade-induced convergence is therefore weak.

This note shows that the local average treatment effect (LATE) assumptions of Angrist and Imbens are weaker than imposing an ordered, discrete-choice selection model if one imposes the standard assumption of constant thresholds in the latter. However, the note extends results of Vytlacil to show that the LATE assumptions are equivalent to an ordered, discrete-choice selection model if one allows for random thresholds in the latter. A nonparametric representation result for ordered, discrete-choice models is produced as a by-product of these results.

Foreclosure laws govern the rights of borrowers and lenders when borrowers default on mortgages.Many states protect borrowers by imposing restrictions on the foreclosure process; these restrictions, in turn, impose large costs on lenders.Lenders may respond to these higher costs by reducing loan supply; borrowers may respond to the protections imbedded in these laws by demanding larger mortgages.I examine empirically the effect of the laws on equilibrium loan size.I exploit the rich geographic information available in the 1994 and 1995 Home Mortgage Disclosure Act data to compare mortgage applications for properties located in census tracts that border each other, yet are located in different states.Using semiparametric estimation methods, I find that defaulter-friendly foreclosure laws are correlated with a four percent to six percent decrease in loan size.This result suggests that defaulter-friendly foreclosure laws impose costs on borrowers at the time of loan origination.