Knowledge that Transforms

We construct a dynamic general equilibrium model in which the typical industry colludes by threatening to punish deviations from an implicitly agreed-on pricing path. We use methods similar to those of Kydland and Prescott to calibrate linearized versions of both our model and an analogous perfectly competitive model. We then compute the two models' predictions concerning the economy's responses to a change in military spending. The responses predicted by the oligopolistic model are closer to the empirical responses estimated with postwar U.S. data than the corresponding predictions of the competitive model.

It is well known that the inability to observe workers' full labor market productivity can bias estimates of compensating wage differentials. This paper attempts to determine how serious this bias is likely to be. It adopts a stochastic framework of workers' tastes over job attributes and models their equilibrium wage-job attribute choices. Workers' productivity is assumed to consist of observed and unobserved components. Applying the standard estimation methodology, we find that the degree of bias can be surprisingly large. On the basis of our analysis, we conclude that contemporary labor market studies are likely to severely underestimate workers' willingness to pay for job attributes. This has implications for a number of applications of compensating wage differentials, including value of life studies.

A time-series counterpart of Engel's law is that the expenditure share on food declines as the economy grows. The main purpose of this paper is to test whether Houthakker's addilog utility function can simultaneously explain this time-series observation and cross-sectional observations concerning Engel's law. Ogaki and Park's cointegration approach is used to estimate parameters of the utility function from time-series data. Total expenditure elasticities implied by the estimated addilog utility function are compared with estimates of the elasticities from cross-sectional data.

This paper estimates the effects of school quality--measured by the pupil/teacher ratio, average term length, and relative teacher pay--on the rate of return to education for men born between 1920 and 1949. Using earnings data from the 1980 census, we find that men who were educated in states with higher-quality schools have a higher return to additional years of schooling. Rates of return are also higher for individuals from states with better-educated teachers and with a higher fraction of female teachers. Holding constant school quality measures, however, we find no evidence that parental income or education affects average state-level rates of return.

This paper analyzes the effects of inflation on the dispersion of prices, as well as other aspects of price behavior, using disaggregated data on prices of foodstuffs in Israel during 1978-84. We find that the effect of expected inflation on intramarket price variability is stronger than the effect of unexpected inflation. We show that even in times of high inflation, price quotations are not trivially short and price changes are not synchronized across firms. These facts, taken together, confirm that there is some staggering in the setting of prices. We find that the distribution of real prices is far from being uniform, as many menu cost-based models assume or conclude. In fact, as inflation increases to very high levels, this distribution is not even symmetric. When the annual inflation rate reaches 130 percent, there are equal chances of finding real prices above or below the market average, but upward deviations in the real price are further away from zero than downward ones. Furthermore, as the annual rate of inflation more than doubles from 60 to 130 percent, real prices are pushed toward both tails of the distribution.

We describe a model in which rental and owner housing are risky assets, tenure choice is endogenous, and each household is constrained to consume the same amount of owner housing that it has in its investment portfolio. At each iteration in the search for an equilibrium, we determine the new taxable income for each of 3,578 households (from the Survey of Consumer Finances), and we use statutory schedules to find the marginal rate and tax paid. Equilibrium net rates of return are major determinants of the amount of owner housing, but a logit model indicates that demographic factors are the main determinants of ownership rates. In our simulation, taxes on owner housing would raise welfare not only by reallocating capital but also by the government's taking part of the risk from individual properties and diversifying it away. Measures to disallow property tax or mortgage interest deductions do not help share this risk. Simulations of the 1986 tax reform indicate a small shift from rental to owner housing and welfare gains from reallocating risk.

The paper develops a general, "collective" model of household labor supply in which agents are characterized by their own (possibly altruistic) preferences, and household decisions are only assumed to be Pareto efficient. An alternative interpretation is that there are two stages in the internal decision process: agents first share nonlabor income, according to some given sharing rule; then each one optimally chooses his or her own labor supply and consumption. This setting is shown to generate testable restrictions on labor supplies. Moreover, the observation of labor supply behavior is sufficient for recovering individual preferences and the sharing rule (up to a constant). Finally, the traditional tools of welfare analysis can be adapted to the new setting.

It is not unusual for reforming socialist economies to relax wage controls without hardening budget constraints on enterprises or freeing consumer goods prices. This policy can be dangerously destabilizing. While higher wages permit workers to purchase more of some goods, they also tend to exacerbate shortages and to breed waste and corruption. Beyond a certain level, economywide wage hikes will worsen worker welfare. This is true regardless of whether deficit goods are strictly rationed, are sold randomly at official prices to queuing workers, or are offered to workers by "insiders" only at black-market prices. However, the form of allocation does influence the levels of output and welfare.

This paper investigates the feasibility of a monetary policy aimed at pegging the nominal rate of interest. It shows that under general conditions such a policy would produce the well-known cumulative process, despite the fact that there exists a well-behaved rational expectations equilibrium with no tendency for inflation to accelerate or decelerate. The cumulative process shows up as the failure of learning to converge to rational expectations. Specifically, the paper shows, first in a conventional IS-LM model with an expectations-augmented Phillips curve and then in a micro-based finance constraint model, that if people follow any learning rule based on experience that satisfies a weak condition, then the sequence of temporary equilibria under a policy of interest pegging cannot converge. The nonconvergent path that will be observed accords with the familiar cumulative process, in that inflation accelerates if the market rate of interest has been pegged below the natural rate.

We contrast properties of real quantities with those of price levels and stocks of money for ten countries over the last century. Although the magnitude of output fluctuations has varied across countries and periods, relations among real quantities have been remarkably uniform. Properties of price levels, however, exhibit striking differences between periods. Inflation rates are more persistent after World War II than before, and price-level fluctuations are typically procyclical before World War II and countercyclical afterward. Fluctuations in money are less highly correlated with output in the postwar period but are no more persistent than in earlier periods.