The paper is concerned with economies in which agents find sellers and employers in a time-consuming search process while they simultaneously trade with their current partners. A symmetric steady-state equilibrium does not exist, but asymmetric steady-state equilibria exist and are such that larger firms offer higher wages and charge lower prices than smaller firms, but still make more profits. These profits can be seen as rents from a superior market position

One of the important determinants of the response of saving and consumption to the real interest rate is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. That elasticity can be measured by the response of the rate of change of consumption to changes in the expected real interest rated. A detailed study of data for the twentieth-century United States shows no strong evidence that the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is positive. Earlier findings of substantially positive elasticities are reversed when appropriate estimation methods are used.

This paper models ancademic department as an internal labor market. The major problem facing the university administration is to ensure that members of its departments are willing to hire the best possible candidates. Academic tenure is seen to be a necessary condition for this. The analysis is also consistent with other aspects of the academic environment including "tenure-track" appointments, contract buy-outs, early retirement plans, and, when a budget crunch hits, the elimination of entire departments. The results extend in a simple way to other organizations in which members have an input into overall decisions

In this paper we contrast panics and information-based bank runs in an effort to provide a robust and empirically plausible model of how bank runs are triggered. The model of information-based runs is characterized by two-sided asymmetric information: the bank cannot observe the true liquidity needs of the depositors while depositors are asymmetrically informed about bank asset quality. We also examine the relative degrees of risk sharing provided by bank deposit contracts and traded equity contracts. We show that the choice of deposit or equity depends on the attributes of and information about the underlying investment returns

Quarterly data for the period from 1961 to 1986 suggest that the real quantity of money (defined as M2) demanded relative to income is positively r elated to the deflated price of equities (Standard and Poor's composi te) three quarters earlier and negatively related to the contemporane ous real stock price. The positive relation appears to reflect a weal th effect; the negative, a substitution effect. The wealth effect app ears stronger than the substitution effect. The volume of transaction s has an appreciable effect on M1 velocity but not on M2 velocity. An nual data for a century suggest that the apparent dominance of the we alth effect is the exception, not the rule.

The employment relationship with employees' ability and their actions both private information (thus combining adverse selection with moral hazard) is modeled as a repeated game with self-enforcing contracts being perfect Bayesian Nash equilibria. Under termination contracts, the equilibrium contract structure consists of a hierarchy of ranks, finite in number even though ability is continuous. Reputation acts as an effective device for worker discipline without the need for involuntary unemployment. Selection by bonding is not, in general, incentive compatible, but selection by promotion of employees through the ranks is. Many other features correspond to observed employment structures.