Knowledge that Transforms

We develop an analytical framework to explain firm's choice of equity flotation method and the near disappearance of rights offers by U.S. exchange-listed firms. The choice between uninsured rights, rights with standby underwriting, and firm-commitment underwriting depends on information asymmetries, shareholder characteristics, and direct flotation costs. Underwriter certification and current-shareholder takeup are viewed as substitute mechanisms for minimizing wealth transfers between shareholders and outside investors. Uninsured rights create adverse-selection effects when shareholder takeup is low. Implications for stock-price behavior around issue announcements, shareholder subscription precommitments, and relative issue frequencies are supported by large-sample evidence.

There is a significant foreign influence on the risk premium for U.S. assets. Using a bivariate GARCH-in-mean process, we find that the conditional expected excess return on U.S. stocks is positively related to the conditional covariance of the return of these stocks with the return on a foreign index but is not related to its own conditional variance. Further, we are unable to reject the international version of the CAPM. We present evidence for different model specifications, multiple-day returns, and alternative proxies for foreign stock returns.

We document that instrumental variables known to possess forecast power in equity and bond markets (Treasury bill yields, equity dividend yields, and the ‘junk’ bond premium) also possess forecast power for prices in agricultural, metals, and currency futures markets. The pattern of forecastability in futures is consistent with economic equilibrium as embodied by a two-‘latent-variable’ model. We test whether the latent variables that explain these futures returns coincide with latent variables that explain returns on size-ranked equity portfolios. This hypothesis is rejected, suggesting that futures are subject to different sources of priced risk than are equities.

In contrast with numerous studies that find significant underpricing for initial public offerings of industrial firms, we document a statistically significant average return of −2.82% on the first trading day for a sample of 87 initial public offerings of real estate investment trusts during the 1971–1988 period. Our overpricing result is invariant to offer price, issue size, distribution method, offer period, and underwriter reputation. Newly issued REITs, on average, substantially underperform a matching sample of seasoned REITs during the first 190 trading days. Interestingly, buyers of overpriced REITs are predominantly individual or non-13(f) institutional investors.

We investigate the relation between the Value Line enigma and post-earnings-announcement drift. The ability of Value Line's ‘timeliness’ ranks to predict future abnormal returns is well-documented. However, we show that most rank changes occur within eight trading days of an earnings announcement. Once we control for post-earnings-announcement drift, differences in abnormal returns across Value Line timeliness ranks are no longer significant. Moreover, we find that timeliness ranks have no predictive power for firms with small earnings ‘surprises’. We conclude that the Value Line enigma is a manifestation of post-earnings-announcement drift.

It seems plausible that an increase in stock market volatility raises required stock returns, and thus lowers stock prices. We develop a formal model of this volatility feedback effect using a simple model of changing variance (a quadratic generalized autoregressive conditionally heteroskedastic, or QGARCH, model). Our model is asymmetric and helps to explain the negative skewness and excess kurtosis of U.S. monthly and daily stock returns over the period 1926–1988. We find that volatility feedback normally has little effect on returns, but it can be important during periods of high volatility.

The role of fee contracts in the agency relation between investment bankers and client firms in tender offers is investigated using a sample of offers between 1978 and 1986. Different fees have different payoff functions which can be used by firms to create incentives and by bankers to signal differences in abilities. The effectiveness of fee contracts in resolving agency problems in tested, with mixed results. The evidence suggests that fee contracts are used as a tool by both firms and bankers and that contracts influence tender offer outcomes but that contracting is only a partial solution to the agency problem.

We show the Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross term structure framework can allow a variety of alternative equilibrium solutions for discount bond prices. This is important since it allows us additional flexibility in developing models that capture the properties of the term structure. As an example, we solve for the value of a discount bond when the short-term rate is absorbed at zero. We compare the yields implied by this model to those implied by the original Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross model. We also show that alternative equilibria can occur in other term structure models.

This paper investigates the effect of bankruptcy announcements on the equity value of the bankrupt firm's competitors. On average, bankruptcy announcements decrease the value of a value-weighted portfolio of competitors by 1%. This negative effect is significantly larger for highly levered industries and industries where the unconditional stock returns of the nonbankrupt and bankrupt firms are highly correlated; the effect is significantly positive for highly concentrated industries with low leverage, suggesting that in such industries competitors benefit from the difficulties of the bankrupt firm.

We estimate the conditional distribution of trade-to-trade price changes using ordered probit, a statistical model for discrete random variables. This approach recognizes that transaction price changes occur in discrete increments, typically eighths of a dollar, and occur at irregularly-spaced time intervals. Unlike existing models of discrete transactions prices, ordered probit can quantify the effects of other economic variables like volume, past price changes, and the time between trades on price changes. Using 1988 transactions data for over 100 randomly chosen U.S. stocks, we estimate the ordered probit model via maximum likelihood and use the parameter estimates to measure several transaction-related quantities, such as the price impact of trades of a given size, the tendency towards price reversals from one transaction to the next, and the empirical significance of price discreteness.