Knowledge that Transforms

Savings and Portfolio Choice in a Two-Period Two-Asset Model by Saku Aura, Peter Diamond and John Geanakoplos. Published in volume 92, issue 4, pages 1185-1191 of American Economic Review, September 2002

The well-known positive association between health and income in adulthood has antecedents in childhood. Not only is children’s health positively related to household income, but the relationship between household income and children's health becomes more pronounced as children age. Part of the relationship can be explained by the arrival and impact of chronic conditions. Children from lower income households with chronic conditions have worse health than do those from higher-income households. The adverse health effects of lower income accumulate over children’s lives. Part of the intergenerational transmission of socioeconomic status may work through the impact of parents' income on children’s health.

We develop a dynamic model with knowledge spillovers in production. The model contains two opposing forces. Imitation of other firms helps followers catch up with leaders, but the prospect of doing so makes followers want to free ride. The second force dominates and creates permanent inequality. We show that the greater are the average spillovers and the easier they are to obtain, the greater is the free-riding and inequality. More directed copying raises inequality by raising the free-riding advantages of hanging back. Using Compustat and patent-citation data we find that copying is highly undirected.

We measure monetary policy shocks as changes in the Fed funds target rate that surprise bond markets in daily data. These shock series avoid the omitted variable, time-varying parameter, and orthogonalization problem of monthly VARs, and do not impose the expectations hypothesis. We find surprisingly large and persistent responses of bond yields to these shocks. 10 year rates rise as much as 8/10 of a percent to a one percent target shock. The usual view that monetary policy only temporarily raises long term rates and influences inflation would lead one to predict a negative long rate response.

Although theory on corruption is well developed, it has proven difficult to isolate corrupt behavior empirically. In this paper, we provide overwhelming statistical evidence documenting match rigging in Japanese sumo wrestling. A non-linearity in the incentive structure of promotion leads to gains from trade between wrestlers on the margin for achieving a winning record and their opponents. We show that wrestlers win a disproportionate share of the matches when they are on the margin. Collusion, rather than increased effort, appears to explain the results. Wrestlers who are victorious when needing a victory lose more often than would be expected the next time they meet that same opponent, suggesting that part of the payment for throwing a match is future payment in kind. Cheating disappears in times of high media scrutiny. In addition to collusion by individual wrestlers, there is also evidence of reciprocity agreements across stables of wrestlers, suggesting a centralized element to the match rigging.

Within a simple New Keynesian model emphasizing forward-looking behavior of private agents, I evaluate optimal nominal income growth targeting versus optimal inflation targeting. When the economy is mainly subject to shocks that do not involve monetary policy trade-offs for society, inflation targeting is preferable. Otherwise, nominal income growth targeting may be superior because it induces inertial policy making, which improves the inflation–output-gap trade-off. Somewhat paradoxically, inflation targeting may be relatively less favorable the more society dislikes inflation, and the more persistent are the effects of inflation-generating shocks.

Trade has been considered a condition for growth and development, a view that might have merits in explaining the rise of the Western world. I use a new data set from archival sources of eighteenth-century China to revisit this question. This analysis suggests previous studies of market integration, which attribute much growth to a reduction in transport costs, have overestimated these effects. I find the overall level of market integration in China was higher than previously thought, and, intertemporal effects are important substitutes for trade. Both factors reduce the importance of trade as a unique explanation for subsequent growth.

We provide simple mechanisms to implement the efficient allocation of pollution, first assuming complete information across firms and then allowing for incomplete information. Both mechanisms operate by inducing firms to monitor one another, using firms’ reports to determine pollution allotments and transfers. The complete information mechanism determines a firm’s transfer according to a linear pollution price, set by other firms. Both mechanisms can be modified to be budget-balanced, in and out of equilibrium. The complete information mechanism implements the efficient allocation even when firms are allowed to use mixed strategies. Under a “single-crossing” condition, the same holds for the incomplete

Between 1800 and 1940 the U.S. went through a dramatic demographic transition. In 1800 the average woman had 7 children, and 94 percent of the population lived in rural areas. By 1940 the average woman birthed just 2 kids, and only 43 percent of populace lived in the country. The question is: What accounted for this shift in the demographic landscape? The answer given here is that technological progress in agriculture and manufacturing explains these facts.