Knowledge that Transforms

This paper determines when a debt contract will be monitored by lenders. This is the choice between borrowing directly (issuing a bond, without monitoring) and borrowing through a bank that monitors to alleviate moral hazard. This provides a theory of bank loan demand and of the role of monitoring in circumstances in which reputation effects are important. A key result is that borrowers with credit ratings toward the middle of the spectrum rely on bank loans, and in periods of high interest rates or low future profitability, higher-rated borrowers choose to borrow from banks.

This paper explores some macroeconomic implications of including household production in an otherwise standard real business cycle model. We calibrate the model on the basis of macroeconomic evidence and long-run considerations, simulate it, and examine its statistical properties. We find that introducing home production significantly improves the quantitative performance of the standard model along several dimensions. It also implies a very different interpretation of the nature of aggregate fluctuations.

The hypothesis that price discrimination based on willingness to pay for quality can occur in multifirm markets is confirmed using microdata on gasoline retailing. A test that discriminates between price structures associated with discrimination and with cost-driven, competitive differentials is developed and implemented with controls for variation in outlet and market characteristics. A second test based on profitability variation rejects a competitive, peak-load pricing explanation for the observed price dispersion. The data suggest that price discrimination at the retail level adds at least 9¢ a gallon to the average price of full-service gasoline.

We show how to use security market data to restrict the admissible region for means and standard deviations of intertemporal marginal rates of substitution (IMRSs) of consumers. Our approach (i) is nonparametric and applies to a rich class of models of dynamic economies, (ii) characterizes the duality between the mean--standard deviation frontier for IMRSs and the familiear mean- standard deviation frontier for asset returns, and (iii) exploits the restriction that IMRSs are positive random variables. The region provides a convenient summary of the sense in which asset market data are anaomalous from the vantage point of intertemporal asset pricing theory.

This paper develops a dynamic general equilibrium model of economic growth. The model has a steady-state equilibrium in which some firms devote resources to discovering qualitatively improved products and other firms devote resources to copying these products. Rates of both innovation and imitation are endogenously determined on the basis of the outcomes of $R & D$ races between firms. Innovation subsidies are shown to unambiguously promote economic growth. Welfare is enhanced, however, only if the steady-state intensity of innovative effort exceeds a critical level.

We develop an overlapping-generations model of endogenous growth in which human capital is the engine of growth and the generations are linked through material and emotional interdependencies within the family. Parents invest in their children to achieve both old-age support (care) and emotional gratification, and material support from children is determined through self-enforcing implicit contracts. We show that optimal intergenerational trade can then lead to maximization of growth opportunities. Our model produces a theory of the "demographic transition" linking longevity, fertility, and economic growth. We also show that while population aging may raise the growth rate, an increase in young-age longevity is likely to produce a greater increase in the growth rate and a reduction in the fertility rate in a growth equilibrium. These predictions and the model's implications concerning the behavior of private savings during the takeoff period appear consistent with empirical evidence.

This paper interprets seventeenth-century mercantilism in light of recent theories of strategic trade policy. Long-distance international commerce during the mercantilist period was undertaken chiefly by state-chartered monopoly trading companies and was therefore conducted under conditions of imperfect competition. The economic structure of the Anglo-Dutch rivalry for the East India trade provides an excellent illustration of an environment in which the profit-sharting motive for strategic trade policies exists. Dutch supremacy in the early East India trade was facilitated by a managerial incentive scheme in the monopoly charter that enabled it to achieve a Stackelberg leadership position against the English. Using data from the East India trade around 1620 in a Cournot duopoly model, I find that the managerial incentives yielded greater Dutch profits than would have been obtained from a standard profit-maximizing objective and that the scope for other strategic trade policies was clearly present.

Crime and the fear of crime have a deep negative impact on personal and societalwell-being. Several observed patterns regarding criminal behavior, however, remain inadequately understood. In this analysis, individuals' perceptions (concerning their probabilities of punishment) and choices are determined endogenously, while incorporating the information available to them and how this information is generated within the economy. The resulting dynamic relationships are then studied to examine how criminality might evolve over time, why crime participation rates might differ among societal groups even when they face similar economic fundamentals, and how the features of the economy might affect these rates.