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Vouchers for Private Schooling in Colombia: Evidence from a Randomized Natural Experiment

American Economic Review 2002 92(5), 1535-1558
Colombia used lotteries to distribute vouchers which partially covered the cost of private secondary school for students who maintained satisfactory academic progress. Three years after the lotteries, winners were about 10 percentage points more likely to have finished 8th grade, primarily because they were less likely to repeat grades, and scored 0.2 standard deviations higher on achievement tests. There is some evidence that winners worked less than losers and were less likely to marry or cohabit as teenagers. Benefits to participants likely exceeded the $24 per winner additional cost to the government of supplying vouchers instead of public-school places.

IQ and Income Inequality in a Sample of Sibling Pairs from Advantaged Family Backgrounds

American Economic Review 2002 92(2), 339-343
The Bell Curve (Richard Herrnstein and Murray, 1994) presented data on the independent effect of IQ on a wide variety of social and economic outcomes for members of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY). To control for socioeconomic background, we constructed an index using the standard three indicators: parental education, occupation, and income. Among the many threads in the response to The Bell Curve, the following question arose: How much would the independent effect of IQ have been attenuated if a broader set of family background variables had been used as controls? To test this, Sanders Korenman and Christopher Winship conducted a fixedeffects analysis of the large number of siblings within the NLSY, in effect controlling not just for socioeconomic status, but for everything in the shared environment of the family. The results were that [w]ith a few exceptions, the fixed-effects for AFQT [the cognitive test used in the NLSY] are remarkably similar to the standard OLS and logit estimates (Korenman and Winship, 2000 p. 146). The independent effect of IQ is robust across methods. I subsequently conducted my own analysis of the NLSY siblings for a publication on income inequality and IQ (Murray, 1998). In the course of that work, another aspect of sibling analysis struck me. The procedure, which is used in this paper as well, begins by identifying every sibling pair in which one sibling had scored in the normal range, defined as a tested IQ of 90-109, and the other member of the pair had scored somewhere outside that range. Those in the normal range were used as the reference group against which sibling outcomes were compared. I then limited the sample to full biological siblings, to take genetics out of the picture, and further limited the sample to sibling pairs in which the siblings had lived with both biological parents for at least seven years after birth, to minimize differential family backgrounds arising from divorce and remarriage. Both limits on the sample were essential to preserve the virtues of the sibling comparison. But notice what had been done in the process. In applying those conditions, the sibling sample represented a population in which all parents were wed when the child was born (zero illegitimacy) and all young children were brought up by both biological parents during their most formative years (zero early divorce). Such a population is one that has achieved much of what we ideally want to achieve through social policy. The thought occurred to me: why not complete the process? Having already created a sample without illegitimacy and early divorce, why not slay as well the great beast of social policy, poverty? To achieve that, I lopped off the sibling pairs whose parents were anywhere in the bottom 25 percent of the income distribution as of 1978-1979, when the NLSY began. This produced a sample of 733 sibling pairs who grew up in households which, by 1978-1979, had a median parental family income of $64,586 and a minimum income of $30,486 (expressed in 2000 dollars). For practical purposes, I had by this process nearly achieved the utopia of income distribution as defined by many, one in which the lowest income is half the median income. I hereby dub these 733 pairs the utopian sample. It is utopian not just because it has virtually no illegitimacy, divorce, and poverty. The way it has been selected has also necessarily effected drastic improvements in the neighborhoods, peers, and educational systems which the youths attended. The members of the utopian sample had a big edge in their potential access to college, both economically and because the sample is highly selected for the kind of parents who actively encourage their children to continue their educations. The same selection factors mean that I have created a sample in * American Enterprise Institute, 1150 17th Street, N.W., Washington, DC 20036.

International Spillovers and Water Quality in Rivers: Do Countries Free Ride?

American Economic Review 2002 92(4), 1152-1159
Transboundary spillovers may degrade environmental quality if countries free ride. This paper examines the extent of such degradation in water quality in international rivers. Using data from river monitoring stations in the UN's Global Emissions Monitoring System (GEMS), it compares pollution levels in international and domestic rivers. The results suggest that free riding may substantially increase pollution in international rivers, but the estimates are sensitive to the inclusion of country effects.

The Gains From Self-Ownership and the Expansion of Women's Rights

American Economic Review 2002 92(4), 1079-1092
Throughout history wives have been the property of their husbands. Only in the past two centuries has this institution broken down in the world’s most developed regions. In America and England, the doctrine of coverture restricted women’s choices in virtually every aspect of their lives until the beginning of the 20th century. A married woman (a feme covert) could not make contracts, buy and sell property, sue or be sued, or draft wills (Joel P. Bishop, 1875; John C. Wells, 1878; John F. Kelly, 1882). Her husband owned any wages she earned, and he controlled any property she brought to the marriage. A husband also could control his wife’s economic activities outside the home, such as limiting a particular shopkeeper from selling to his wife (Marylynn Salmon, 1986). Even in the rare case of divorce, the children of the marriage fell under the father’s custody. Today the doctrine of coverture is extinct in most developed countries. Women now control rights to themselves and the products of their labor. No formal restrictions remain on a woman’s ability to own or convey title to land or other forms of real property. Women are able to contract freely and enforce their contractual rights. No formal restrictions remain on a woman’s capacity to sue or be sued in tort. Rape is no longer a crime against a husband’s property interest in his wife, but a crime in which the woman is the sole victim. No formal restrictions limit a woman’s ability to alienate her labor and own the wages she earns. Whether married or single, women today have practically all the rights of their male counterparts. We use a property-rights analysis to explain the demise of coverture in the United States. We characterize the modern property-rights structure to human beings as a system in which all adults are self-owners. Men and women have essentially equal rights and are able to contract fully inside and outside of marriage, so marriage is a share contract (Douglas W. Allen, 1992). Coverture, in contrast to self-ownership, is characterized as a principal–agent system in which the man (husband) legally owned his wife and her flow of value. Under coverture a wife was an agent, severely constrained by the system of property rights, which denied her the right to freely choose human-capital investments and consumption as well as to capture the full returns from her actions. The husband’s economic ownership was imperfect, however, allowing the woman to deviate from the man’s directives. Human ownership regimes are important because they affect incentives to acquire and develop human capital (T. W. Schultz, 1968; Stanley Engerman, 1973). In particular, we argue that economic growth with attendant increases in wealth and specialized markets leads * Geddes: Department of Policy Analysis and Management, Cornell University, 107 MVR Hall, Ithaca, NY 14853, and Hoover Institution (e-mail: [email protected]); Lueck: Montana State University and University of Virginia School of Law (e-mail: [email protected]). Geddes was supported by the Earhart Foundation. Lueck was supported as John M. Olin Faculty Fellow at the Yale Law School. Cynthia Powell, Hui-Ping Chao, and Mary Godfrey provided research assistance. We have also benefited from comments from Doug Allen, Lee Alston, Ian Ayres, David Barker, Parantap Basu, Gary Becker, Mary Beth Combs, Lee Craig, Joe Ferrie, Andy Hanssen, Gillian Hamilton, Shawn Kantor, Dean Lillard, Robin Lumsdaine, Steve Margolis, Joel Mokyr, Bart Moore, Lee Redding, Glen Whitman, Paul Zak, two anonymous referees, and participants in numerous seminars and conferences. 1 While married women’s property belonged to their husbands, most single women were dependents of their male relatives. Although a single woman legally had the same property rights as a man, powerful norms and private restrictions severely limited the rights of divorcees, spinsters, and widows (Mary Beth Norton, 1980). 2 We recognize a potential divergence between economic and purely legal rights because enforcement costs limit the application of legal doctrine (Yoram Barzel, 1977). Here, however, we treat economic and legal rights as virtually synonymous since coverture codified customs and norms and because coverture’s restrictions extended beyond the family into markets and society.